Beating the odds, and the system : purpose-led transformation in further education by Hamnett, Matt
MATT HAMNETT
Purpose-led transformation 
in further education 
4ABOUT FETL
The Further Education Trust for 
Leadership’s vision is of a further 
education sector that is valued and 
respected for:
•	 	Innovating	constantly	to	meet	the	needs		
of	learners,	communities	and	employers;
•	 	Preparing	for	the	long	term	as	well		
as	delivering	in	the	short	term;	and
•	 	Sharing	fresh	ideas	generously	and		
informing	practice	with	knowledge.
Website: www.fetl.org.uk 
Email: enquiries@fetl.org.uk 
 @FETforL
This	work	is	licensed	under	the	Creative	Commons	Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike	4.0	International	(CC	BY-NC-SA	4.0)	
License.	To	view	a	copy	of	the	license,	visit		
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
To	cite	this	paper:	
FETL	(Further	Education	Trust	for	Leadership).	2019.		
Beating the odds, and the system. Purpose-led transformation in further 
education. FETL.
3CONTENTS
Foreword  Dame Ruth Silver 5
Prologue  You’ve done what? 7
Executive summary  Beating the odds, and the system 13
Chapter one The operating context  25
Chapter two Recent college performance  47
Chapter three The causes of poor performance  57
Chapter four  Learning from transformations 
elsewhere   63
Chapter five  The importance of purpose,  
strategy and values   81
Chapter six The hard yards of transformation  101
Chapter seven Leading the transformation     123
Chapter eight  Conclusions      137
Epilogue  YOLO     145
4 
For Harry
‘The old dog for the hard road,  
the pup for the path’
(Irish proverb)
5Dame Ruth Silver
Achieving	swift,	noticeable		culture	change	in	an	organisation	
is	one	of	the	toughest	challenges	a	leader	can	take	on.	It	is	a	
particular	challenge	in	the	further	education	sector,	characterised,	
as	it	is,	by	significant	budgetary	constraint,	a	demanding	
accountability	regime	and	a	culture	of	high	expectations	
combined	with	regular	and	often	ill-considered	top-down	
policy	reform.	This	publication	explores	this	issue,	sharing	one	
leader’s	perceptions	of	effective	culture	change	at	his	own	
struggling	college.	The	perspective	it	takes	is	a	personal,	albeit	
a	recognisable,	one.	However,	the	lessons	are	transferable,	and	
leaders	in	the	sector	are	engaged	with	and	think	hard	about	the	
issues	this	experience	raises.
There	is,	of	course,	no	one	way	to	run	a	college	and	there	are	no	
ready-made	solutions	when	it	comes	to	changing	the	culture	and	
performance	of	an	organisation.	That	would	be	the	wrong	way	
to	read	this	paper.	Rather,	it	gives	leaders	different	options	and	
ways	of	thinking	about	problems	and	challenges	that	may	or	may	
not	be	relevant	to	them,	and,	I	very	much	hope,	the	confidence	
to	try	something	different.	New	ideas	and	fresh	thinking	are	
the	lifeblood	of	good	educational	leadership,	but	they	must	be	
tempered	by	a	shrewd	and	carefully	cultivated	understanding	of	
purpose,	people,	place	and	possibility.
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6Matt	Hamnett	describes	the	process	of	organisational	
transformation	he	oversaw	as	Chief	Executive	of	North	
Hertfordshire	College,	showing	how	he	took	evidence	and	
inspiration	from	different	sources,	frequently	from	other	
sectors,	and	brought	them	to	bear	on	his	own	leadership,	
filtered	through	his	own	experience	and	the	circumstances	
he	encountered	at	the	college.	He	goes	to	the	heart	of	one	
of	the	key	issues	facing	any	organisation	with	an	educational	
mission	–	how	to	ensure	teachers	are	free	to	do	what	they	do	
best,	teaching,	without	being	overburdened	with	demands	to	
cut	costs	or	raise	funds.	This	is	a	core	issue	within	the	sector,	
as	leaders	search	for	ways	to	absorb	and	react	to	the	pressures	
they	face	without	passing	them	onto	staff	and	detracting	from	
the	core	mission	of	colleges:	teaching	and	learning.	As	he	argues,	
purpose	is	important,	and	cultivating	a	shared	sense	of	purpose	
is	key	to	improving	performance.
This	study	represents	a	useful	contribution	to	the	literature	on	
leadership	in	further	education.	As	with	all	FETL	publications,	the	
idea	is	not	to	offer	the	final	word	on	a	subject	but	to	provoke	
a	conversation,	in	staff	rooms,	board	meetings	and,	perhaps	
most	importantly,	in	the	minds	of	leaders.	There	are	ideas	here	
to		challenge	and	engage.	Matt	offers	a	perspective	from	which	
leaders	can	take	different	things.	It	is	probably	the	most	personal	
work	FETL	has	published.	Leadership	is	a	lonely	business	and	it	
is	unusual	to	find	a	leader	prepared	to	share	the	interior	process	
underpinning	change	as	well	as	the	mechanics	of	transformation.	
This	is	valuable	in	and	of	itself.	However,	I	believe	leaders	will	
relate	to	the	story	told	and	engage	with	it,	creatively	and	
critically,	whether	they	are	in	the	process	of	transformation	or	
looking	to	maintain	business	as	usual.
Dame Ruth Silver is President of the Further Education Trust 
for Leadership
7You’ve done what?
‘You	were	always	going	to	do	that’	was	not	the	response	I	
expected	when	I	told	one	of	my	favourite	former	colleagues	that	
I	had	just	accepted	a	job	as	chief	executive	of	a	further	education	
college.	Almost	everyone	else	I	told	went	with	something	more	
like,	‘you’ve	done	what?!’	Leaving	a	senior	position	in	a	FTSE50	
organisation	to	run	a	college	was,	I	admit,	an	unusual	career	
move.	Andrew	was	right	though;	I	had	always	thought	that	at	
some	point	I	would	want	to	run	a	college.
I	remember	exactly	the	moment	when	I	decided	that	it	was	time.	
I	was	on	honeymoon	in	the	USA.	We’d	spent	a	couple	of	weeks	
driving	around	Florida,	Georgia	and	North	and	South	Carolina.	
On	the	day	in	question,	we	arrived	in	Folly	Beach,	just	outside	
Charleston,	after	a	long	drive	from	the	Blue	Ridge	mountains.	I	
was	walking	along	a	long,	sandy	and	remarkably	quiet	beach.	
Three	weeks	earlier,	two	days	before	the	wedding,	I	met	a		
head	hunter	to	chat	about	the	chief	executive	position	at	
North	Hertfordshire	College.	They	were	looking	‘outside’	further	
education	for	someone	commercial,	inventive	and	ambitious.	
They	weren’t	afraid	to	appoint	someone	young	either.	I	was	36		
at	the	time.	I	knew	my	prospects	were	good	when	they	tweaked	
the	timeline	for	the	selection	process	to	accommodate		
my	honeymoon.
As	I	walked	along	the	beach,	I	found	myself	thinking	more	and	
more	about	the	manifesto	I	would	offer	in	my	interview:	how,	
as	someone	not	from	a	teaching	background,	I	would	immerse	
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8myself	in	matters	curriculum;	create	a	discrete	commercial	
business	to	take	advantage	of	apprenticeship	reforms	to	come;	
and	redefine	the	college’s	relationship	with	the	schools	trust	
it	sponsored.	I	couldn’t	have	been	clearer	about	my		
strategic	perspective.	
The	alternative	path,	my	sliding	door,	was	a	colossally	attractive	
role	in	an	organisation	I’d	grown	to	love	–	Capita.	I	was	a	
director	in	the	major	deals	team,	responsible	for	identifying	new	
opportunities	for	Capita	to	do	major	deals.	I	loved	it	because	the	
parameters	of	my	role	were	few	and	simple:	if	it	was	something	
that	we	could	do	well,	and	generate	sufficient	margin	from,	folk	
were	interested.
I’d	just	spent	a	year	setting	up	Capita’s	emerging	talent	business.	
Having	put	forward	a	market	assessment	and	business	case,	I	was	
simply	told	to	get	on	with	it.	And	get	on	with	it	we	had	–	building	
a	wonderful	team,	articulating	a	progressive	client	proposition	
and	forging	new	partnerships	with	clients	including	Barclays,	
HSBC,	Lloyds,	the	Cabinet	Office	and	DWP.	
On	return	from	honeymoon,	I	was	due	to	kick	off	a	piece	of	
genuinely	strategic	work	on	how	Capita	engaged	with	disruptive	
innovations,	technologies	and	start-ups.	I	felt	privileged	that	I	
was	to	be	trusted	with	such	a	fundamental	piece	of	work	for	a	
massive	corporate	organisation.	Yet,	as	I	walked	along	that	beach	
in	South	Carolina,	I	knew	that	I	wanted	to	become	the	chief	
executive	of	a	college	in	Stevenage.	
Three	years	later,	I	was	equally	clear	that	it	was	time	to	stop.	I	
had	inherited	an	organisation	that	wasn’t	quite	in	the	shape	that	
I	had	understood	during	the	selection	process.	Over	the	course	
of	three	exhilarating	and	challenging	years	I	worked	with	a	
committed	team	to	transform	the	organisation.	
9Between	2014/15	and	the	end	of	2016/17	we:	
•	 	Increased	16–18	achievement	rates	by	almost	9		
percentage	points;	
•	 	Substantially	improved	GCSE	maths	and	English		
achievement	rates;	
•	 	Increased	apprenticeship	achievement	rates	by	almost	5	
percentage	points;	
•	 	Increased	all-age,	all-level	achievement	rates	by	almost	8	
percentage	points;	
•	 	Launched	an	award-winning	commercial	business	which	
secured	large,	national	apprenticeship	deals	with	clients	
including	the	Co-op	and	Lloyds;	
•	 	Negotiated	several	large-scale	capital	asset	disposals		
and	exit	from	a	long	list	of	onerous	and	off-mission	
commercial	arrangements;	
•		 	Dramatically	improved	the	financial	performance	of	the		
joint	venture	through	which	we	operated	three	colleges		
in	Saudi	Arabia;
•	 	Improved	the	group’s	overall	financial	outturn	from	a	loss		
of	over	£6.2	million	in	2014/151	to	a	surplus	of	over	£700,000	
for	2016/17;2
•	 	Reduced	borrowing	as	a	percentage	of	income	from	36		
per	cent	at	the	end	of	2014/15	to	23	per	cent	at	the	end		
of	2016/17.
In	November	2017,	Ofsted	validated	the	progress	we	had	
made.	We	were	judged	to	be	Good	overall,	with	Outstanding	
traineeships	and	provision	for	students	with	high	needs.	The	
report	praised	our	‘inspirational	leadership’,	the	culture	we	had	
built,	and	the	‘rapid	and	significant’	progress	we	had	made	to	
improve	the	quality	of	our	provision.
1	ESFA.	2016.	College accounts dataset and college accounts data field definitions year 2014 to 2015. Available	
at:	www.gov.uk/guidance/esfa-financial-management-college-accounts	[Accessed	September	2018]
2	ESFA.	2018.	College accounts dataset and college accounts data field definitions year 2016 to 2017. Available	
at:	www.gov.uk/guidance/esfa-financial-management-college-accounts	[Accessed	September		2018]
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It	had	been	a	demanding	period	for	everyone	involved	in	our	
improvement.	My	mission	in	further	education	was	over	and	it	
was	time	for	me	to	move	on	to	my	next	professional	adventure,	
once	I’d	taken	a	break	to	reflect	on	my	experience.	
This	piece	represents	the	outcome	of	that	period	of	reflection.	I	
am	hugely	grateful	to	the	Further	Education	Trust	for	Leadership	
(FETL)	for	commissioning	me	to	undertake	a	substantive	piece	of	
work	on	a	topic	I	am	deeply	passionate	about.	I	am	also	grateful	
to	my	many	friends	and	colleagues	around	the	sector	and	beyond	
for	their	input,	advice	and	challenge	on	this	piece	over	the	last	
nine	months	or	so.	
Particular	thanks	go	to	my	colleague	in	MH&A,	Kate	McAleenan,	
who	has	undertaken	substantial	research	exercises,	provided	
invaluable	critique	–	and	countless	reviews	of	drafts	in	need	of	
her	expertise	in	proper	punctuation	and	grammar.	Thanks	also	
to	my	great	friend	Chris	Edwards,	who	has	helped	me	navigate	
colossal	transparency	data	sets	and	prepare	the	analytical	aspects	
of	this	piece.
The	purpose	of	this	piece	is	to	understand	and	offer	some	
reflections	on	the	transformation	of	further	education	colleges	
which	are	not	performing	to	the	level	that	their	students,	business	
customers	and	communities	should	expect.	To	do	that,	I	want	
to	establish	a	proper	sense	of	colleges’	operating	environment;	
understand	what’s	typically	wrong	in	colleges	which	aren’t	
performing	to	the	expected	level;	and,	most	importantly,	I	want	to	
think	about	how	they	might	deliver	the	transformation	required	
to	improve	their	performance.
I	do	so	by	looking	at	the	oodles	of	available	data,	reflecting	on	
my	own	experience	and	–	significantly	–	by	taking	the	advice	
of	colleagues	within	and	beyond	the	sector.	In	preparing	this,	
I	have	enjoyed	fascinating	conversations	with	college	leaders,	
representatives	and	policy-makers,	as	well	as	experts	in	
transformation	from	other	sectors	–	whose	insight	I	have	found	
incredibly	useful	in	testing	further	education	norms.
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I	hope	that	colleagues	find	this	report	interesting	and	of	some	
use	in	considering	how	to	transform	colleges	in	an	operating	
environment	which	shows	no	sign	of	being	anything	other	than	
desperately	challenging.	
I	have	drafted	the	piece	in	the	first	person,	sharing	something	of	
myself	as	I	go,	because	further	education	is	personal	for	those	
who	work	in	it	–	and	so	is	leadership.	
12
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Beating the odds, and the system
Chapter one: the further education operating context is 
incredibly tough… 
Delivering	any	form	of	public	service	is	a	really	tough	gig.	Citizen	
expectations	are	high.	Government	policy	and	measures	of	
success	change	often,	and	it	can	be	difficult	for	public	service	
organisations	to	stay	focused	on	their	customers,	given	the	
attention	that	government	commands.	The	challenges	faced	by	
the	further	education	sector	are	an	acute	case	of	that	public	
service	context.	
Government	policy	relevant	to	further	education	changes	often	
and	substantially.	The	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies	(IFS)	recently	
described	a	‘near-permanent	state	of	revolution’	in	policy,	listing	
25	major	reforms	between	2000	and	2020.3	This	level	of	change	
is	unreasonable	–	and	unhelpful	to	college	leaders	looking	to	
improve	their	organisations’	performance.
Government	initiatives	often	create	issues	for	colleges	which	
go	way	beyond	their	stated	aims.	The	2008/09	capital	crisis	left	
many	colleges	high	and	not-even	dry.	The	area	review	process	
didn’t	deliver	the	radical	reform	initially	expected	–	but	did		
deliver	radical	disruption	for	colleges,	their	leaders	and	staff	–	and	
spooked	lenders.	Likewise,	apprenticeship	reform	has	brought	as	
many	short-term	challenges	and	costs	of	change	as	it	has		
new	opportunities.	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies.	2018.	2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England,	London,		
IFS,	p.	38.
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Colleges	are	now	badly	under-funded	by	Government.	The	
IFS	concluded	that	spending	on	16	to	18-year-olds	in	further	
education	had	been	the	‘big	loser	from	education	spending	
changes	over	the	last	25	years’;4	funding	levels	compare	terribly	
with	those	in	the	rest	of	the	education	sector.	As	a	result	of	
these	funding	pressures,	the	Association	of	Colleges	(AoC)	has	
estimated	that	colleges	will	need	to	absorb	almost	17	per	cent	
inflation	between	2015	and	2020.5
Colleges	also	often	receive	what	is	known	in	American	politics	
as	‘unfunded	mandates’,	i.e.	new	expectations	not	accompanied	
by	additional	resources.	For	example,	the	2015/16	condition	of	
funding	changes	with	respect	to	maths	and	English	brought	very	
substantial	costs	of	change,	ongoing	operational	costs	–	as	well	
as	an	incredibly	challenging	performance	expectation	–	but	no	
serious	funding.	The	relationship	between	price	and	cost	in	further	
education	long	since	ended	in	messy	divorce.
The	combined	effect	of	these	and	other	factors	is	that	running	
any	college	is	incredibly	hard.	Transforming	one	that	is	not	
currently	in	the	position	it	needs	to	be	in	is	harder	still.	Only	
one	of	29	colleges	that	were	rated	Requires	Improvement	or	
Inadequate	by	Ofsted	in	2014/15	and	posted	a	financial	loss	for	
that	year	has	since	moved	up	to	Ofsted	Good	and	into	surplus	in	
the	same	organisational	formation.	That’s	to	say	the	probability	
of	a	successful	transformation	on	these	measures,	over	the	period	
2014/15	to	2016/17,	was	only	10	per	cent.	That	doesn’t	seem	to	
me	like	a	reasonable	set	of	odds	to	ask	organisations	and	their	
leaders	to	take	on.
Government’s	recent	preference	has	been	to	merge	struggling	
institutions	into	stronger	neighbours;	it	is	too	soon	to	tell	
whether	this	approach	has	solved	the	issue,	or,	as	likely,	concealed	
and	deferred	it	for	another	day.	The	impact	of	this	merger-led	
approach	warrants	thorough	evaluation	and	discussion	once	good	
data	are	available	on	merged	institutions’	performance.
4	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies.	2018.	2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England,	London,	IFS,	p.	7.
5	Association	of	Colleges.	2018. AoC 2018 report of college finances,	London,	AoC,	p.	14.
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Chapter two: that context is evident in college curriculum and 
financial performance…
Given	the	acutely	challenging	operating	context,	it	is	perhaps	
not	surprising	that	the	performance	of	further	education	colleges	
compares	poorly	with	the	rest	of	the	education	sector.	At	the	end	
of	2016/17,	31	per	cent	of	further	education	colleges	were	rated	
Requires	Improvement	or	Inadequate	by	Ofsted	–	compared	to	19	
per	cent	of	sixth	form	colleges	and	independent	training	providers,	
13	per	cent	of	schools	and	6	per	cent	of	early	years	providers.6
Comparisons	beyond	the	education	sector	are	also	unfavourable	
–	suggesting	that	there	may	be	issues	in	further	education	which	
cannot	be	completely	attributed	to	funding.	In	July	2017,	only	20	
per	cent	of	adult	social	care	providers,	and	8	per	cent	of	General	
Practitioners	were	rated	Requires	Improvement	or	Inadequate	
by	the	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC);7	only	‘NHS	acute	
core	services’	had	a	greater	proportion	(40	per	cent)	of	poorly	
performing	providers	than	further	education	colleges.
Where	performance	in	other	parts	of	the	education	sector	has	
been	improving	in	recent	years,	it	hasn’t	among	further	education	
colleges.	Whilst	the	proportion	of	schools	rated	Requires	
Improvement	or	Inadequate	fell	from	31	per	cent	in	2011	to	11	
per	cent	in	2017,	the	proportion	of	colleges	carrying	those	ratings	
has	increased	from	23	per	cent	in	2015	to	the	current	figure	of	
31	per	cent.8	In-year	inspection	data	show	that	poorly	performing	
colleges	find	it	very	difficult	to	improve	to	Good	or	better.	Of	29	
Requires	Improvement	or	Inadequate	further	education	colleges	
inspected	during	2016/17,	20	did	not	improve	to	Good	or	better.9	
6	Ofsted.	2018.	Data View.	Available	at:	https://public.tableau.com/profile/ofsted#!/vizhome/Dataview/
Viewregionalperformanceovertime	[Accessed	September	2018]
7	Care	Quality	Commission.	The State of health care and adult social care in England 2016/17.	
Available	at:	www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20171123_stateofcare1617_report.pdf	
[Accessed	September	2018]
8	Ofsted.	2018.	Data View.	Available	at:	https://public.tableau.com/profile/ofsted#!/vizhome/Dataview/
Viewregionalperformanceovertime	[Accessed	September	2018]
9	Ofsted.	2018.	Further education and skills inspections and outcomes as at 31 August 2017.	Available	at:	
www.gov.uk/government/collections/further-education-and-skills-inspection-outcomes	[Accessed	
September	2018]
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While	overall	in-year	inspection	performance	improved	markedly	
between	2016/17	and	2017/18,10	further	improvements	will	
likely	be	needed	before	the	proportion	of	colleges	rated	Requires	
Improvement	or	Inadequate	falls	to	levels	seen	in	other	parts	of	
the	education	sector.
College	financial	performance	has	also	worsened	slightly	in	recent	
years.	General	further	education	colleges	shared	an	operating	
deficit	equivalent	in	value	to	3	per	cent	of	their	combined	
turnover	in	2016/17	–	compared	to	1	per	cent	in	2014/15.	The	
number	of	colleges	which	posted	a	deficit	increased	from	89	in	
2014/15	to	136	in	2016/17;	the	combined	deficit	of	those	136	
colleges	was	almost	£240m	for	2016/17	–	equivalent	to	7	per	
cent	of	their	combined	turnover.11	
The	AoC	has	calculated	that	the	proportion	of	all	colleges	
(including	sixth	form	and	general	further	education)	rated	
Satisfactory	or	Inadequate	for	financial	health	by	the	(Education	
and	Skills	Funding	Agency	(ESFA)	has	actually	remained	broadly	
constant	over	the	last	five	years	–	at	between	35	per	cent	and	
40	per	cent.12	TES	analysis	showed	that	88	further	education	
colleges	were	rated	Satisfactory	or	Inadequate	for	financial	health	
in	2016/17;	these	colleges	shared	a	combined	deficit	equivalent	
in	value	to	6	per	cent	of	their	turnover	–	and	shared	borrowings	
worth	34	per	cent	of	turnover.	
There	is	a	clear	correlation	between	poor	curriculum	and	
financial	performance.	In	2016/17,	33	colleges	were	rated	both	
Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	by	Ofsted,	and	Inadequate	
or	Satisfactory	for	financial	health.	Only	82	colleges	were	rated	
Good	or	better	on	both	measures	of	performance.	
10	Ofsted.	2018.	Further education and skills inspections and outcomes: management information from 
December 2015 to August 2018.	Available	at:	www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/monthly-
management-information-ofsteds-further-education-and-skills-inspections-outcomes-from-
december-2015	[Accessed	September	2018]
11	ESFA.	2018.	ESFA financial management: college accounts.	Available	at:	https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
esfa-financial-management-college-accounts
12	Association	of	Colleges.	2018.	AoC	2018	report	on	college	finances.	Available	at:	www.aoc.co.uk/
news/aocs-2018-report-college-finances	[Accessed	September	2018]
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Chapter three: there are common causal issues among poorly 
performing colleges…
I	reviewed	the	Ofsted	reports	of	39	colleges	which,	in	August	
2017,	were	performing	poorly	on	either	curriculum	and/or	
financial	measures.	From	that	review,	it	was	easy	to	identify		
a	set	of	common	causal	issues,	including:
	•		A	culture	of	low	expectations	of	and	for	students;
	•		Insufficient	progress	since	the	previous	inspection	and/
or	leaders’	failure	to	take	timely	and	effective	action	to	
address	identified	areas	for	improvement;	
	•		Poor	financial	management,	including	a	failure	to	align	
resources	with	teaching	and	learning	improvement	priorities;	
	•		Inaccurate	or	overly-optimistic	self-assessment	of	the	
quality	of	provision	and	/	or	a	lack	of	focus	on	areas		
for	improvement;	
	•		Insufficient	use	of	data	to	identify	and	address	areas		
for	improvement.
I	tested	these	conclusions	with	an	experienced,	senior	Ofsted	
inspector	who	confirmed	this	aggregate	diagnosis	and	reinforced	
the	need	for	strong,	insightful	and	relentless	leadership	and	
management	to	drive	improvement	–	often	missing	in	poorly	
performing	colleges.
This	Ofsted	lens	on	the	issues	common	to	poorly	performing	
colleges	is	consistent	with	the	perspective	offered	by	the	FE	
Commissioner	in	his	annual	report	for	2016/1713	–	in	which	
he	identifies	common	areas	for	improvement	and	makes	
recommendations	to	colleges	which	have	been	referred	to	
him	for	formal	intervention.	He	also	notes	that	leadership	and	
management,	including	at	governor	level,	is	a	consistent	theme	
across	all	interventions.
13	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Annual Report of the Further Education Commissioner	– 1 September 
2016 to 31 August 2017.	Available	at:	https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677985/FEC_Annual_Report_2016-17.pdf,	[Accessed	
September	2018],	p.	6.
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Chapter four: there is a great deal we can learn from 
transformations in other sectors…
I	have	always	been	interested	in	how	insight,	expertise	and	good	
practice	from	one	sector	can	be	applied	to	another.	I	believe	that	
while	every	sector	is	unique,	it	is	also	possible	to	learn	and	apply	
lessons	across	sectors	which	superficially	appear	to	be	completely	
different	in	nature.	Applying	such	lessons	can	be	very	difficult	and	
typically	requires	a	deep	understanding	of	both	sector	contexts	
and	the	principles	which	underpin	a	given	expertise	or	piece	of	
good	practice;	crude	transplants	rarely	work	for	want	of	that	
deftness	of	touch.
In	2017,	Sir	Michael	Barber	completed	a	‘public	value’	review	
for	HM	Treasury14	which	focused	on	the	practical	steps	which	
could	be	taken	to	improve	public	sector	productivity.	The	review	
established	a	framework	to	help	government	translate	funding	
into	outcomes	by	focusing	on	clear	goals,	the	management	of	
inputs,	engaging	with	users	and	developing	system	capability.	
A	group	of	Infrastructure	and	Projects	Authority	(IPA)	
practitioners	developed	the	‘seven	lenses’	tool15	to	help	
transformation	leaders.	The	framework	focusses	on	clarity	of	
purpose,	the	importance	of	a	coherent	and	communicable	
roadmap,	expert	leadership,	collaboration	across	the	programme,	
clearly	defined	accountabilities	and	effective	staff	engagement.
Research	by	the	McKinsey	Centre	for	Government	in	2018	
found	that	80	per	cent	of	government	attempts	to	transform	
performance	in	the	public	sector	fail.16	The	research	identified	five	
disciplines	which,	when	applied	together,	more	than	treble	the	
14	Barber,	M.	2017,	Delivering better outcomes for citizens: practical steps for unlocking public value.	Available	
at:	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-better-outcomes-for-citizens-practical-steps-
for-unlocking-public-value.	[Accessed	September	2018],	p.	6.
15	Infrastructure	and	Projects	Authority.	2017.	Annual Report on Major Projects 2016/17.	Available	at:	https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/629622/
IPA_Annual_Report_2017.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018]
16	McKinsey	Centre	for	Government.	2018.	Delivering for citizens – How to triple the success rate of 
government transformations.	Available	at:	https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/
Public%20Sector/Our%20Insights/Delivering%20for%20citizens%20How%20to%20triple%20the%20
success%20rate%20of%20government%20transformations/Delivering-for-citizens-How-to-triple-the-
success-rate-of-government-transformations.ashx	[Accessed	September	2018],	p.	5.
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success	rate	of	transformations:	committed,	energetic	leadership;	
clarity	of	vision,	purpose	and	priorities;	consistent	cadence	and	
coordination	in	delivery;	compelling	communications;	and,	
expertise	in	change	management.	
These,	and	other	insights	from	elsewhere,	all	resonate	strongly	
with	the	issues	commonly	identified	in	poorly	performing	
colleges	–	particularly	with	respect	to	clarity	of	purpose,	robust	
management,	good	use	of	data	and	expert	leadership.	There	is	
nothing	about	further	education	colleges	which	suggests	these	
lessons	cannot	or	should	not	be	applied.
Chapter five: organisational purpose, strategy and values are 
crucial for transformation…
Most	organisations	and	colleges	have	a	mission	statement.		
Often	abstracted	and	committee-drafted,	these	statements	try		
to	say	everything,	yet	say	–	and	do	–	nothing.	Done	differently,	
the	mission	which	all	further	education	colleges	share	can	be	one	
of	the	most	powerful	and	important	tools	for	transformation.	
Quinn	and	Thakor	found	that	organisations	which	frame	their	
mission	in	terms	of	their	‘authentic	higher	purpose’	and	use	that	
purpose	to	engage	and	support	their	people	unlock	new	levels		
of	performance.17
This	approach	requires	open,	authentic	leadership	and	constant	
communication.	One	of	its	most	powerful	impacts	can	be	on	the	
performance	of	middle	managers	–	empowering	and	creating	a	
framework	within	which	they	can	drive	transformation	in	their	
teams.	Likewise,	a	focus	on	purpose	can	help	colleagues	at	all	
levels	to	better	translate	organisational	priorities	into	their	own	
daily	work	and	performance	–	because	they’re	clear	about	what’s	
expected	and	galvanised	to	deliver	it.	
That	clarity	of	purpose	must	be	reflected	in	good,	long-term	
strategy.	Rumelt18	identifies	four	hallmarks	of	‘bad	strategy’	
17	Quinn,	R.	E.	and	Thakor,	A.	V.	2018.	Creating a purpose-driven organisation.	Available	at:	https://hbr.
org/2018/07/creating-a-purpose-driven-organization	[Accessed	September	2018]
18	Rumelt,	R.	2011.	The perils of bad strategy.	Available	at:	https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-perils-of-bad-strategy	[Accessed	September	2018]
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which	resonate	with	some	of	Ofsted	and	the	FE	Commissioner’s	
comments	on	poorly	performing	colleges:	failure	to	face	the	
problem;	mistaking	goals	for	strategy;	fuzzy	strategic	objectives;	
and	‘fluff’	–	superficial	chatter.	He	characterises	‘good	strategy’	as	
that	which	includes:	a	clear	diagnosis	of	the	problem;	a	guiding	
approach	to	address	that	diagnosis;	and,	a	coherent,	coordinated	
set	of	actions.	
Understanding	the	baseline	position	and	developing	a	‘diagnosis’	
is	a	critical	step	in	the	process	of	transforming	a	further	
education	college	–	and	one	which	I,	and	others	who	have	led	
college	transformations,	wish	we	had	invested	more	in	at	the	
outset.	Such	an	exercise	should	include,	at	least:	an	analysis	of	
curriculum	and	financial	performance	data;	a	review	of	regulatory	
and	contractual	compliance;	substantial	stakeholder	and	staff	
engagement,	including	opportunities	for	honest	feedback;	and,	
some	sort	of	curriculum	quality	review	exercise.
Constant	change	in	government	policy	makes	setting	‘good	
strategy’	in	further	education	very	difficult	indeed.	Further	
education	policies	are	like	premier	league	football	managers;	
there	are	lots	of	them,	few	last	long,	even	fewer	succeed	–	and	
some	reappear	over	and	again.	It	is	just	about	possible	to	set	good	
strategy	if	leaders	focus	on	the	underlying	trends	in	policy,	i.e.	a	
focus	on	skills	as	a	driver	of	productivity	and	growth;	a	desire	to	
give	employers	influence	over	the	skills	system;	a	focus	on	student	
progression	and	destinations;	and	growing	commercialisation.
It	follows,	from	a	focus	on	purpose,	that	organisational	values	also	
have	an	important	role	to	play	in	the	creation	of	a	transformative	
environment.	Like	mission,	values	are	often	stated	but	not	lived	
or	used	as	a	tool	for	change	and	performance	improvement.	Like	
mission,	they	have	the	potential	to	be	a	powerful	transformation	
tool	–	if	leaders	position	them	as	a	means	of	defining	how	the	
organisation	works,	and	if	leaders	lead	by	example	in	that	respect.	
Recognising	the	reality	of	communications	and	conversations	in	
the	organisation	is	an	important	factor	in	this	respect.	Zaffron	
and	Unruh	counsel	that	organisations	should	be	seen	as	a	
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‘network	of	conversations’	–	leadership,	managerial	and	individual	
in	nature.19	Leaders	need	to	understand	and	use	all	of	those	
different	channels	to	build	momentum	behind	their	change.
Chapter six: transformations must also include a bundle of 
gritty components…
It	is	easy	for	the	leaders	of	colleges	in	need	of	transformation	to	
assume	that	to	change	the	performance	they	need	to	change	
the	people.	To	make	such	a	blanket,	cold	assumption	would	be	
a	mistake.	Purpose-led,	open	and	authentic	engagement	with	
colleagues	and	the	creation	of	a	relatively	stable,	structured	
operating	environment	has	the	potential	to	unlock	new	levels	
of	performance	amongst	colleagues.	Particularly	powerful	is	
the	opportunity	to	build	a	cadre	of	purposeful,	empowered	and	
focused	middle-managers	able	to	drive	transformation	within	
their	teams;	they	can	become	the	fulcrum	of	improvement.
The	sector	context	is	complex	and	changeable;	the	
transformation	will	likely	be	a	complex,	multi-faceted	and	whole-
organisation	endeavour.	Leaders	need	to	find	clear,	simple	ways	
to	communicate	with	colleagues	about	the	transformation	–	its	
architecture	and	roadmap	–	which	will	help	them	engage	with	
and	play	their	part	in	its	delivery.	Leaders	will	also	need	to	create	
‘umbrellas’	which	protect	colleagues	from	the	variable	weather	
conditions	both	externally	and	in	other	parts	of	the	organisation	
so	that	they	can	focus	on	the	task	in	hand.	By	doing	this,	leaders	
create	more	reasonable	jobs	in	an	unreasonable	sector	–	meaning	
they	can	then	reasonably	hold	colleagues	to	account	for	their	
delivery	and	performance.
There	are	huge	benefits	to	be	gained	from	the	proportionate	
application	of	proper	programme	and	project	management	
techniques	to	college	transformation;	the	structure,	rigour	and	
discipline	they	offer	respond	directly	to	the	issues	commonly	seen	
in	poorly	performing	colleges	–	and	reflect	the	recommendations	
19	Zaffron,	S.	and	Unruh,	G.	2018.	Your organisation is a network of conversations.	Available	at:		
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/your-organization-is-a-network-of-conversations/	[Accessed	
September	2018]
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of	Barber,	the	IPA	and	McKinsey.	I	see	four	distinct	opportunities	
to	apply	programme	management	to	college	transformations:
•	 	The	development	and	management	of	a	clear,	detailed	
roadmap	for	the	transformation	which	can	be	shared	with	
colleagues	and	used	to	drive	progress.	
•	 	The	management	of	the	annual	business	cycle,	including	the	
creation	of	annual	‘version	control’	of	policies,	processes	and	
products	to	punctuate	the	improvement	cycle.
•	 	The	establishment	of	streamlined,	robust	and	integrated	
performance	management	and	accountability	arrangements,	
mitigating	the	risk	that	meetings	proliferate	and	mire	the	
organisation	in	treacle	rather	than	driving	the	change	at	pace;	
•	 	The	adoption	of	a	programme	management	and	process	
excellence	approach	to	curriculum	management	and	
improvement	process,	including	the	creation	of	standard	
operating	procedures	and	a	clear	model	for	how	different	
processes	interact	with	each	other	and	contribute	to	overall	
improvement	and	organisational	goals.
Given	the	acute	paucity	of	resources	in	the	sector,	it	is	vital	that	
leaders	put	in	place	business	planning	and	operational	cost-
control	processes	which	ensure	that	resources	are	aligned	with	
their	organisational	and	transformational	priorities	–	and	which	
support	the	organisation’s	long-term	sustainability.	
In	the	first	year	of	the	transformation,	leaders	may	well	judge	
that	a	zero-based	exercise	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	the	
organisation’s	purpose,	strategy	and	transformation	plans	are	
reflected	in	their	allocation	of	resources.	Likewise,	leaders	need	to	
leverage	their	wider	culture	change	into	a	practice	of	operational	
austerity	and	the	application	of	resources	to	transformational	
priorities.	Their	failure	to	do	so	risks	undermining	the	overall	
organisational	conversation	about	purpose.
Colleges	have	responded	in	different	ways	to	the	growing	need	
for	commercial	expertise	and	commerciality	in	their	operation.	
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I	strongly	advocate	the	concentration	of	commercial	work	in	
commercial	job	roles	and	business	units	–	including	the	creation	
of	a	discrete	business	unit	to	focus	on	apprenticeships	and	other	
commercial	work	with	business	customers;	this	separation	both	
supports	the	commercial	development	of	those	new	business	
units	and	permits	curriculum	colleagues	to	focus	on		
curriculum	improvement.
Maintaining	an	up-to-date,	accurate	and	compliant	college	
data-set	is	a	mammoth	task	in	its	own	right;	Ofsted	often	
criticise	poorly	performing	colleges	for	their	failure	to	use	data	
to	help	them	identify	and	address	areas	for	improvement.	
It	is	vital	that	leaders	establish	a	single	version	of	the	truth	
to	inform	accountability	and	improvement	discussions.	Few	
colleges	push	beyond	information	to	access	genuine	insight	
about	their	performance,	i.e.	identifying	the	correlations	and	
causal	relationships	shown	in	their	data,	which	could	help	them	
develop	sharply	targeted	interventions	to	drive	improvement.	
Though	incredibly	difficult,	particularly	in	the	early	stages	of	a	
transformation,	the	potential	benefits	are	huge.
Chapter seven: transformations require authentic, inspirational 
and expert leadership…
It	is	the	role	of	the	leader	to	envision	and	model	the	change	they	
want	to	bring	about	in	the	organisation	–	in	all	respects.	While	
it	is	becoming	more	common	for	the	title	of	CEO	and	principal	
to	be	separated	between	individuals,	I	believe	there	are	real,	
existential,	risks	for	organisations	which	affect	that	separation	
in	a	manner	which	lets	the	CEO	off	the	hook	for	curriculum	
performance,	i.e.	for	the	organisation’s	purpose.
There	is	strong	evidence	from	the	school	sector	that	only	those	
leaders	who	re-design	the	whole	organisation	deliver	sustained	
improvements;	this	perspective	underpins	the	holistic,	strategic	
approach	to	transformation	advocated	through	this	piece.
There	is	also	strong	evidence	that	the	skills	and	expertise	required	
to	lead	transformation	are	very	different	to	those	required	to	lead	
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during	‘business	as	usual’;	neither	skill	set	is	more	valuable	than	
the	other,	but	they	are	different.	The	transformation	of	a	poorly	
performing	college	will	require	leaders	expert	in	transformation	–	
people	who	can	challenge	convention	without	provoking	outrage,	
act	on	strategy	and	detailed	operations,	while	at	the	same	time	
adjust	their	course	as	the	transformation	unfolds	and,	engage	
humbly	with	colleagues	throughout.
The	authenticity,	openness	and	sensitivity	of	the	leader		
matters	to	both	the	definition	and	execution	of	any	
transformation.	The	purpose-led,	strategic	approach	advocated	
here	places	a	heavy	leadership	burden	on	the	CEO;	their	technical	
expertise	in	corporate	and/or	curriculum	matters	is	not	enough.	
They	must	also	be	able	to	guide	and	support	their	senior	team	
through	the	challenges	and	inevitable	insecurities	that	the	
transformation	will	throw	at	them;	and,	most	important	of	all,	
they	must	be	able	to	connect	with	colleagues	at	all	levels	to,	in	
turn,	connect	their	work	with	the	transformation	in	hand	and		
the	organisation’s	purpose.
As	such,	leaders	should	expect	that	the	transformation	will	
impact	them	and	shape	the	leaders	they	will	become	in	the	
future.	I	know	that	I	would	not	have	been	able	to	lead	colleagues	
to	deliver	the	progress	we	achieved	during	my	time	at	Hart	
Learning	Group	(HLG)	without	each	and	every	one	of	the		
career	experiences	I	enjoyed	before	that;	and	that	I	am	now	a	
different	and	better	leader	because	of	my	experience	of	the		
HLG	transformation.
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The operating context
Delivering any form of public service is extremely difficult. 
Expectations are high, resources are scarce, it is not always clear 
what success looks like or even who the customer is…
Public	service	delivery	is	a	tough	gig.	A	really	tough	gig.	
Expectations	are	understandably	high.	As	citizens’	experience	of	
service	delivery	in	the	private	sector	evolves	with	the	introduction	
of	new	technologies,	slick	user	interfaces	and	tailored	products,	
they	naturally	expect	the	same	from	public	services.	Yet,	
particularly	following	the	financial	crisis	of	2008,	resources	are	
scarce.	Citizens’	tolerance	for	tax	increases	is	limited	–	though	
that	may	be	starting	to	change	–	wages	are	growing	very	slowly	
at	best,	and	government’s	fiscal	focus	has	been	to	reduce	the	
national	debt	–	meaning	a	sustained	period	of	austerity	in		
public	spending.20
It	can	be	acutely	difficult	to	measure	–	sometimes,	even	to	define	
–	what	success	looks	like	in	the	delivery	of	public	services.	Where	
in	the	private	sector	price,	cost,	profit	and	loss	are	simple,	widely	
understood	measures	of	performance,	the	same	clarity	is	rarely	
available	to	public	sector	organisations.	While	it	is	likely	possible	
to	define	and	quantify	the	outputs	required	of	a	given	public	
service	organisation,	it	can	be	incredibly	difficult	to	adequately	
measure	the	breadth	of	outcomes	which	are	expected	to	flow	as	
a	result.	
CHAPTER ONE
20	Barber,	M.	2017.	Delivering better outcomes for citizens: practical steps for unlocking public value.		
Available	at:	www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-better-outcomes-for-citizens-
practical-steps-for-unlocking-public-value	[Accessed	September	2018],	p.	3.	
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It	is	the	nature	of	public	service	that	mission,	strategy,	objectives	
and	measures	of	success	change	–	whether	the	result	of	a	change	
of	government,	minister,	spending	review	outcome	or	some	other	
political	event.	It	is	the	lot	of	those	involved	in	public	service	
delivery	to	respond	to	such	events	at	a	pace	that	most	private	
sector	leaders	would	consider	laughable.	I	recall	vividly	the	day	
in	June	2007	when	my	Director	General	–	my	hero	at	the	time	–	
returned	from	a	meeting	to	inform	several	hundred	of	us	that	we	
now	worked	in	the	new	Department	for	Innovation,	Universities	
and	Skills	(DIUS)	and	not	the	Department	for	Education	and	Skills	
(DfES)	–	which	no	longer	existed	following	the	stroke	of	a	Prime	
Ministerial	pen.
At	times	it	can	be	difficult	for	public	service	organisations	to	
know	who	their	customers	are.	Is	it	their	citizen	service	users,	
with	whom	they	interact	on	a	daily	basis	to	deliver	the	outputs	
expected	of	them?	Or	is	it	the	government	agencies,	departments	
and	ministers	which	so	actively	shape	their	operating	
environment	through	the	definition	of	policy,	determination	of	
funding	and	prescription	of	the	outputs	they	must	deliver?	The	
answer	should	be	citizens,	but	it	can	be	incredibly	difficult	for	
public	service	leaders	to	stay	focused	on	their	service	users	when	
their	regulators,	funders	and	policy-shapers	demand	so	much	of	
their	attention.
These	and	other	contextual	factors	combine	to	make	the	
leadership	of	any	public	service	organisation	an	extremely	
difficult	task.	The	unique	context,	challenges	and	nuances	of	
public	service	delivery	are	too	rarely	understood	by	those	who	
level	generalised	criticisms	at	the	public	sector	about	inefficiency,	
lack	of	commercialism	and	poor	performance.	It	is	not	that	
those	criticisms	are	always	and	necessarily	invalid;	rather	that	
they	often	fail	to	reflect	a	nuanced	appreciation	of	the	operating	
context	and	challenges	faced	by	colleagues	leading	the	delivery	
of	public	services	and	public	service	organisations.	
The	value,	success	or	failure	of	a	given	public	service	organisation	
cannot	be	distilled	simply	from	a	review	of	its	financial	
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statements	as	some	who	come	late	to	public	service	delivery	are	
used	to	doing	in	their	corporate	lives.	The	game	is	a	different	one	
altogether	and	must	be	understood	as	such	before	performance	
can	reasonably	be	assessed.	I’ve	worked	on	both	sides	of	the	
fence	and	am	determined	that	this	piece	will	be	a	balanced,	
reasoned	one.	
I	therefore	want	to	use	this	chapter	to	characterise	the	
environment	in	which	further	education	colleges	operate.	
Subsequent	discussion	of	college	performance,	issues	and	
transformation	does	not	make	sense	without	proper	reflection		
on	this	context.
Government policy relevant to further education colleges 
changes often. Many of those changes have major implications 
for the overall operating environment… 
As	a	young	civil	servant,	I	worked	on	the	2006	Leitch Review of 
Skills	and	the	Government’s	response	to	it	in	the	2007	World 
Class Skills: Implementing the Leitch Review in England.	The	
publication	of	a	white	paper	I	drafted	much	of	and	edited	all	of	
was	the	proudest	achievement	of	my	career,	until	the	HLG	Ofsted	
inspection	of	2017.	I	loved	every	minute	of	my	incredibly	long	
working	days	on	a	strategy	which	I	genuinely	believed	would	see	
us	through	to	2020.	That	was,	after	all,	the	stated	purpose	of	the	
review	and	our	response	to	it.	
We	spent	months	and	months	modelling	the	upskilling	that	
would	be	required	to	bring	the	nation’s	skills	base	up	to	the	
level	of	our	international	competitors.	We	worked	out	how	
many	training	places	we	would	need	to	fund	to	deliver	that	
level	of	change	in	the	skills	mix	of	the	working	age	population.	
We	debated	and	negotiated	the	long-term	policy	measures	and	
investments	that	would	get	us	there.	It	was	brilliant.	The	happiest	
time	of	my	career	by	miles;	many	of	my	best	friends	in	the	sector	
are	folk	I	worked	with	around	that	time	and	in	the	golden	era	
of	the	Department	of	Innovation,	Universities	and	Skills	that	
followed.	Several	have	been	kind	enough	to	review	emerging	
drafts	of	this	piece.
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I	was	so	naïve!	I	thought	that	we	were	developing	long-term	
policy	for	the	long	term.	It	quickly	became	clear	that	we	hadn’t	
been.	By	2009,	I	was	overseeing	the	development	of	a	new	
strategy	for	adult	literacy	and	numeracy;	this	was	the	point	at	
which	slightly	scary	mime	hands	replaced	the	gremlins	in	the	
marketing	effort.	By	2010,	Train	to	Gain	was	gone,	buried	in	a	
pile	of	its	own	deadweight.21	With	the	change	of	government	in	
2010,	the	pace	of	change	picked	up	further.	My	beloved	2020	
goals	were	gone,	replaced	with	a	new	target	to	deliver	2	million	
apprenticeship	starts	by	2015.	Leitch	was	out	of	fashion.	Wolf22	
was	the	new	vogue.
Since	1997,	there	have	been	11	secretaries	of	state	responsible	
for	further	education	and	too	many	ministers,	in	too	many	
different	formations,	to	recall.	Responsibility	for	the	sector	has	sat	
in	five	different	government	departments	in	that	time:	Education	
and	Employment	(DfEE);	Education	and	Skills	(DfES);	Innovation,	
Universities	and	Skills	(DIUS);	Business	Innovation	and	Skills	(BIS);	and	
Education	(DfE).	That	level	of	change	in	the	mothership,	coupled	with	
the	changing	nature	of	policy-making	and	the	media,	make	it	almost	
inevitable	that	policy	will	change	often	and	substantially.	
A	recent	IFS	report	describes	a	‘near-permanent	state	of	
revolution	in	the	further	education	sector’23	and	includes	a	
timeline	of	25	major	reforms	between	2000	and	2020.	Their	
diagnosis	is	spot	on	–	though	I	could	add	another	15	major	
changes	to	their	timeline	off	the	top	of	my	head.	A	former	
colleague	once	told	me	that	further	education	quangos	should	
expect	to	exist	for	five	years	–	seven	if	they’re	lucky.	Those	five	
years,	he	suggested,	were	much	like	the	term	of	an	American	
President	in	that	they	actually	included	about	a	year	in	which	
they	could	expect	to	get	anything	done	–	once	they’d	been	
properly	set	up	and	before	they’d	started	to	fight	for	their	
political	life.	Looking	at	the	IFS	list,	he	was	about	right.	
21	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	&	Skills.	2012.	Assessing the Deadweight Loss Associated with 
Public Investment in Further Education and Skills,	London,	BIS.
22	Wolf,	A.	2011.	Review of Vocational	Education	– The Wolf Report,	London,	DfE.
23	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies.	2018.	2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England,	London,	IFS,	
p.	38.
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More	recently,	we	have	seen	a	new	phenomenon;	what	I	call	
phantom	(menace?)	policies,	i.e.	those	which	are	announced	but	
which	never	quite	get	to	the	point	at	which	they	have	substance.	
Government	first	announced	its	intention	to	create	a	national	
network	of	‘institutes	of	technology’	in	July	201624.	These	new	pieces	
in	the	further	education	jigsaw	were	to	provide	technical	education	
in	STEM	(science,	technology,	engineering	and	mathematics)	subject	
areas,	and	would	‘build	on	infrastructure	that	already	exists	but	will	
have	[their]	own	independent	identity,	governance	arrangements	
which	directly	involve	employers,	and	national	branding’.25	We	
were	told	that	these	new	organisations	would	be	a	central	topic	of	
discussion	through	the	area	review	process.	
They	weren’t,	because	we	weren’t	given	any	more	details	
about	what	they	were	until	after	the	area	review	process	
was	completed.	The	issue	seems	to	have	been	that	even	the	
wordsmiths	of	the	Civil	Service	couldn’t	find	a	way	of	describing	a	
polytechnic	without	just	using	the	word.	It	wasn’t	until	November	
2017	that	Government	issued	a	prospectus	launching	a	tender	
exercise	which	would	create	the	first	wave	of	institutes.	The	
outcome	of	the	tender	exercise	is	not	due	until	March	2019,	
i.e.	almost	three	years	since	we	first	heard	of	these	vital	new	
instruments.	One	might	reasonably	wonder	whether	and	how	
these	institutes	will	sit	in	the	T-level	landscape	to	come,	and	
whether,	therefore,	they	will	ever	come	into	being.
The 2009 capital crisis, area review process and apprenticeship 
reform are examples of initiatives which have had major 
implications for the college operating environment…
The	level	of	policy	change	characterised	above	is	clearly	an	issue	
in	and	of	itself.	It	is	perfectly	possible	that	government	has	hit	
on	the	right	set	of	policies	to	address	the	nation’s	technical	and	
vocational	skills	challenges	over	the	last	20	years	–	but	changed	
course	before	those	policies	have	had	time	to	bed	in,	mature	and	
deliver	on	their	potential.	
24	Department	for	Education.	2016.	Post-16 skills plan and independent report on technical education,	
London,	DfE,	p.	35.
25	Department	for	Education.	2017.	Post-16 technical education reforms – T level action plan,	London,	DfE
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The	pain	of	policy	change	is	felt	most	acutely	in	the	organisations	
charged	with	delivery.	What	can	be	finessed	away	as	‘an	
evolution	of…’,	‘building	on…’,	or	‘learning	the	lessons	from…’	
a	given	initiative	in	a	government	policy	statement	feels	like	
a	ship	tilting	from	one	side	to	another	in	a	storm	if	you’re	in	
a	front-line	delivery	organisation.	If	you’re	in	the	front-line	
delivery	organisation	that	is	also	in	the	midst	of	a	transformation	
effort	designed	to	address	serious	curriculum	and	or	financial	
challenges,	acute	sea	sickness	is	inevitable.	
Some	policy	changes	and	initiatives	are	so	substantial	in	their	
nature	that	they	create	rippling	implications	for	the	operating	
environment	which	go	far	beyond	their	direct	purpose.	These	
implications	are	too	often	not	considered,	understood	or	
mitigated	by	government	when	they	initiate	such	changes.	I	am	
particularly	interested	in	three	examples	which,	in	different	ways,	
have	had	major	implications	for	the	further	education	operating	
context:	the	2009	capital	crisis,	the	area	review	process	and	
apprenticeship	reform.
The 2008/09 capital crisis
The	2000s	saw	substantial,	welcome	and	much-needed	
government	investment	in	further	education	college	capital	
projects.	Between	2001/02	and	2007/08,	projects	worth	£4.2	
billion	–	attracting	£1.7	billion	of	Government	funding	–	were	
approved	for	investment	by	the	then	Learning	and	Skills	Council	
(LSC).	All	of	which	sounds	brilliant,	right?	In	December	2009,	the	
LSC	announced	a	three-month	moratorium	on	new	projects	while	
it	conducted	a	review	of	the	programme	because,	‘a	large	surge	in	
college	proposals	had	opened	up	an	untenable	gap	between	the	
resources	identified	and	the	costs	of	projects	underway	or	in	the	
pipeline.’26	Which	sounds	quite	a	lot	less	brilliant.
When	the	LSC	completed	its	review,	it	found	that	253	projects	
were	already	underway	or	fully	approved;	a	further	eight	projects	
had	also	been	given	the	go-ahead.	Another	79	had	received	
first-stage	approval	in	principle	–	generating	a	requirement	for	
26	Foster,	A.	2009.	A Review of the Capital Programme in Further Education,	London,	DIUS,	p.	3.	
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£2.7	billion	of	LSC	funding.27	A	further	65	colleges	had	submitted	
proposals	for	approval	–	which,	if	approved,	would	generate	a	
requirement	for	a	further	£3	billion	of	LSC	funding.	The	number	
and	value	of	projects	which	had	received	‘approval	in	detail’	and	
‘approval	in	principle’	–	let	alone	those	in	the	pipeline	for	approval	
–	far,	far	outstripped	the	level	of	funding	available.	
The	LSC’s	efforts	to	boost	interest	in	the	programme	had	
stimulated	way	(way,	way)	too	much	interest.	Once	the	LSC	had	
completed	a	detailed	review	of	the	programme,	many	projects	
were	paused,	deferred,	scaled-back	or	cancelled	altogether.	
Many	colleges	had	incurred	substantial	costs	–	including	one	
which	had	spent	£4m28	–	and	some	had	even	started	demolition	
and	development	work	given	the	approvals	they	received	from	
the	LSC.	
Sir	Andrew	Foster,	who	was	asked	to	review	and	make	
recommendations	on	the	programme,	concluded	that	‘the	
crisis	was	predictable	and	probably	avoidable.	Certainly,	it	could	
have	been	mitigated	if	action	had	been	taken	earlier.	The	final	
confusion	in	communication	made	a	bad	situation	worse’.29	The	
lasting	impact	of	what	came	to	be	known	as	‘the	capital	crisis’	
cannot	be	underestimated.	Colleges	invested	a	huge	amount	
of	time,	energy,	resource	and	hope	in	their	engagement	with	
the	programme.	Those	that	were	forced	to	defer,	scale	back	or	
cancel	projects	were	distracted,	distressed	and	dismayed	by	the	
programme’s	implosion.	
The	lasting	financial	impact	will	be	material	for	many	of	the	
colleges	affected	–	whether	in	terms	of	money	spent	without	
benefit	accrued;	land	bought	or	held	for	development,	but	not	
developed;	or	projects	latterly	taken	forward	at	greater	cost	
to	the	college	than	originally	expected.	Whatever	else	it	may	
be,	the	capital	crisis	is	a	clear	example	of	the	way	in	which	
Government	has	not	always	played	its	part	in	the	proper,	
27	Ibid.	p.	3.
28	Ibid.	p.	19.
29	Ibid.	p.	5.
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sensible	functioning	of	the	further	education	sector.	One	dreads	
to	think	what	the	FE	Commissioner	would	have	to	say	if	a	college	
so	calamitously	mismanaged.
The area review process
Government	first	signalled	its	intention	to	launch	a	programme	
of	area	reviews	in	July	2015.	The	purpose	of	the	programme	
was	clear	and	radical:	to	drive	consolidation	among	further	
education	and	sixth	form	colleges,	given	a	belief	that	fewer,	larger	
organisations	would	be	more	efficient,	resilient	and	responsive	to	
customer	needs.	At	that	time,	government	seemed	to	intimate	
that	it	had	an	appetite	for	fairly	aggressive	consolidation.	The	
impression	was	that	no	area	would	exit	the	process	with	the	
same	number	of	organisations	that	entered	it.
Given	my	long-held	belief	that	colleges	operate	sub-scale,	
the	funding	outlook	(see	below)	and	the	growing	number	of	
colleges	in	some	form	of	distress	at	that	time,	I	found	it	hard	
to	argue	against	the	government’s	strategic	intent	–	though	I	
did	have	reservations	(and	still	do)	about	whether	a	programme	
of	traditional	college	mergers	would	deliver	the	benefits	which	
government	hoped	for	from	the	area	review	process.30
We	were	also	told	that	once	the	area	review	process	was	
complete,	government’s	approach	to	organisational	failure	
would	change.	No	longer	would	government	act	as	a	funder	
of	last	resort	for	colleges	which	fell	into	financial	trouble.	In	
future,	organisations	would	be	left	for	the	wolves	through	a	new	
insolvency	regime.	At	the	time	of	writing,	we	have	yet	to	see	
what	that	regime	will	look	like	in	reality.	Governments	tend	to	
lose	their	nerve	on	failure	in	public	service	organisations	given	the	
citizen	impact	and	political	stakes.
The	area	review	process	was	conceived	in	advance	of	the	2015	
spending	review,	which	many	feared	would	be	a	bloodbath	for	
further	education.	In	the	event,	the	spending	review	was	not	
30	Hamnett,	M.	2016.	‘All	the	single	colleges	put	your	hands	up’, TES.	Available	at:	www.tes.com/news/
opinion-all-single-colleges-now-put-your-hands	[Accessed	September	2018]
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as	bad	as	most	–	in	and	outside	of	the	Department	–	feared;	
spending	on	provision	for	both	16-	to	19-year-olds	and	adults	
was	protected	in	cash	terms	through	to	2020	with	‘only’	£360m	
of	savings	sought	from	other	parts	of	the	overall	adult	budget.31	I,	
and	many	others	I	have	spoken	to	in	preparing	this	piece,	felt	that	
the	Department’s	relief	at	the	settlement	was	palpable	in	the	way	
that	the	area	review	process	was	conducted.
One	did	not	get	the	sense	that	government	was	ready	for	the	
fight	that	would	come	with	the	radical	consolidation	many	
expected.	The	latter	waves	of	the	review	were	reduced	to	
little	more	than	a	bureaucratic	tyre-kicking	exercise.	The	FE	
Commissioner’s	annual	report	for	2016/1732	notes	that	332	
colleges	(including	both	general	further	education	and	some,	but	
not	all,	sixth	form	colleges)	were	visited	as	part	of	the	area	review	
process.	At	the	conclusion	of	the	process,	it	was	agreed	that	133	
further	education	and/or	sixth	form	colleges	should	continue	as	
standalone	organisations	and	144	should	‘look	towards’	merger.	
That’s	quite	some	way	short	of	the	sort	of	level	of	consolidation	
which	government	seemed	to	intimate	that	it	had	an	appetite	
for	when	it	first	initiated	the	process.	During	2016/17	–	the	
first	full	year	after	the	area	review	process	was	completed	
–	23	further	education	college	(and	five	sixth	form	college)	
mergers	were	finalised.	The	Commissioner’s	annual	report	noted	
ongoing	challenges	with	the	implementation	of	the	review’s	
recommendations	including,	most	notably,	difficulties	with	
colleges	reaching	final	agreement	on	merger	proposals	and	banks’	
appetite	for	lending	to	merging	organisations.33	
While	the	area	review	process	did	not	deliver	radical	reform,	it	
did	deliver	radical	disruption.	The	original	rhetoric	of	the	review	
process	created	something	of	a	‘hunger	games’	for	college	CEOs	
in	the	expectation	that,	post	consolidation,	only	a	minority	
31	Foster,	D.	2018.	Adult further education funding in England since 2010,	London,	House	of		
Commons	Library.
32	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Annual report of the Further Education Commissioner	–	1 September 
2016 to 31 August 2017,	London,	DfE,	p.	14.
33	Ibid.	p.	15.
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would	survive.	There	were	endless	discussions	amongst	partner	
organisations	nationally,	regionally	and	locally	about	what	the	
outcomes	might	be	in	a	given	area.	Colleges	were	required	
to	complete	a	colossal	data	return	about	their	performance,	
estate	and	outlook	–	providing	information	almost	all	of	which	
was	already	available	to	reviewers	from	other	of	the	many	
submissions	required	of	organisations	through	the	regulatory	
cycle.	Colleges	were	visited	by	the	FE	Commissioners’	team	
of	expert	advisors.	Then	there	were	steering	group	meetings;	
big,	long	ones	with	an	unmanageable	number	of	attendees	–	
predators,	prey,	bemused	and	amused.
The	distraction	factor,	cost	and	opportunity	cost	were	real	and	
substantial	for	colleges	–	even	those	that	were	very	likely	to	be	
untouched	in	the	final	reckoning.	Delivering	well	as	a	further	
education	college	is	difficult.	Delivering	well	with	scare	resources	
is	very	difficult.	Delivering	well	with	scarce	resources	while	being	
distracted	by	a	process	that	does	not,	in	the	end,	deliver	the	
profound	reforms	–	and	benefits	–	expected,	is	unfairly	difficult.
The	point	about	lenders’	risk	appetite	touched	on	in	the	FE	
Commissioner’s	annual	report34	is	an	important	point	to	draw	
out.	A	process	designed	to	improve	the	organisations’	resilience	
and	sustainability	spooked	lenders	–	making	it	harder	for	colleges	
to	access	finance	and	manage	their	debt,	in	turn	requiring	
government	to	step	in	to	the	lender	role	where	institutions	would	
previously	have	been	able	to	access	commercial	finance.	That	
is	to	say,	government’s	intervention	both	failed	to	deliver	the	
intended	benefits	and	made	the	problem	worse.	
Apprenticeship reform
I	am	basically	a	fan	of	apprenticeship	reform.	Reform	of	the	
apprenticeship	product	and	funding	mechanism,	taken	together,	
could	and	should	deliver	meaningful	long-term	benefits	if	they	
are	both	properly	implemented	and	given	time	to	mature.	It	
follows	from	much	of	the	above	that	those	are	quite	big	‘ifs’	
34	Ibid.	p.	15.
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–	but	I	do	think	that	this	is	an	example	of	a	reform	package	
which	government	must	hold	its	nerve	on	and	stick	with	for	the	
genuinely	long-term.	
Apprenticeship	reform	is	a	complex	and	multi-faceted	thing	
for	further	education	colleges	to	engage	with.	There	are	real	
opportunities	to	improve	and	grow	provision,	generate	additional	
revenue	and	tangible	benefits	for	the	students,	businesses	and	the	
communities	which	colleges	serve.	There	are	also,	however,	real	
challenges	–	to	improve	and	grow	provision,	generate	additional	
revenues	and	tangible	benefits…!	
I	wrote	for	TES	on	the	subject	in	November	201535	and	my	view	
has	not	changed.	Apprenticeship	reform	offers	real,	substantial	
and	long-term	opportunities	for	colleges	–	provided	that	
government	permits	a	long-term,	of	course.	Colleges	occupy	a	
unique	position	in	their	local	community;	particularly	in	technical	
areas,	even	the	worst-off	colleges	possess	facilities	that	are	the	
envy	of	their	commercial	competitors.	Minister	Boles’	infamous	
challenge	to	colleges	that	were	guilty	of	allowing	more	agile	and	
commercial	providers	to	‘nick	their	lunch’36	was	probably	justified	
by	the	data	on	college	apprenticeship	performance	to	that	point	
–	if	not	by	the	principles	of	good	stakeholder	management.	
The	struggle	is	real	too,	though.	The	dramatic	slow-down	
in	apprenticeship	starts37	since	the	apprenticeship	levy	was	
introduced	in	the	spring	of	2017	will	have	been	a	real	issue	for	
colleges	working	with	larger,	levy-paying	business	customers.	
A	February	2018	AoC	survey	reported	that	colleges’	carry-in	
activity	would	account	for	half	of	their	apprenticeship	income	
in	2017/18.38	Given	that	the	dip	in	activity	has	continued	into	
35	Hamnett,	M.	2015.	‘Is	the	apprenticeship	levy	a	big	deal?	Definitely	maybe’, TES.	Available	at:	www.
tes.com/news/apprenticeship-levy-big-deal-definitely-maybe	[Accessed	September	2018]
36	Exley,	S.	2015.	‘Change	your	approach’	to	deliver	more	apprenticeships,	Nick	Boles	tells	colleges’,	TES.	
Available	at:	www.tes.com/news/change-your-approach-deliver-more-apprenticeships-nick-boles-
tells-colleges	[Accessed	September	2018]
37	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Apprenticeships and traineeships data.	Available	at:	https://www.gov.
uk/government/statistical-data-sets/fe-data-library-apprenticeships.	[Accessed	September	2018]
38	Association	of	Colleges.	2018. Apprenticeships and college finances.	Available	at:	www.aoc.co.uk/
sites/default/files/AoC%20apprenticeships%20and%20college%20finance%20jan%202018.pdf	
[Accessed	September	2018]
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2017/18	that	figure	will	likely	be	some	way	lower	going	into	
2018/19.39	The	analysis	of	further	education	college	finances	
below	suggests	that	few	are	in	a	position	to	ride	out	a	continued	
dip	unscathed.	
Likewise,	and	on	a	more	practical	level,	the	move	from	grant	
allocations	and	payment	on	profile	to	income	earned	in-year	and	
paid	in	arrears	on	actuals,	will	have	hurt	the	cash	flow	of	even	the	
most	financially	robust	colleges	in	2017/18.	A	February	2018	AoC	
survey	of	colleges	reported	a	slowdown	in	payments	compared	to	
the	pre-levy	system.40
Just	as	colleges	had	to	manage	both	their	engagement	with	
the	area	review	process	and	its	wider,	rippling	implications	for	
the	operating	environment,	the	same	is	true	for	apprenticeship	
reform.	The	development	of	new	programmes,	new	delivery	
models	and	new	commercial	models	must	be	accompanied	by	a	
studied	response	to	the	wider	implications	of	the	same	reforms.	
As	with	the	area	review	process,	it	is	worth	it	if	the	reforms	
sustain	and	deliver.	If	they	don’t,	all	you’re	left	with	are	the	costs,	
opportunity	costs	and	the	distraction	factor.
The introduction of T levels 
The	next	major	reform	on	the	further	education	conveyor	belt	is	
the	introduction	of	‘T	levels’	–	the	latest	iteration	of	government’s	
full-time	programme	specification	for	16	to	18-year-olds.	T	
levels	will	be	designed	with	employers	and	will	provide	young	
people	with	a	combination	of	‘technical	knowledge	and	practical	
skills	specific	to	their	chosen	industry	or	occupation;	an	industry	
placement	of	at	least	45	days	…;	relevant	maths,	English	and	
digital	skills;	common	workplace	skills’.41	
The	introduction	of	T	levels	has	already	become	mired	in	a	degree	
of	controversy.	In	March	2017,	the	Chancellor	announced	that	
39	Ibid.
40	Association	of	Colleges.	2018.	Apprenticeships and college finances – Association of Colleges 
Survey,	London,	AoC.
41	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Introduction of T Levels.	Available	at:	www.gov.uk/government/
publications/introduction-of-T	levels/introduction-of-T	levels	[Accessed	September	2018]
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government	would	invest	an	additional	£500m	a	year	to	support	
delivery	of	T	levels	once	they	were	fully	up	and	running.42	That	
increase	in	funding	was	welcomed	by	some;	others,	though,	
wondered	whether	that	level	of	additional	resource	would	be	
sufficient	to	support	the	increase	in	programme	intensity	to	
around	900	hours.43	Since	then,	awarding	organisations	have	
threatened	–	and	backed	away	from	–	legal	action	about	the	way	
in	which	DfE	intends	to	appoint	awarding	organisations	to	each		
T	level	pathway.	
Full	implementation	has	been	delayed	beyond	2022.44	Even	then,	
the	Secretary	of	State	has	been	forced	to	issue	a	‘ministerial	
direction’	instructing	officials	to	implement	to	that	timeline	
despite	advice	he	received	and	rejected	from	the	Permanent	
Secretary	on	risks	to	successful	delivery	on	that	timeline.45	It	is	
hard	to	think	of	implementation	red	flags	which	have	not	already	
been	waved.
The financial context in which further education colleges 
operate is even more challenging than the policy context. 
Colleges are now badly under-funded relative to the rest of the 
education sector…
The	IFS	has	done	some	excellent	work	on	government	spending	
on	education	over	time	–	including	an	analysis	of	spending	per	
student	over	time	in	different	parts	of	the	education	sector46	–	
which	helpfully	characterises	the	incredibly	challenging	financial	
environment	in	which	further	education	colleges	operate.
Government	spent	£90	billion	on	education	in	2017/18.	That’s	
4.3	per	cent	of	national	income,	and	second	only	to	health	as	
42	Exley,	S.	2017.	‘Hammond	to	spend	£500m	a	year	on	technical	education	reforms’,	TES.	Available		
at:	www.tes.com/news/hammond-spend-ps500m-year-technical-education-reforms	[Accessed		
September	2018]
43	Belgutay,	J.	2017.	‘FE’s	£500m	boost	might	fall	short	for	T	levels’,	TES.	Available	at:	www.tes.com/news/
tes-magazine/tes-magazine/fes-ps500m-boost-might-fall-short-T	levels	[Accessed	September	2018]
44	Ryan,	G.,	2018.	‘T	levels:	Rollout	of	some	courses	will	be	delayed’,	TES.	Available	at:	www.tes.com/
news/T	levels-rollout-some-courses-will-be-delayed	[Accessed	September	2018]
45	Department	for	Education.	2018.	T level: Ministerial direction.	Available	at:	www.gov.uk/government/
publications/T	levels-ministerial-direction	[Accessed	September	2018]
46	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies.	2018.	2018	Annual Report on Education Spending in England,	London,	IFS.
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an	area	of	government	spend	on	public	service	delivery	overall.	
Government	spending	on	education	has	increased	significantly	
in	real	terms	over	the	last	30	years	–	and	particularly	between	
the	late	1990s	and	late	2000s;	between	1998/99	and	2010/11,	
education	spending	grew	at	an	average	rate	of	around	5	per	cent	
per	year.	Since	then,	education	spending	has	fallen	as	cuts	have	
taken	effect;	between	2010/11	and	2017/18	real-terms	spending	
fell	by	around	14	per	cent	–	taking	spending	back	to	the	same	
level	it	was	in	2005/06.47	
Chart 1	shows	changes	in	spending	per	student	at	different	stages	
in	the	education	system	between	1989/90	and	2019/20.	
Chart 1: Long-term comparison of spending per student 
across different stages of education48 
	
Spending	in	schools	accounted	for	just	under	£42	billion	of	
Government’s	£90	billion	spending	on	education	in	2017/18.		
In	that	year,	per	student	spending	at	primary	school	was	£4,700	
and	at	secondary	school	£6,200.	Spending	rose	by	over	50	per	
47	Ibid.	p.	10.
48	Ibid.	p.	74.
M
ea
n
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 p
er
 p
u
pi
l o
r 
st
u
d
en
t,
2
0
1
8
-1
9
 p
ri
ce
s
Early years
Primary school
Secondary school
Further education
Higher education
£10,000
£8,000
£6,000
£4,000
£2,000
£0
19
89
-9
0
19
91
-9
2
19
93
-9
4
19
95
-9
6
19
97
-9
8
19
99
-0
0
20
01
-0
2
20
03
-0
4
20
05
-0
6
20
07
-0
8
20
09
-1
0
20
11
-1
2
20
13
-1
4
20
15
-1
6
20
17
-1
8
20
19
-2
0
39
cent	in	real	terms	between	2000/01	and	2010/11	and	has	largely	
been	protected	in	real	terms	since	2010.	Spending	per	student	fell	
by	4	per	cent	in	real	terms	between	2015/16	and	2017/18	but	
will	be	held	constant	through	to	2019/20.	As	a	result,	real-terms	
spend	per	student	will	be	60	per	cent	higher	in	2019/20	that		
in	2000/01.49	
Universities	currently	receive	£28,200	per	student	to	fund	the	
cost	of	degree	provision.	This	is	almost	60	per	cent	higher	than	
the	level	made	available	to	them	in	1997/98.	This	increase	is	
largely	the	result	of	substantial	tuition	fee	reforms	in	2006	and	
2012	–	which	boosted	per	student	resources	by	28	per	cent	and	
19	per	cent	respectively50.	
Spending	on	provision	for	16-	to	18-year-olds	in	further	
education	was	just	under	£5.8	billion	in	2017/18.	In	that	year,	
per	student	spending	was	around	£5,700.	In	1989/90,	it	was	
around	£5,000	before	falling	by	almost	22	per	cent	in	real	terms	
through	the	1990s	to	a	low	of	£4,100	in	1998/99.	It	then	rose	by	
nearly	60	per	cent	to	a	high	of	around	£6,500	in	2011/12.	Further	
education	is	one	of	the	very	few	areas	of	education	spending	
which	has	not	been	protected	from	cuts	since	2010.	As	such,	
since	2011/12,	IFS	estimates	that	spending	has	fallen	by	around	
12	per	cent	in	real	terms.	They	forecast	that	spending	per	student	
will	be	constant	between	2017/18	and	2019/20	–	leaving	
spending	per	student	at	around	£5,700	in	2019/20.	That’s	around	
£500	per	student	(10	per	cent)	higher	than	in	1989/9051.	
The	effect	of	these	changes	–	summarised	in	Chart 2	–	is	that	
where	in	1990/91	spending	per	student	on	16	to	18-years-olds	
in	further	education	was	50	per	cent	higher	than	in	secondary	
schools,	it	is	now	8	per	cent	lower52.	The	IFS’s	conclusion	is	clear:	
‘16–18	education	has	been	a	big	loser	from	education	spending	
changes	over	the	last	25	years’.53	
49	Ibid.	p.	7.
50	Ibid.	p.	8.
51	Ibid.	p.	48.
52	Ibid.	p.	7.
53	Ibid.	p.	7.
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Chart 2: Long-term changes in spending per 16- to  
18-year-old student in further education54 
The	story	is	a	slightly	different	in	relation	to	adult	education.	Here	
the	story	is	one	of	funding	cuts	which	have	dramatically	affected	
participation	rather	than	per	student	funding.	Between	2005	and	
2016,	the	total	number	of	adult	students	fell	from	4	million	to	
around	2.2	million.	This	was	in	large	part	because	government	
spending	on	adult	education	(including	apprenticeships)	fell	by		
45	per	cent	in	real	terms	between	2009/10	and	2017/18.55		
The	AoC	2018	report	on	college	finances56	includes	some	helpful	
analysis	of	the	financial	pressure	on	colleges.	It	notes	that	funding	
rates	for	adult	and	16	to	18-year-old	students	have	been	fixed	
in	cash	terms	since	2009	and	2013	respectively	and	summarises	
some	of	the	many	cost	pressures	which	colleges	have	faced	and	
absorbed	through	that	period	including:	staff	pay	rises	(see	below);	
escalating	national	insurance	and	pension	costs;	the	introduction	
of	the	national	minimum	wage;	and,	increasing	energy	prices.	
54	IFS.	2018.	2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England – presentation.	Available	at:	www.ifs.
org.uk/publications/13335	[Accessed	September	2018]
55	IFS.	2018.	2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England,	London,	IFS,	p.	8.
56	Association	of	Colleges.	2018.	AoC 2018 report of college finances,	London,	AoC.
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They	compiled	a	‘college	price	index’	(CPI)	which	shows	how	
the	traditional	‘consumer	price	index’	approach	to	inflation	has	
affected	colleges	in	recent	years.	Using	2015	as	the	reference	
year,	their	model	shows	the	college	CPI	increasing	from	100	in	
2015	to	116.9	by	2020.57	They	note	that	for	a	college	to	absorb	
this	level	of	cost	pressure	by	finding	efficiency	savings	will	be	
extraordinarily	difficult.	To	do	so	while	also	finding	the	resource	
required	to	invest	in	transformation	is	absurdly	difficult.
What colleges are expected to deliver for the funding they 
receive changes often – and rarely comes with the additional 
resources required to meet those new expectations… 
The	constant	changes	in	policy,	characterised	above,	often	
ultimately	translate	into	changes	to	what	colleges	are	expected	
to	deliver	for	the	money	they	receive.	There	is	little	evidence	
that	when	policy	changes	resource	implications	are	carefully	
and	scientifically	considered,	or	that	the	funding	made	available	
to	colleges	is	adjusted	accordingly.	That	is	simply	not	how	
government	spending	processes	work.	HM	Treasury	expects	
the	Department	to	fund	new	expectations	through	efficiency	
improvements	–	which	in	turn	the	Department	expects	of	
colleges.	The	relationship	between	price	and	cost	long	since	
ended	in	messy	divorce.
The	effect	is	that	colleges	too	often	receive	what	is	known	in	
American	politics	as	an	‘unfunded	mandate’	–	a	new	requirement	
not	accompanied	by	a	fair	allocation	of	additional	resource.	
The	clearest	recent	example	of	such	a	thing	is	the	introduction	
for	2015/16	of	the	requirement	that	16–19-year-old	students	
enrolling	on	a	full-time	course	with	a	GCSE	grade	D	in	maths	
and/or	English	must	re-sit	in	pursuit	of	an	A-C	grade.58	That	
change	brought	considerable	additional	costs	for	colleges	–	both	
in	terms	of	implementation	and	operation	–	but	no	real	funding.
57	Association	of	Colleges.	2018.	AoC 2018 report of college finances,	London,	AoC,	p.	14.
58	Department	for	Education.	2014.	16 to 19 funding: maths and English condition of funding.	Available	
at:	www.gov.uk/guidance/16-to-19-funding-maths-and-english-condition-of-funding		
[Accessed	September	2018]
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Others	in	the	sector	will	have	their	own	favourite	unfunded	
mandates,	I	am	sure.	Some,	like	the	maths	and	English	example,	
are	obvious	and	substantial.	Others,	such	as	the	subtle	new	
expectations	articulated	with	every	refresh	of	Ofsted’s	common	
inspection	framework,	can	be	financially	innocuous	on	their	own	
but	add	up	to	a	genuine	resource	problem	over	time.	
The	effect	of	these	unfunded	mandates	is	obvious.	Organisations	
must	look	for	cost	savings,	efficiencies	and	inventive	means	of	
meeting	new	expectations	imposed	on	them	–	whilst	maintaining	
and	improving	their	overall	performance	for	the	students,	
businesses	and	communities	they	serve.	As	the	overall	funding	
position	has	become	tighter	and	tighter,	that	has	become	more	
and	more	difficult	to	do.	
Precisely	because	so	little	work	has	been	done	on	what	it	actually	
costs	to	be	a	college,	it	is	very	difficult	to	know	when	we	passed	
the	point	at	which	colleges	could	reasonably	be	expected	to	
deliver	for	the	resources	made	available	to	them;	it	is	very	clear	
that	that	date	is	in	the	past!	
These pressures also bear acutely on further education colleges’ 
ability to attract, retain and reward the teachers they need to 
deliver quality provision…
The	Association	of	Colleges’	annual	workforce	survey59	provides	
useful	insights	as	to	how	the	pressure	that	colleges	are	under	is	
affecting	their	staff.	Staff	turnover	in	colleges	for	2016/17	was	
17.4	per	cent;	16	per	cent	among	teaching	staff.	Both	figures	
represented	a	fall	from	slightly	higher	levels	the	previous	year.	All	
sector	benchmarks	are	around	15	per	cent	so	these	figures	are,	
perhaps	surprisingly,	not	that	high.	More	interesting	is	that	the	
pressures	on	the	sector	at	macro	level	can	be	seen	in	colleagues’	
reasons	for	moving	job	within	or	out	of	the	sector:	‘job	change	
out	of	sector’	was	cited	by	30	per	cent	of	respondents;	heavy	
workload,	20	per	cent;	and	low	pay,	16	per	cent.60	
59	Association	of	Colleges.	2018.	AoC college workforce survey 2017,	London,	AoC.
60	Ibid.	p.	15.
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Average	absence	was	5.6	days	for	2016/17	compared	to	5.8	
days	in	2015/16.	Among	teaching	staff,	the	figure	was	5.2	days	
for	2016/17.61	These	levels	are	not	particularly	high	by	all-sector	
benchmarks.	Again,	though,	macro	pressures	on	the	sector	are	
worryingly	visible	in	colleagues’	reasons	for	absence.	‘Stress	and	
mental	health’	issues	were	cited	by	80	per	cent	of	respondents		
as	one	of	the	three	main	reasons	for	sickness	absence.62	
Median	pay	for	teachers	in	further	education	is	£30,000	a	year	
–	some	£7,000	less	than	their	peers	in	the	schools	sector.63	In	
July	2018,	DfE	announced	a	3.5	per	cent	pay	increase	for	school	
teachers64	as	part	of	a	much	wider	announcement	of	pay	increases	
for	around	one	million	public	sector	workers,	including	members	
of	the	armed	forces,	police	service,	prison	officers	and	doctors.65	
It	later	confirmed	that	it	would	not	do	the	same	in	further	
education.66	This	is	an	example	of	the	ways	in	which	college’s	
distance	from	government	works	against	them	and	their	workforce.
The combined effect of all the above is simple: running a college 
is hard, transforming one that is not currently performing to the 
standard expected means beating the odds and the system…
The	simplified	effect	of	all	the	above	funding	and	policy	context	
is	that	colleges	have	been	desperately	trying	to	stretch	the	
canvas	over	the	frame	for	at	least	a	decade.	Indeed,	one	could	
reasonably	argue	that	the	frame	has	been	getting	bigger	and	the	
canvas	smaller	as	they	have	been	doing	that.	The	practical	reality	
has	been	a	sustained	period	of	restructuring,	staff	reductions,	
increased	workload	and	pressure	to	perform	for	staff	who	remain.
61	Ibid.	p.	25.
62	Ibid.	p.	27.
63	Ryan,	G.	2018.	‘School	teachers’	pay	rise	could	hit	college	staff’,	TES.
64	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Government to fund pay rise for teachers.	Available	at:	www.gov.uk/
government/news/government-to-fund-pay-rise-for-teachers	[Accessed	September	2018]
65	HM	Treasury.	2018.	Around one million public sector workers to get pay rise.	Available	at:	www.gov.uk/
government/news/around-one-million-public-sector-workers-to-get-pay-rise	[Accessed	September	2018]
66	Ryan,	G.	and	Belgutay,	J.	2018.	‘No	government	funding	for	college	teacher	pay	rise’,	TES.	Available	at:	
www.tes.com/news/no-government-funding-college-teacher-pay-rise	[Accessed	September	2018]
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My	hypothesis	is	that	organisations	that	were	not	in	a	strong	
position	at	the	end	of	2014/15	would	find	it	very	difficult	to	
improve	their	position	thereafter.	That	was	the	summer	in	which:
•	 	Huge	reductions	in	the	adult	education	budget	hit		
college	allocations.	
•	 	Colleges	stopped	receiving	‘transitional	protection’	funding	
which	had	been	provided	to	help	colleges	adjust	to	their	new,	
more	austere,	operating	environment.	
•	 	Apprenticeship	reform	began	to	impact	colleges’	financial	
performance,	as	most	began	to	reduce	the	level	of	sub-
contracted	apprenticeship	provision	they	supported	in	
preparation	for	its	likely	much-reduced	role	in	the		
future	market.	
•	 	The	maths	and	English	requirements	were	introduced,	bringing	
with	them	additional	teaching	and	administration	costs.
It	was	also,	of	course,	another	year	into	the	cash	freeze	on	the	
unit	of	funding.	I	simply	could	not	see	how	colleges	would	find	
the	wriggle	room	required	to	deliver	a	substantive,	effective	
transformation	going	into	2015/16.	I	say	this	having	taken	up	
post	a	few	days	after	my	organisation	received	its	grant	letter	for	
2015/16	–	showing	a	huge	reduction	in	allocation.
A	simple	analysis	shows	that	I	was	right	to	be	concerned.	There	
were	89	colleges	that	posted	an	operating	loss	in	2014/15.	Of	
that	group,	67	moved	into	surplus	in	2015/16.	Only	26	either	
stayed	or	moved	into	surplus	in	2016/17.	Put	another	way,	if	your	
college	posted	a	loss	in	2014/15	there	was	only	a	44	per	cent	
probability	that	you	would	stay	or	move	into	surplus	in	2016/17.
At	the	end	of	2014/15,	49	colleges	were	rated	Inadequate	or	
Requires	Improvement	by	Ofsted.	By	the	end	of	2016/17,	only	15	
of	that	group	had	moved	up	to	Good	or	Outstanding	as	the	same	
organisation	(10	merged	or	closed	by	the	end	of	2016/17).	Put	
another	way,	if	your	college	was	Ofsted	Inadequate	or	Requires	
Improvement	at	the	end	of	2014/15,	there	was	only	a	31	per	cent	
45
probability	that	you	would	reach	Good	or	better	by	the	end		
of	2016/17.
Combining	the	two	factors,	29	colleges	posted	a	loss	and	were	
Ofsted	Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	at	the	end	of	
2014/15.	Only	one	(one!)	of	that	group	was	both	in	surplus	and	
Ofsted	Good	at	the	end	of	2016/17	(another	six	merged	or	
closed).	That	is	to	say,	if	your	college	was	loss-making	and	not	
Ofsted	Good	at	the	end	of	2014/15,	there	was	only	a	10	per	cent	
probability	that	you	would	turn	around	your	headline	position	by	
the	end	of	2016/17.	
Government ’s recent preference has been to merge struggling 
colleges with stronger neighbours. It’s too soon to say whether 
that approach is working…
Through	the	area	review	process,	and	for	some	years	before	that,	
government’s	strong	preference	has	been	to	merge	struggling	
colleges	into	stronger-performing	ones	–	typically	but	not	always	
close	geographic	neighbours	–	in	the	belief	that	the	stronger	will	
be	able	to	support	the	weaker	to	improve	its	position.	
It	is	too	soon	to	tell	whether	the	recent	wave	of	mergers	has	
worked	in	that	respect;	few	have	been	Ofsted	inspected	in	their	
new	formation.	Indeed,	as	noted	above,	not	all	the	mergers	
recommended	through	the	area	review	process	have	yet	been	
completed.	The	merits	of	merger	as	a	response	to	organisational	
failure	warrants	a	fuller	discussion	in	its	own	right,	once	
performance	data	is	available.	I	am	sceptical	and	have	prepared	
this	piece	on	the	assumption	that	transformations	will	continue	
to	be	required.
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Recent college performance 
The performance of further education colleges compares 
poorly with organisations in the wider education, health and 
social care sectors…
At	the	end	of	2016/17,	13	per	cent	of	further	education	colleges	
were	rated	Outstanding	by	Ofsted,	56	per	cent	Good,	29	per	
cent	Requires	Improvement	and	2	per	cent	Inadequate.67	This	
distribution	compares	poorly	with	the	further	education	sector	as		
a	whole	–	and	with	other	parts	of	the	education	sector;	see	Chart 3.	
Chart 3: Distribution of Ofsted ratings for different parts of 
the education sector at the end of 2016/17
CHAPTER TWO
67	Ofsted.	2018.	Data View.	Available	at:	https://public.tableau.com/profile/ofsted#!/vizhome/
Dataview/Viewregionalperformanceovertime	[Accessed	September	2018]
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Where	31	per	cent	of	further	education	colleges	were	rated	
Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	by	Ofsted	at	the	end	of	
2016/17,	the	figure	for	sixth	form	colleges	was	19	per	cent,	
independent	training	providers	also	19	per	cent	–	and	for	the	
further	education	sector	as	a	whole	20	per	cent.	The	figure	for	
schools	was	13	per	cent	and	for	early	years	providers,	6	per	cent.
Wider	comparisons	are	also	unfavourable.	Table 1	summarises	the	
proportion	of	providers	rated	Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	at	
the	end	of	July	(health	and	care)	or	August	(education)	2017	across	
the	education,	health	and	care	sectors.	In	comparing	these	figures,	I	am	
knowingly	assuming	that	a	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC)	rating	is	
broadly	comparable	to	the	Ofsted	equivalent	with	the	same	label.	
Table 1: Public service providers rated Inadequate or Requires 
Improvement at their most recent Ofsted/Care Quality 
Commission inspection68 
Sector % rated 
Inadequate
% rated 
Requires 
Improvement
Number 
rated 
Inadequate 
or Requires 
Improvement
% customers 
supported
Schools 4 10 2,884 13
Early years 1 5 3,332 5
Further 
education & 
skills
2 18 215 20
General FE 
colleges
2 29 58 32
Adult social 
care
1 19 4,255 20
NHS acute 
core services
3 37 700 -
General 
practitioners
2 6 490 -
68	Ofsted.	2018.	Data View.	Available	at:	https://public.tableau.com/profile/ofsted#!/vizhome/Dataview/
Viewregionalperformanceovertime	[Accessed	September	2018];	and	Care	Quality	Commission,	The	
State	of	health	care	and	adult	social	care	in	England	2016/17.	Available	at:	www.cqc.org.uk/sites/
default/files/20171123_stateofcare1617_report.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018]
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While	31	per	cent	of	further	education	colleges	are	rated	
Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	by	Ofsted,	only	20	
per	cent	of	social	care	providers	are	rated	Inadequate	or	
Requires	Improvement	by	the	CQC	and	8	per	cent	of	general	
practitioners.	Only	NHS	acute	core	services	(i.e.	hospitals)	show	
a	greater	proportion	of	providers	rated	Inadequate	or	Requires	
Improvement,	at	their	most	recent	inspection,	than	further	
education	colleges.	
While performance in other parts of the education sector is 
improving, further education colleges’ Ofsted performance  
isn’t really…
The	proportion	of	further	education	colleges	rated	Inadequate	or	
Requires	Improvement	by	Ofsted	had	been	worsening	in	recent	
years.	The	figure	stood	at	23	per	cent	at	the	end	of	2014/15,	
growing	to	29	per	cent	at	the	end	of	2015/16	and	then	again	to	
31	per	cent	at	the	end	of	2016/17.	This	trend	compares	poorly	
with	other	parts	of	the	education	sector,	see	Chart 4.
Chart 4: Proportion of education providers rated Inadequate 
or Requires Improvement by Ofsted since 2013 
	
The	proportion	of	schools	rated	Inadequate	or	Requires	
Improvement	has	been	improving	steadily	in	recent	years.	In	
August	2011,	the	figure	was	31	per	cent,	falling	to	24	per	cent	by	
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2013	and	19	per	cent	by	2015,	before	improving	again	to	14	per	
cent.69	A	similar	improvement	trend	is	evident	in	the	early	years	
part	of	the	education	sector.
In-year	Ofsted	inspection	data	confirms	the	problematic	trend	in	
further	education	college	inspection	outcomes.	In	2015/16,	Ofsted	
inspected	82	further	education	colleges;	51	per	cent	were	rated	
Outstanding	or	Good,	34	per	cent	Requires	Improvement	and	15	
per	cent	Inadequate.70	In	2016/17,	Ofsted	inspected	71	further	
education	colleges;	47	per	cent	were	rated	Outstanding	or	Good,	
46	per	cent	Requires	Improvement	and	7	per	cent	Inadequate.71	In	
2017/18,	Ofsted	inspected	64	further	education	colleges;	69	per	cent	
were	rated	Outstanding	or	Good,	28	per	cent	Requires	Improvement	
and	3	per	cent	Inadequate.72	Chart 5	summarises	this	position.
While	2017/18	performance	is	a	marked	improvement	on	
previous	years,	performance	will	need	to	be	stronger	again	in	
future	years	before	the	proportion	of	further	education	colleges	
rated	Requires	Improvement	or	Inadequate	compares	more	
favourably	with	the	rest	of	the	education	sector.
Chart 5: In-year inspection outcomes for further education 
colleges, 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18
69	Ofsted.	2018.	Data View.	Available	at:	https://public.tableau.com/profile/ofsted#!/vizhome/Dataview/
Viewregionalperformanceovertime	[Accessed	September	2018]
70	Ofsted.	2018.	Further education and skills inspections and outcomes as at 31 August 2017.	Available	at:	
www.gov.uk/government/collections/further-education-and-skills-inspection-outcomes	[Accessed	
September	2018]
71	Ibid.
72	Ofsted.	2018.	Further education and skills inspections and outcomes: management information from 
December 2015 to August 2018.	Available	at:	www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/monthly-
management-information-ofsteds-further-education-and-skills-inspections-outcomes-from-
december-2015	[Accessed	September	2018]
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Of	29	further	education	colleges	inspected	during	2016/17	that	
had	been	rated	Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	at	their	
previous	inspection,	20	did	not	improve	to	Good	or	better,	though	
eight	of	those	previously	rated	Inadequate	did	improve	–	six	to	
Requires	Improvement,	two	to	Good.73
Chart 6	shows	the	change	in	inspection	outcomes	between	
previous	and	most	recent	inspections	for	all	further	education	
colleges	at	the	end	of	2016/17.	
Chart 6: Most recent and previous inspection outcomes for 
further education colleges at the end of 2016/17 
At	the	end	of	2016/17,	of	the	58	further	education	colleges	
rated	Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	at	their	most	recent	
inspection,	35	had	declined,	17	had	stayed	the	same	and	only	six	
had	improved	from	their	previous	inspection.	
Within	that	group	of	58	colleges	rated	Inadequate	or	Requires	
Improvement	at	their	most	recent	inspection,	27	were	also	rated	
Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	at	their	previous	inspection.	
This	group	of	27	colleges	supported	202,000	learners	in	2016/17,	
with	a	combined	all-age	achievement	rate	of	81.6	per	cent	
compared	to	84.4	per	cent	for	all	further	education	colleges.	
73	Ofsted.	2018.	Further education and skills inspections and outcomes.	Available	at:	https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/662570/Further_education_
and_skills_inspections_and_outcomes_as_at_31_August_2017.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018],	p.	6.
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Had	their	performance	matched	the	average,	an	additional	circa	
5,500	students	would	have	achieved	in	2016/17.	Looking	only	at	
16-	to	18-year-old	students,	those	27	colleges	supported	108,000	
students	and	had	an	achievement	rate	of	79	per	cent,	compared	
to	81.5	per	cent	for	all	colleges;	had	their	performance	matched	
the	average,	approximately	2,500	more	16-to	18-year-old	
students	would	have	achieved	in	2016/17.
Further education colleges’ financial performance is also poor, 
and getting worse…
The	financial	performance	of	further	education	colleges	
has	worsened	in	recent	years.	Table 2	summarises	headline	
measures	of	performance	for	all	colleges	and	the	subset	which	
posted	a	deficit	in	each	of	the	2014/15,	2015/16	and	2016/17	
academic	years.
Table 2: Financial performance of further education colleges, 
2014/15 to 2016/17
2014/15 2015/16 2016/17
Number of colleges 214 213 195
Combined turnover ('000) £5,930,370 £5,588,435 £5,371,588
Combined surplus/deficit ('000) -£46,415 -£101,784 -£141,836
Combined surplus/deficit (%) -1% -2% -3%
Combined borrowing ('000) £1,498,402 £1,520,506 £1,335,729
Combined borrowing (%) 25% 27% 25%
Number in deficit 89 131 136
Combined turnover of those in 
deficit ('000)
£2,402,805 £3,304,107 £3,446,322
Combined deficit ('000) -£156,837 -£220,870 -£238,637
Combined deficit (%) -7% -7% -7%
Combined borrowing of those 
in deficit ('000)
£693,893 £977,078 £918,753
Combined borrowing of those 
in deficit (%)
29% 30% 27%
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The	above	figures	are	drawn	from	the	transparency	data	sets	
which	the	ESFA	publishes	on	college	financial	performance	soon	
after	college	accounts	for	a	given	year	are	finalised	and	submitted	
to	the	ESFA.	They	typically	exclude	information	on	a	handful	of	
colleges	which	have	failed	to	meet	their	submission	deadline;	
that’s	why	the	total	number	of	colleges	listed	above	doesn’t	quite	
reconcile	with	other	presentations	on	the	same.	The	colleges	
which	fail	to	meet	the	submission	deadline	and	don’t	have	their	
information	included	in	the	transparency	data	sets	tend	to	be	
amongst	the	less	well-performing	colleges	in	the	pack;	as	such,	
these	figures	probably	slightly	overstate	the	aggregate	position	of	
the	sector	as	a	whole	–	excluding	likely	losses	and	debts	among	
those	at	the	back	of	the	financial	peloton.	
With	those	caveats,	it	is	unsurprising	–	given	the	operating	
context	–	that	combined	losses	among	all	colleges	have	grown	
over	the	last	three	years	to	negative	3	per	cent	of	turnover.	Given	
funding	pressures,	it	is	in	many	ways	surprising	that	the	position	is	
not	worse;	it	follows,	of	course,	that	pressures	have	therefore	been	
borne	by	college	operations	and	staff	more	than	by	their	profit	
and	loss	accounts.	One	imagines	that	the	reduction	in	combined	
borrowings	is	a	function	of	lender,	rather	than	borrower	appetite	
–	as	discussed	in	Chapter 1.	
The	ESFA	rates	further	education	colleges’	financial	health	
Outstanding,	Good,	Satisfactory	or	Inadequate	at	the	end	of	each	
financial	year.	The	ESFA	does	not	publish	these	ratings	–	as	it	does	
with	so	much	other	data	on	college	performance.	However,	a	
September	2018	AoC	report74	summarised	financial	health	ratings	
amongst	all	colleges	–	including	sixth	form	as	well	as	general	
further	education	colleges	–	over	the	five-year	period	to	2017/18	
(where	the	2017/18	figures	reflect	college	forecasts,	rather	than	
actual	outturns).	It	shows	that	the	proportion	rated	Satisfactory	
or	Inadequate	has	remained	broadly	constant	at	between	35	
per	cent	and	40	per	cent	of	all	colleges	–	even	as	mergers	have	
reduced	the	number	of	colleges	being	assessed.	
74	Association	of	Colleges.	2018.	AoC 2018 report on college finances.	Available	at:	www.aoc.co.uk/
news/aocs-2018-report-college-finances	[Accessed	Sept	2018]
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In	spring	2018,	TES	recreated	the	ESFA’s	assessment	for	2016/17,	
using	the	stated	methodology	and	published	base	data.	Their	
analysis	showed	that	47	colleges	were	in	Outstanding	financial	
health,	60	in	Good	health,	58	Satisfactory	and	30	Inadequate.	
That	is	to	say,	45	per	cent	of	colleges	were	not	in	Good	or	better	
financial	health	at	the	end	of	2016/17.	Those	88	colleges	shared	
a	combined	operating	deficit	equivalent	to	6	per	cent	of	turnover,	
and	borrowings	equivalent	to	35	per	cent	of	turnover;	74	of	the	
88	posted	deficits	for	the	year,	and	21	had	borrowings	that	were	
more	than	50	per	cent	of	turnover.	Two	had	borrowings	which	
were	more	than	100	per	cent	of	turnover.
There is a fairly clear correlation between poor curriculum and 
poor financial performance…
Chart 7 segments	further	education	colleges	by	their	Ofsted	and	
financial	health	rating	at	the	end	of	2016/17.	
Chart 7: Further education colleges segmented by Ofsted and 
ESFA financial health ratings
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From	the	above,	it	can	be	seen	that	33	colleges	were	rated	both	
Inadequate	or	Requires	Improvement	by	Ofsted,	and	Inadequate	
or	Satisfactory	for	financial	health	at	the	end	of	2016/17.	Two	
were	rated	Inadequate	on	both	measures.	Only	82	colleges	–	46	
per	cent	–	were	rated	Good	or	Outstanding	by	Ofsted	and	for	
their	financial	health.	
Colleges are finding it increasingly difficult to navigate their  
way out of trouble. I want to dive deeper into the performance of 
colleges which are in real curriculum and/or financial distress…
The	purpose	of	this	piece	is	not	to	criticise	the	performance,	
leadership	or	governance	of	those	further	education	colleges	
which	found	themselves	in	a	weak	position	at	the	end	of	
2016/17.	The	operating	environment	and	probabilities	of	a	
successful	transformation	are	such	that	it	is	all	too	easy	to	see	
how	colleges	might	find	themselves	in	a	tough	spot.	
I	am,	however,	very	interested	in	the	performance	of	those	
organisations.	I	want	to	understand	the	nuance	of	their	position,	
and	I	want	to	understand	what	tends	to	happen	in	those	
organisations,	so	that	I	can	test	my	thinking	about	what	a	
successful	transformation	effort	might	look	like	against	the		
reality	of	their	experience.
The	ESFA’s	intervention	policy	of	November	201775	defines		
four	triggers	for	formal	intervention	in	a	college:
•	 	An	Ofsted	inspection	which	judges	the	organisation	
Inadequate	for	overall	effectiveness.	
•	 	An	Inadequate	assessment	for	financial	health	and/or	financial	
management	and	control	from	the	ESFA.	
•	 	Failure	to	meet	minimum	standards	of	performance	set		
by	the	Department.
75	Department	for	Education.	2017.	Intervention policy in colleges and expansion of the Further Education 
Commissioner role.	Available	at:	https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/662365/FE_colleges_intervention_policy_and_commissioner_role.pdf	
[Accessed	September	2018]
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•	 	Escalation	to	formal	intervention	following	a	diagnostic	
assessment	by	the	FE	Commissioner.
The	fourth	point	was	added	to	the	list	of	triggers	in	November	
2017,	as	part	of	an	expansion	in	the	role	of	the	FE	Commissioner.	
The	expansion	in	the	Commissioner’s	role	was	in	part	an	
acknowledgement	that	‘greater	action	needs	to	be	taken	
to	support	progress	in	colleges	that	are	Ofsted	Requires	
Improvement’.76	It	is	a	helpful,	partial,	recognition	of	the		
need	for	up-stream	intervention.
For	the	purposes	of	this	exercise,	I	propose	to	use	the	following	
criteria	to	establish	a	pool	of	organisations	for	further	analysis:
•	 	Poor	curriculum	performance:	Ofsted	Inadequate	at	their	
most	recent	inspection	at	the	end	of	2016/17;	or,	Requires	
Improvement	at	their	most	recent	inspection	and	either	
Requires	Improvement	or	Inadequate	at	their	previous	
inspection.	This	measure	gives	an	approximation	of	sustained	
poor	performance	on	curriculum.
•	 	Poor	financial	performance:	rated	Inadequate	for	financial	
health	by	the	ESFA.	This	measure	gives	a	rounded	
approximation	of	sustained	poor	financial	performance,	given	
that	it	is	possible,	for	example,	to	post	an	operating	loss	in	
a	single	year	but	still	be	considered	to	be	in	Good	financial	
health,	if	other	factors	are	positive.
17	colleges	hit	the	curriculum	criteria	and	30	the	financial	criteria	
–	39	in	total.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	explore	the	performance	of	
these	colleges	in	more	detail	–	including	a	detailed	analysis	of	
their	performance	data	and	Ofsted	reports.	
76	Ibid.	p.	3.
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The causes of poor performance 
If you interrogate the data and read the Ofsted reports of 
poorly performing further education colleges, it is possible to 
identify a set of common causal issues…
I	reviewed	the	Ofsted	reports	of	all	39	further	education	
colleges	which	hit	either	my	curriculum	and/or	financial	
performance	criteria.	
Chart 8: Underpinning Ofsted grades of colleges which hit 
curriculum or financial criteria
I	wanted	to	make	sure	that	my	discussion	of	different	
approaches	to	transformation	was	rooted	in	the	problems	
which	most	commonly	need	to	be	address	through	college	
transformations.	I	identified	five	common	causal	issues:	
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•	  Insufficient progress since the previous inspection: the	
vast	majority	of	the	reports	talk,	in	one	way	or	another,	about	
colleges	making	insufficient	progress	since	the	previous	Ofsted	
inspection	and/or	leaders’	failure	to	take	timely	and	effective	
action	to	address	identified	areas	for	improvement.	Reports	
said	things	like:
		 		‘Governors and leaders have been too slow to bring about 
the required improvements in the quality of provision and 
outcomes for learners and apprentices.’ 
    ‘Leaders and managers have been too slow to implement 
 the improvements recommended following the previous  
two inspections.’
    ‘Actions to improve outcomes for learners have not always 
been successful and the pace of improvement has often been 
too slow.’
    ‘Governors recognise that the pace of improvement has been 
too slow and have reviewed their oversight of the college to 
ensure that the pace of improvement increases.’
•	 	A culture of low expectations:	the	majority	of	the	reports	
talked,	in	one	way	or	another,	about	leaders,	managers	and	
teachers	having	low	expectations	of	and	for	their	students.	
Reports	said	things	like:
    ‘Teachers’ expectations are too low and too many learners make 
insufficient progress.’ 
    ‘Teachers’ expectations of learners are too low and do not 
sufficiently promote or reinforce the demands of employers, 
such as full attendance, punctuality and dress code.’
    ‘In most lessons, teachers’ expectations of what students can 
achieve are too low… Too many lessons lack pace and challenge 
and fail to stimulate learning.’
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•	 	Poor financial management:	the	majority	of	the	reports	talked,	
in	one	way	or	another,	about	poor	financial	management,	
including	leaders’	failure	to	align	resources	with	their	teaching	
and	learning	improvement	priorities.	Reports	said	things	like:
	  ‘The college is in significant financial difficulties. Despite this, 
instances of poor financial management and unwise spending 
of public funds are frequent.’
  ‘Governors possess a wide range of pertinent skills in, for 
example, education, human resources, senior leadership and 
law, but financial expertise requires strengthening.’
•	  Inaccurate self-assessment and/or a lack of focus on areas 
for improvement:	a	significant	minority	of	the	reports	talked,	
in	one	way	or	another,	about	inaccurate	or	optimistic	self-
assessment	of	curriculum	quality	and/or	a	lack	of	focus	on	
–	and	focussed	action	in	relation	to	–	areas	for	improvement.	
Reports	said	things	like:
  ‘Inspectors judge that leaders’ overall view of the quality of 
teaching is too generous.’
  ‘The self-assessment process is not fit-for-purpose. Leaders  
and managers do not identify sufficiently strengths and areas 
 for improvement.’
  ‘Middle managers are not sufficiently skilled in critically 
evaluating their provision and, as a result, managers do not 
focus well enough on the priority areas for improvement.’ 
•	  Insufficient use of data to understand and address areas 
for improvement:	a	significant	minority	of	the	reports	talk,	in	
one	way	or	another,	about	a	failure	to	use	data	to	help	them	
understand	and	address	areas	for	improvement.	Reports	said	
things	like:
  ‘Leaders do not make effective use of assessment information 
and other data to secure improvement.’
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   ‘Governors do not scrutinise information and data provided to 
them sufficiently or challenge the senior management team 
to more rapidly improve the quality of teaching, learning and 
assessment, and outcomes for learners.’ 
  ‘Work-based learning managers have insufficient access to 
accurate in-year data to assess current performance and 
trends reliably.’
I	tested	these	conclusions	with	Paula	Heaney,	who	was	the	regional	
lead	Ofsted	inspector	when	I	first	took	up	post	at	HLG.	In	that	
capacity	she	quality	assured	the	June	2015	inspection	of	HLG	
and	later	provided	us	with	exceptionally	helpful	advice,	challenge	
and	support	as	we	continued	our	improvement	journey	ahead	of	
our	second	inspection	in	November	2018.	She	recognised	these	
issues	from	her	years	of	inspection	experience	–reinforcing	the	
importance	of	strong	leadership	and	management	to	college	
performance	and	improvement.	She	suggested	that	colleges	which	
are	successful	in	transforming	their	performance	focus	relentlessly	
on	the	impact	they’re	having	on	students,	and:	
•	 	Have	a	thorough	understanding	of	their	strengths	and	
areas	for	improvement	across	all	sites,	provision	types	and	
subcontracted	provision.
•	 	Know	what	they	need	to	improve,	what	actions	they’re	going	
to	take,	and	how	they’ll	measure	progress	and	success.	
•	 	Have	well-defined	and	widely-communicated	processes	for	
regularly	monitoring	performance,	including	clear	processes	
for	tracking	remedial	and	follow-up	actions.	
•	 	Have	well-developed	processes	for	monitoring	students’	
progress	so	they	can	judge	whether	students	are	on-track		
and	what	support	they	may	need.	
•	 	Have	well-established	processes	through	which	leaders		
and	governors	use	data	to	monitor	and	help	drive	
performance	improvements.	
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I	will	come	back	to	several	of	the	points	Paula	emphasised	in	
chapters 5, 6 and 7.
The FE Commissioner’s annual report also identifies a set of 
common issues affecting poorly performing colleges, similar in 
nature to those identified through a review of Ofsted reports…
My	analysis	of	Ofsted	reports	coheres	reasonably	well	with	the	FE	
Commissioner’s	conclusions,	given	his	remit	to	work	with	further	
education	colleges	which	need	to	improve	their	position.	His	
annual	report	is	another	important	source	of	insight	into	thinking	
about	the	issues	common	among	poorly	performing	further	
education	colleges.	
During	2016/17,	nine	further	education	organisations,	including	
five	general	further	education	colleges,	were	placed	into	FE	
Commissioner	intervention	having	received	Inadequate	Ofsted	
grades.	In	his	annual	report,	the	Commissioner	notes	that	his	
recommendation	to	those	organisations	focussed	on	the		
following	areas:77
•	 	Good	quality	management	information	presented	
transparently	to	the	board	for	monitoring	with	the	use		
of	traffic	light	indicators	and	sector	benchmarks.
•	 	A	strong	focus	on	and	championing	of	the	student	experience.
•	 	A	costed	curriculum	plan,	showing	cost	margins	for		
each	course.
•	 	Strengthened	leadership	and	governance.	
•	 	A	robust	performance	management	system.	
•	 	A	relentless	focus,	from	governors	and	senior	leaders,		
on	improving	teaching,	learning	and	assessment.
77	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Annual Report of the Further Education Commissioner	–	1 September 
2016 to 31 August 2017.	Available	at:	https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677985/FEC_Annual_Report_2016-17.pdf,	[Accessed	
September	2018],	p.	6.
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His	annual	report	also	notes	that	11	further	education	organisations	
were	referred	to	the	Commissioner	for	formal	intervention	
for	financial	reasons	during	2016/17.	The	Commissioner’s	
recommendations	to	those	organisations	typically	focussed	on:78	
•	 A	clear,	costed	curriculum	plan	setting	out	margins	by	course.
•	 	Realistic,	prudent	and	tested	income	targets	which	reflect	
demographic	change	and	competitive	pressures.	
•	 	Spending	sufficient	board	time	scrutinising	budgets,	capital	
and	estate	plans	and	in-year	performance.
•	 	Effective	recruitment	of	leaders	and	managers	with	the	right	
financial	skills	and	experience.
•	 	Clear	benchmarking	to	monitor	performance.	
•	 	A	Commissioner-led	structure	and	prospects	appraisal.
The	Commissioner	also	notes	that	action	on	leadership	and	
governance	is	a	consistent	theme	across	all	interventions.	He	notes	
that	his	recommendations	in	this	area	tend	to	focus	on:79	
•	 Effective	recruitment	of	governors	with	the	necessary	skills.	
•	 A	culture	of	challenge	at	board	level.
•	 	Commissioning	independent	reviews	of	governance	
arrangements.
•	 	Clear	board	reporting,	with	transparent	performance	metrics	
and	use	of	benchmarking.
•	 	Governors	developing	their	expertise	and	understanding	of	
the	college’s	management,	including	through	direct	access	to	
middle	management.
•	 	Mentoring	and	training	programmes	for	senior	leaders.
It	is	clear	then	that	poorly	performing	colleges	often	share	a	set	of	
common	causal	issues;	their	transformation	must	be	rooted	in	and	
address	these	issues.
78	Ibid.	p.	11
79	Ibid.	p.	12
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Learning from transformations 
elsewhere 
There is a great deal that college leaders can learn from 
transformations in other sectors and disciplines which may 
appear unrelated to further education…
I	have	always	been	interested	in	how	insight,	expertise,	good	
practice	from	one	area	can	be	applied	to	another.	I	believe	both	
that	every	sector	and	organisation	is	unique,	and	that	it	is	possible	
to	learn	and	apply	lessons	from	other	sectors	and	disciplines	when	
thinking	about	how	a	given	organisation	can	improve	performance	
and	deliver	its	long-term	goals.
Applying	lessons	and	discipline	expertise	from	elsewhere		
can	be	incredibly	difficult.	It	requires	a	deep	understanding	of	
the	practice,	why	and	how	it	works	in	one	setting	so	that	its	
application	in	another	can	be	properly	considered,	designed	
and	taken	forward.	Doing	so	effectively	is	often	a	matter	of	
understanding	the	underlying	principles	of	a	given	discipline	or	
practice,	so	that	it	can	be	deftly	applied	to	a	new	setting	–	rather	
than	as	a	crude	transplant.	
There	are	often,	also,	people	and	cultural	barriers	to	the	effective	
application	of	lessons	from	elsewhere.	Colleagues	can	be	precious	
about	the	uniqueness	of	their	sector	and	organisational	context	
–	arguing	that	other	sectors	and	disciplines	are	too	different	for	
parallels	to	be	drawn	and	lessons	learned.	I	strongly	disagree	with	
such	a	position;	considered	on	the	right,	nuanced	basis	and	taken	
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forward	deftly,	I	believe	there	are	great	opportunities	for	leaders	
in	all	sectors	–	including	further	education	–	to	find	new	answers	
and	opportunities	in	the	work	of	apparently	unrelated	sectors	and	
professional	disciplines.
I,	therefore,	want	to	invest	this	chapter	in	the	search	for	insight	
from	elsewhere,	before	beginning	to	think	about	how	leaders	might	
be	able	to	beat	the	odds,	and	the	system,	in	transforming	further	
education	colleges	in	the	current	operating	context.
Sir Michael Barber’s public value review offers a useful 
perspective on how leaders might improve efficiency and 
productivity in delivering public service goals…
In	2017,	Sir	Michael	Barber	completed	a	‘public	value	review’	for	
HM	Treasury80	–	the	purpose	of	which	was	to	identify	practical	
steps	that	could	be	taken	to	improve	productivity	in	the	public	
sector.	His	report	proposes	a	‘public	value	framework’	to	help	
government	better	convert	funding	into	policy	outcomes	for	
citizens.	The	framework	consists	of	four	pillars:
•	 	Pursuing goals: understanding	intended	outcomes	and	
how	progress	will	be	measured;	whether	those	outcomes	
represent	an	appropriate	degree	of	ambition;	how	progress	
toward	them	will	be	tracked;	and	what	data	show	about	
historic	and	future	trends.
•	 	Managing inputs:	how	well	public	bodies	understand	the	
resources	available	to	them;	how	well	they	track	resource	
and	forecast	spending;	how	effectively	they	benchmark	to	
identify	and	secure	efficiencies;	and	how	well	they	understand	
where	a	decision	taken	in	one	part	of	government	creates	cost	
pressures	elsewhere.	
•	  Engaging users and citizens:	how	well	public	bodies	
understand	what	taxpayers	think	of	them,	and	how	they’re	
working	to	improve	that	understanding;	what	the	user	
80	Barber,	M.	2017,	Delivering better outcomes for citizens: practical steps for unlocking public value.	
Available	at:	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-better-outcomes-for-citizens-
practical-steps-for-unlocking-public-value.	[Accessed	September	2018].	p.	6.
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experience	looks	like,	and	how	public	bodies	are	influencing	
it;	and	the	extent	to	which	the	identity	and	interests	of	
stakeholder	groups	are	understood.	
•	  Developing system capacity:	how	well	public	bodies	
promote	innovation,	develop	and	adopt	new	technologies	and	
use	behavioural	insights	to	improve	performance;	whether	
planning	and	accountability	processes	support	delivery	of	
defined	outcomes;	how	delivery	chains	are	structured;	the	
extent	of	collaborative	working	with	other	public	bodies;	the	
quality	of	a	public	body’s	workforce	strategy;	and	whether	
public	bodies	have	the	systems	in	place	to	gather	and	evaluate	
performance	data.	
Barber	is	careful	to	note	that	these	pillars	are	about	the	process	of	
turning	funding	into	outcomes	–	independent	of	any	discussion	
about	levels	of	funding.
Chart 9: Barber’s public value framework
Though	pitched	primarily	as	a	tool	for	HM	Treasury	and	
government	departments	to	use	in	taking	spending	and	strategic	
policy	decisions,	it	is	very	easy	to	see	how	the	framework	could	
be	used	as	a	tool	to	help	public	service	delivery	organisations	
–	including	further	education	colleges	–	think	about	how	
effectively	they	are	set	up	to	succeed.	The	framework	includes	a	
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series	of	questions	which	organisations	could	use	to	assess	the	
arrangements	they	have	in	place	to	deliver	‘public	value’,	i.e.	the	
outcomes	expected	of	them.
The	‘pursuing	goals’	pillar	of	the	framework	is	relevant	to	further	
education	colleges	at	both	strategic	and	operational	levels.	The	sector	
context	described	in	Chapter 1 means	that	it	is	incredibly	difficult	
for	further	education	colleges	to	cut	through	the	noise	and	define	
realistic,	long-term	strategy	and	objectives;	Barber’s	framework	is	an	
important	reminder	that,	however	difficult	it	is	to	do,	it	is	incumbent	
on	college	leaders	to	be	clear	about	intended	outcomes	–	because	
their	doing	so	is	essential	to	the	delivery	of	impactful	change.
At	the	operational	level,	measuring	performance	in	further	education	
colleges	is	fairly	complicated,	to	say	the	least.	Ofsted’s	and	others’	
assessment	of	college	performance	cannot	be	boiled	down	to	a	
single	or	even	small	set	of	performance	indicators;	it	has	long	since	
been	recognised	that	achievement	rates	alone	do	not	tell	a	rounded	
story	of	performance.	Indeed,	the	basket	of	performance	measures	
on	which	leaders	and	managers	should	train	their	eye	is	substantial	–	
and	varies	from	programme	type	to	programme	type.	
It	can	be	difficult	for	colleges	to	go	beyond	tracking	these	measures	
and	begin	to	analyse	them	in	search	of	insight.	We	saw	in	Chapter 
3	that	Ofsted	often	comments	on	poorly	performing	colleges’	
insufficient	use	of	data	to	drive	performance	improvement.	Barber’s	
framework	reminds	us	of	the	importance	of	their	doing	so.
We	also	saw	in	Chapter 3	that	poorly	performing	colleges	often	
suffer	from	weak	financial	management	and	a	failure	to	align	
resources	with	their	improvement	and	delivery	priorities	–	which	
resonates	very	clearly	with	the	imperatives	described	in	the	
‘managing	inputs’	pillar	of	the	Barber	framework.	Equally,	the	
framework’s	reference	to	understanding	how	a	decision	in	one	
part	of	the	system	affects	another,	resonates	with	government’s	
tendency	to	reinvent	policy	on	a	rapid	cycle	and	to	lumber	further	
education	colleges	with	unfunded	mandates.
I	am	also	interested	in	the	‘developing	system	capacity’	pillar	of	
the	framework.	It	should	be	obvious	from	Chapter 1	that	colleges’	
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capacity	and	ability	to	invest	in	the	development	of	capacity	for	
the	long-term	are	constrained	by	the	resources	which	are	(not)	
being	made	available	to	them	by	government.	Barber’s	framework	
serves	as	an	important	reminder,	however,	that	a	focus	on	what’s	
next,	insight,	performance	and	accountability	arrangements	are	
essential	to	organisational	performance	in	delivering	public	service	
outcomes.	Again,	the	focus	on	data	collection,	insight	and	analytics	
is	notable	–	and	a	theme	I	will	return	to	in	Chapter 6.
The Infrastructure and Projects Authority’s seven lenses of 
transformation offer insights directly relevant to college 
transformation programmes…
The	Infrastructure	and	Projects	Authority	(IPA)	is	the	Government’s	
centre	of	expertise	for	infrastructure	and	major	projects.	It	has	a	
remit	to	both	support	delivery	of	large,	complex	implementations	
and	build	project	leadership	capability	across	government.	It	
supports	delivery	of	a	portfolio	of	the	largest,	most	complex	
and	challenging	implementations	in	government,	including	
over	140	construction,	infrastructure,	military,	technology	and	
transformation	initiatives	with	a	combined	whole-life	cost	of	more	
than	£450	billion.81	
A	group	of	practitioners	involved	in	the	delivery	of	that	portfolio	
of	projects	developed	the	‘seven	lenses	of	transformation’	as	
a	practical	guide	for	understanding	and	delivering	complex	
transformations.82	Both	the	IPA	and	Government	Digital	Service	
(GDS)	use	the	seven	lenses	to	shape	their	support	to	major	
projects;	they	also	suggest	that	the	framework	is	equally	relevant	to	
organisations	of	all	sizes	pursuing	major	transformation	initiatives.	
Table 3	summarises	the	seven	lenses:	why	each	of	them	is	needed;	
how	transformation	leaders	can	reflect	each	lens	in	their	work;	
some	of	the	trade-offs	that	each	lens	entails	for	transformation	
programmes	and	their	leaders;	and	some	red	flags	to	watch	out	for.	
81	Infrastructure	and	Projects	Authority.	2017.	Annual Report on Major Projects 2016/17.	Available	at:	
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/629622/IPA_Annual_Report_2017.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018]
82	Infrastructure	and	Projects	Authority.	2018.	The 7 lenses of transformation.	Available	at:	https://	
www.gov.uk/government/publications/7-lenses-of-transformation/the-7-lenses-of-transformation	
[Accessed	September	2018]
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Table 3: Summary of seven lenses of transformation83
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The	framework	is	deeply	relevant	to	the	transformation	of	poorly	
performing	further	education	colleges	–	not	least	given	how	
directly	it	resonates	with	the	analyses	presented	in	Chapters 1,	2	
and	3.	There	is	nothing	about	further	education	colleges	which	
means	this	generalised	transformation	cannot	be	–	deftly	–	applied	
to	their	transformation.
It	is	interesting	to	see	that	the	red	flags	described	with	respect	to	
the	‘vision’	lens	are	very	similar	to	the	weaknesses	which	Ofsted	
often	identifies	in	poorly	performing	colleges	and/or	issues	which	
are	often	the	focus	of	FE	Commissioner	recommendations,	i.e.	a	
lack	of	ambition;	a	lack	of	clarity	around	and	action	to	address	
areas	for	improvement;	and	the	need	for	stronger	focus	on	
the	student	experience.	The	seven	lenses	framework	describes	
vision	as	a	matter	of	‘clarity	around	[the]	social	outcomes	of	the	
transformation,	and	its	key	themes’.84	I	will	argue	in	Chapter 5	that	
clarity	around	organisational	purpose,	strategy	and	values	is	the	
platform	on	which	any	transformation	should	be	built.
I	am	also	interested	in	the	lenses	focused	on	‘design’	–	‘how	
different	components	will	be	configured	to	deliver	the	vision’	
–	and	‘plan’	–	‘a	roadmap	for	identifying	the	sequencing	
and	interdependencies	between	different	elements	of	the	
transformation’.85	I	will	talk	more	in	Chapter 6	about	the	
importance	of	a	robust,	detailed	and	communicable	plan	–	and	
the	wider	merits	of	an	operations	excellence	mindset	in	delivering	
transformation.	Again,	there	is	clear	resonance	between	the	red	
flags	described	in	relation	to	these	two	lenses,	Ofsted’s	common	
criticisms	and	the	FE	Commissioner’s	common	recommendations,	
including	the	seven	lenses’	references	to:	‘losing	sight	of	
transformational	outcomes’;	‘focussing	on	the	parts	of	the	design	
that	people	are	comfortable	with,	rather	than	doing	what	matters’;	
and,	‘not	having	appropriate	governance’.
84	Ibid.
85	Ibid.
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The	other	two	lenses	which	I	would	like	to	draw	attention	to,	
at	this	point,	are	those	relating	to	‘transformation	leadership’	
–	‘creating	the	right	amount	of	uncertainty	to	generate	
productive	organisational	distress’	–	and	‘people’	–	‘engaging	
and	communicating	effectively	with	the	people	affected	by	the	
transformation;	bringing	people	affected	…	on	the	journey’86.	I	will	
talk	much	more	about	both	of	these	themes	in	Chapters 5	and	7.	
The	suggestion	that	leaders	must	be	able	to	generate	‘productive	
organisational	distress’	is	very	interesting.	It	is	clear	from	Ofsted’s	
common	criticisms	and	the	FE	Commissioner’s	common	
recommendations	that	poorly	performing	colleges	are	not	always	
sufficiently	live	to	the	issues	they	face,	and	are	not	always	taking	
rapid,	focused	and	decisive	enough	action	to	address	those	issues.	
The	notion	that	leaders	need	to	create	a	degree	of	disruption	
to	spark	the	change	process	resonates	very	clearly	with	my	and	
others’	experience.	
On	the	other	hand,	we	saw	in	Chapter 1	some	of	the	many	
examples	of	the	pressure	colleagues	working	in	further	education	
are	under	–	and	the	impact	that	is	having	on	their	health,	wellbeing	
and	willingness	to	continue	working	in	the	sector.	In	thinking	
about	how	they	generate	necessary	disruption,	leaders	in	further	
education	must	also	have	a	very	strong	sense	of	the	level	of	
disruption	that	the	organisation	–	and	those	working	within	it	–	
can	cope	with.	This	is	a	very	fine	balancing	act	in	the	current		
sector	context.
The	seven	lenses	framework’s	suggestion	that	transformation	
and	business-as-usual	roles	require	different	skillsets	is	an	
important	point	–	as	are	the	red	flags	about	having	people	carry	
out	transformation	roles	whilst	maintaining	responsibilities	for	
business-as-usual	work;	and	having	the	same	‘usual	suspects’	
working	on	every	critical	project.	The	challenging	financial	
86	Ibid.
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context	in	further	education	makes	it	very	difficult	for	leaders	to	
supplement	their	existing	teams	with	the	additional	people	and	
expertise	required	to	drive	successful	transformations.
There is evidence to suggest that most public service 
transformations fail – but also that successful transformations 
share a certain set of characteristics… 
A	2018	McKinsey	Centre	for	Government	survey	of	3,000	public	
officials	in	18	countries	found	that	80	per	cent	of	government	
attempts	to	transform	performance	in	public	services	don’t	
fully	meet	their	objectives.87	McKinsey’s	study	identifies	five	
disciplines	which,	together,	can	more	than	triple	the	success	rate	of	
government	transformations:	
•	 	Committed leadership:	leaders	of	transformation	‘must	
commit	extraordinary	energy	to	the	effort,	take	personal	
accountability	for	success	or	failure,	lead	by	example	and	
challenge	long-established	conventions.’88	
•	 	Clear purpose and priorities:	‘successful	transformations	paint	
a	compelling	picture	of	their	destination	and	make	it	clear	to	
public	servants	and	citizens	why	the	change	is	necessary.’89	
•	  Cadence and coordination in delivery:	effective	delivery	
requires	‘a	fast,	yet	steady	pace,	a	flatter	hierarchy	than	
is	usual	in	the	public	sector,	close	collaboration	between	
different	agencies	and	functions	and	the	flexibility	to	solve	
problems	as	they	arise.’90	
•	 	Compelling communication:	almost	90	per	cent	of	
respondents	to	the	McKinsey	survey	said	that	the	programme	
they	were	involved	in	would	have	been	enhanced	by	more	
engagement	with	front-line	employees.
87	McKinsey	Center	for	Government.	2018.	Delivering for citizens – How to triple the success rate of 
government transformations.	Available	at:	https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/
Public%20Sector/Our%20Insights/Delivering%20for%20citizens%20How%20to%20triple%20
the%20success%20rate%20of%20government%20transformations/Delivering-for-citizens-How-to-
triple-the-success-rate-of-government-transformations.ashx	[Accessed	September	2018],	p.	5.
88	Ibid.	p.	5
89	Ibid.	p.	5
90	Ibid.	p.	5
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•	 	Capability for change:	McKinsey	argue	that,	though		
highly	skilled,	public	servants	rarely	have	the	expertise	in	
change	management	required	to	successfully	deliver		
major	transformations.
McKinsey	claim	that	transformations	which	have	all	five	of	these	
disciplines	embedded	within	them	are	three-and-half	times	more	
likely	to	succeed.91	They	go	on	to	identify	three	practical	steps	for	
leaders	of	transformation	programmes:
•	 	‘Paint a compelling picture of the destination—and 
commit to reaching it’:92	leaders	must	be	able	to	paint	a	
vivid	picture	of	why	changes	are	necessary	and	the	potential	
they	have;	the	act	of	setting	an	ambitious	target	can	itself	
motivate	and	help	to	engage	people	in	discussion	about	how	
those	goals	might	be	achieved.
•	 	‘Create a common baseline and trajectory’:93	
transformation	aspirations	must	take	account	of	the	
performance	baseline	and	the	trajectory	the	organisation	
would	be	on	if	action	is	not	taken;	and,	the	baselining	exercise	
needs	to	go	beyond	a	simple	analysis	of	financial	resources	
and	inputs	to	understand	how	inputs	become	outcomes.
•	  ‘Keep targets few, specific, and outcome-based’:94	
achievement	relies	on	setting	clear,	measurable	targets	for	
outcome	improvements	early	on	in	the	transformation.
There	are	clear	resonances	between	the	five	disciplines	which	
McKinsey	claim	will	multiply	the	prospects	of	a	given	public	
sector	transformation	and	the	seven	lenses	framework	proposed	
by	the	IPA.	They	share	a	focus	on	clarity	of	purpose,	robust	
programme	management	and	coordination,	communication,	
staff	engagement	and	capability.	As	such,	the	McKinsey	analysis
91	Ibid.	p.	12.
92	Ibid.	p.	15.
93	Ibid.	p.	15.
94	Ibid.	p.	15.
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resonates	as	strongly	with	Ofsted’s	common	criticisms	of	
poorly	performing	colleges	and	the	FE	Commissioner’s	common	
recommendations	described	in	Chapter 3.	
McKinsey’s	recommendation	that	leaders	create	a	common	
baseline	is	important.	I	will	talk	a	lot	more	about	this	in	Chapter 
5.	Further	education	colleges	are	large,	complex	and	dynamic	
organisations;	a	great	deal	will	have	happened	in	each	of	them	
since	they	were	incorporated	as	distinct	entities	in	1992.	To	
properly	understand	the	issues	their	transformation	needs	to	
address	–	and	the	approach	they	will	need	to	take	to	deliver	it	–	
leaders	must	thoroughly	interrogate	their	baseline	position.
A	separate	2016	McKinsey	piece95	argues	that	transformations	
require	an	‘execution	engine’	that	will	change	the	performance	
rhythms	and	decision-making	in	a	given	organisation.	They	argue	
that	such	an	engine	should	be	a	function	of	five	leadership	actions:	
1.   Taking an independent perspective: organisations	which	
sustain	change	are	never	satisfied,	continue	to	look	for	fresh	
facts	and	guard	constantly	against	falling	back	on	negotiated	
targets	that	managers	will	readily	accept.
2.			Thinking like an investor:	passive	employees	‘kill	the	
dynamism’	of	a	business;	employees	in	successful	organisations	
sustain	their	transformation	by	constantly	challenging	
colleagues,	not	just	getting	along.
3.			Ensure ownership in the line:	central	teams	and	top–down	
target-setting	should	be	resisted	in	favour	of	line-ownership	of	
the	transformation.
4.   Execute relentlessly:	senior	leaders	must	sustain	their	pace	and	
their	proximity	to	the	detail	throughout.
95	Bucy,	M.,	Carmody,	K.,	Davies,	J.	and	Peacocke,	G.	2016.	Sustaining the momentum of a transformation.	
Available	at:	www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/rts/our-insights/sustaining-the-momentum-of-
a-transformation	[Accessed	September	2018]
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5.			Address underlying mindsets:	managers	must	inspire,	‘instil	
meaning’	and	recognise	the	extra	effort	of	employees;	they	must	
not	assume	that	employees	will	necessarily	understand	why	the	
organisation	has	to	work	differently	in	the	future.
This	is	a	useful	supplement	to	the	more	holistic	analyses	provided	
by	Barber,	the	IPA	and	the	aforementioned	McKinsey	piece.	I	would	
particularly	like	to	draw	out	the	suggestion	that	leaders	adopt	an	
‘investor	mindset’	–	which	may	at	first	glance	feel	less	relevant	
in	a	further	education	setting.	It	is	certainly	my	experience	that	
leaders	and	colleagues	who	are	willing	to	challenge	convention	–	
and	colleagues	–	in	pursuit	of	new,	better	ways	of	doing	things	can	
unlock	improvements	which	others	do	not	find	(because	they’re	
not	looking).		
It	is	also	interesting	that	McKinsey	counsel	that	leaders	should	
stay	close	to	the	detail	throughout	the	transformation.	That	can	be	
incredibly	difficult	–	if	not	impossible	–	to	do	in	a	large,	complex,	
organisation	with	such	a	challenging	and	changeable	external	
environment.	McKinsey’s	advice	is	a	helpful	reminder	that	leaders	
need	to	find	ways	to	get	and	stay	close	to	the	detail	–	which	may	
impact	their	thinking	on,	for	example,	the	programme	management	
and	reporting	arrangements	they	put	in	place	to	drive	the	change.
Recent Institute for Government research into organisational 
failure in the public sector offers some valuable insights 
relevant to further education college transformation…
In	2016,	the	Institute	for	Government	(IfG)	looked	at	four	different	
instances	of	organisational	failure	in	the	public	sector96	–	one	in	
each	of	a	local	authority,	hospital	trust,	children’s	services	and	
school.	They	identified	eight	lessons:	
1.			Peer support can provide opportunities for early intervention 
– but requires a trigger:	government	tends	to	intervene	only	
when	there	is	evidence	of	very	serious	problems;	peers,	they	argue,	
could	provide	earlier,	more	consensual,	intervention.	
96	Institute	for	Government.	2016.	Failing Well – Insights on dealing with failure and turnaround from four 
critical areas of public service delivery.	Available	at:	www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/
files/publications/IFGJ4331_Failing-Well_25.07.16_WEBc.pdf,	[Accessed	September	2018]
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2.	  Interventions may not need to remain in place until the 
turnaround is complete:	in	some	instances,	interventions	
may	need	to	remain	until	service	standards	have	returned	
to	the	required	level,	while	in	others	it	may	be	possible	for	
intervention	to	cease	when	the	organisation	is	deemed	capable	
of	completing	that	improvement	journey	itself.
3.			Insularity is often characteristic of failing organisations:	
they	note	that	failing	organisations	are	often	insular,	with	weak	
networks	and	connections	to	their	peers.	
4.			Responses to failure can be over-reliant on structural reforms:	
they	note	that	structural	changes	including,	for	example,	changes	
in	governance	and	accountability	mechanisms,	are	one	of	the	
most	common	responses	to	failure.	There	is	a	risk	that	too	much	
faith	can	be	placed	in	structural	changes,	which	may	not	prevent	
further	failure	unless	enacted	in	combination	with	other	measures	
including,	for	example,	new	leadership.
5.			Creating an open, no-blame culture helps to protect against 
future risk of failure: their	research	showed	that	environments	
in	which	people	feel	unable	to	be	honest	about	problems	can	
allow	even	more	serious	failings	to	incubate.
6.			There is scope for more sector-wide learning from failure: 
colleagues	feel	there	are	currently	limited	opportunities	to	learn	
from	failure;	there	is	an	opportunity	to	capture	and	more	widely	
disseminate	lessons	from	effective	turnaround	efforts.
7.			Failure can (appear to) get worse before it gets better:	
while	being	labelled	an	organisation-in-failure	is	traumatic	for	
an	organisation	and	those	working	in	it,	the	IfG	found	that	the	
label	can	itself	be	a	pivotal	moment	in	the	turnaround	journey	–	
breaking	the	organisation’s	insularity,	bringing	problems	into	the	
open	and	galvanising	action.
8.			Turnaround should set the foundation for long-term 
improvement:	as	well	as	dealing	with	immediate	problems,		
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the	IfG	notes	that	recovery	from	failure	is	only	half	the	journey;	
converting	turnaround	into	lasting	improvement	is	also	
important	–	and	the	approach	taken	to	intervention	can		
impact	the	organisation’s	ability	to	do	that.
Government’s	approach	to	intervention	in	further	education	
colleges	is	decidedly	not	the	focus	of	this	piece;	it	is	a	subject	
worthy	of	deep	exploration	and	discussion	in	its	own	right.	That	
said,	I	cannot	resist	the	temptation	to	note	that	IfG	counsels	
against	an	over-reliance	on	structural	reform	at	a	time	when	
government’s	preferred	solution	to	college	failure	is	merger.	It	
is	several	years	too	soon	for	us	to	see	whether	merging	weaker	
colleges	with	stronger	ones	moves	the	dial	on	curriculum	and/or	
financial	measures	of	performance	and	sustainability.	
Though	focused	on	organisational	failure	and	the	external,	
government	interventions	which	follow	the	lessons	articulated	
through	the	IfG’s	research	also	offer	some	important	insight	
with	respect	to	college	leaders’	efforts	to	drive	transformation	
from	within.	That	three	of	the	IfG’s	lessons	concern	the	merits	of	
peer	support,	the	insularity	of	failing	organisations	and	the	scope	
for	learning	from	failure,	points	to	the	merits	of	looking	beyond	
organisational	and	sectoral	boundaries	for	the	insight,	expertise	and	
good	practice	required	to	successfully	transform	a	given	further	
education	college	–	whether	that	means	looking	at	how	other	
colleges	are	successfully	addressing	similar	issues	and/or	thinking	
about	how	techniques	more	commonly	applied	in	other	sectors	
could	be	used	to	drive	transformation.
The	IfG’s	fifth	lesson,	about	culture,	is	pivotal.	It	notes	that	
whatever	policy	or	process	changes	are	implemented,	
transformation	also	requires	that	colleagues	are	engaged,	enthused	
and	determined	to	deliver	improvements.	This	engagement	is	both	
about	identifying	problems	–	giving	leaders	much	greater	visibility	
and	understanding	of	what’s	really	going	on	–	and	about	refocusing	
the	organisation	on	the	delivery	of	high-quality	services	for	its	
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users.97	We	saw	in	Chapter 3	that	Ofsted	often	criticises	poorly	
performing	colleges	both	for	a	culture	of	low	expectations	and	for	
failing	to	focus	sharply	enough	on	areas	for	improvement.
The	IfG’s	last	lesson	is	also	important	to	this	piece.	They	found	
that,	‘some	organisations	can	be	too	focused	on	achieving	an	
“adequate”	rating	without	addressing	the	underlying	causes	of	
poor	performance’.98	They	argue	that	a	focus	on	sustained,	long-
term	improvement	can	be	the	difference	between	organisations	
sustaining	their	improvement	rather	than	yo-yoing	in	and	out	of	
trouble.	We	saw	in	Chapter 2	how	difficult	colleges	are	finding	it	
to	make	the	improvement	to	Good	–	let	alone	to	stay	there	or	
continue	improving.	
The transformation of the NYU Langone Medical Centre is an 
interesting case study from which further education college 
leaders can draw important insights…
Eric	J.	McNulty,	Nathaniel	Foote	and	Douglas	Wilson	looked	at	
the	case	study	transformation	of	NYU	Langone	Medical	Centre	in	
the	USA99	led	by	Robert	Grossman.	Over	the	10	years	from	2007,	
Grossman	transformed	the	hospital	–	which	is	now	rated	amongst	
the	10	best	in	the	USA.	From	an	operating	loss	of	$120	million	in	
2007,	the	hospital	now	consistently	generates	an	operating	margin	
of	10	per	cent	and	has	received	top	ratings	for	patient	safety	and	
quality	of	care.	
The	NYU	Langone	transformation	put	people	–	rather	than	
changes	in	technology	or	business	model	–	at	its	core,	focusing	on	
three	mutually	reinforcing	elements:	‘creating	belief	in	an	inspiring	
stretch	vision	and	then	translating	it	into	tangible	improvements	
for	each	area;	…	championing	data	transparency	as	a	powerful	
source	of	focus	and	motivation;	[and]	…	committing	to	upgrading	
and	supporting	talent	in	key	roles.’100
97	Ibid.	pp.	24–25.
98	Ibid.	p.	31.
99	McNulty,	E.	J.,	Foote,	N.	and	Wilson,	D.	2017.	Management lessons from one hospital’s dramatic 
turnaround.	Available	at:	www.strategy-business.com/article/Management-Lessons-from-One-
Hospitals-Dramatic-Turnaround?gko=34fb8	[Accessed	September	2018]
100	Ibid
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By	engaging	the	senior	leadership	team	in	a	structured	dialogue	
about	the	vision	he	had	articulated,	Grossman	was	able	to	garner	
the	insight	required	to	test	and	refine	the	vision	–	and	was	able	to	
build	support	for	it.	He	was	also	able	to	develop	a	more	detailed	
roadmap	and	functional	plans	which	taken	together	–	and	tested	
with	colleagues	–	would	deliver	the	required	transformation.	
He	tasked	a	group	of	senior	leaders	to	translate	the	vision	into	the	
metrics	that	should	be	used	to	monitor	the	hospital’s	frontline	
performance	against	external	benchmarks.	These	metrics	were	
drawn	together	in	a	dashboard	that	was	used	to	inform	individual	
departmental	review	meetings	–	and	then	opened	up	so	that	it	
could	be	accessed	by	departmental	leaders	across	the	hospital.	This	
enabled	departments	to	judge	their	own	progress	relative	to	others	
–	using	benchmarks	which	they	had	helped	to	define.
On	arriving	in	post,	Grossman	quickly	replaced	five	of	his	direct	
reports	with	‘more	aggressive’	managers.	He	also	understood	
the	critical	role	of	department	heads,	recognising	that	many	
had	been	promoted	into	managerial	roles	because	of	their	
high	performance	as	medical	practitioners,	rather	than	for	their	
managerial	capability	and	experience	–	and	saw	that	many	were	
entrenched	in	the	old	mindsets	that	Grossman	wanted	to	change.	
He	used	early	vacancies	to	establish	a	new	profile	for	the	sort	of	
departmental	leaders	he	wanted	–	those	with	strong	organisational	
and	emotional	leadership	skills.	He	also	matched	his	heightened	
expectation	of	managers	with	a	greater	willingness	to	invest	in	
them	–	providing	the	resources	and	support	they	needed	to	build	
strong	teams	around	themselves	and	creating	an	orientation	
programme	for	new	leaders.	By	2015,	all	of	the	33	departmental	
heads	in	post	when	Grossman	arrived	had	been	replaced.
Grossman’s	approach	with	respect	to	vision,	data	and	the	
programmatic	roadmap	for	transformation	are	all	consistent	
with	the	approaches	and	recommendations	we	have	seen	from	
Barber,	the	IPA,	IfG	and	McKinsey.	It	is	interesting	to	note	how	
consistently	the	development	of	a	vision	for	the	future	is	seen	as	
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an	inclusive,	discursive	process	which	should	involve	input	from	and	
consultation	with	colleagues	at	all	levels	in	the	organisation;	there	
is	good	counsel	here	for	those	who	tend	to	think	of	strategy	as	
something	which	best	happens	amongst	a	small	group	of	analytical	
and	intellectually	super-charged	colleagues.
I	am	also	interested	to	note	the	relationship	between	vision	and	
roadmap	in	this	case	study.	One	follows,	falls	out	of	and,	therefore,	
fulfils	the	other.	Again,	there	is	good	counsel	here	about	the	need	
for	direct	alignment	between	transformation	and	vision;	practical	
improvement	action	must	move	the	organisation	towards	its	
stated	vision	–	which	must,	therefore,	be	sufficiently	detailed	and	
sharply	articulated	to	serve	as	a	filter	for	decision-making.
Likewise,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Grossman	commissioned	
colleagues	to	create	a	set	of	performance	metrics	which	directly	
reflected	both	the	agreed	vision	and	relevant	external	benchmarks	
–	ensuring	that	progress	could	be	monitored	objectively	and	
with	reference	to	the	desired	destination.	That	the	measures	of	
performance	used	by	colleagues	in	operational	roles	were	directly	
aligned	with	the	vision	and	transformation	roadmap	is	a	crucial	
point	to	note	–	particularly	given	Ofsted’s	common	criticism	that	
leaders	of	poorly-performing	colleges	often	fail	to	effectively	use	
data	to	monitor	and	drive	performance	improvement.
The	merits	of	his	appetite	for	staff	turnover	are	more	debatable.	
I	will	talk	in	Chapter 6	about	the	balance	the	leader	must	strike	
between	building	the	team	they	need	to	deliver	change	and	
creating	opportunities	for	those	already	working	in	the	organisation	
to	flourish	in	a	new	environment.
In	the	chapters	that	follow,	I	will	attempt	to	draw	on	the		
lessons	articulated	in	this	chapter,	as	well	as	the	further	education	
sector	context	and	insights	drawn	out	in	Chapters 1,	2	and	3	to	
reflect	on	how	colleges	might	beat	the	odds	to	deliver		
effective	transformations.	
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The importance of purpose,  
strategy and values 
Particularly given their challenging operating context,  
the purpose of a further education college is one of the 
most powerful tools which leaders can use to drive  
their transformation…
Just	about	every	further	education	college	has	a	mission	statement.	
Some	talk	about	being	the	premier	college	in	the	extended	local	
area.	Some	talk	about	the	policy	imperatives	which	they	exist	to	
advance.	Some	talk	about	the	customers	they	serve.	
It	is	often	the	case	–	in	further	education	and	all	other	sectors	–	
that	mission	statements	exist	on	websites,	in	financial	statements	
and,	perhaps,	a	poster	behind	reception.	They	are	seen	as	one	of	
the	things	that	you’re	supposed	to	have	–	not	as	one	of	the	most	
important	and	powerful	tools	available	to	leaders.	Often	turgid,	
abstracted	and	committee-drafted,	in	trying	to	say	everything	they	
say	nothing	much	at	all	–	and	do	even	less.
Dan	Pallotta	makes	an	important	distinction	between	mission	
statements	–	the	purpose	of	which	is	to	satisfy	communications	
and	public	relations	ends	–	and	being	on	a	mission,	with	all	of	the	
attendant	passion,	clarity	and	urgency.	‘A	person	or	organisation	
on	a	mission	is	inspiring.	A	mission	statement	is	an	abstraction.’101	
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101	Pallotta,	D.	2011.	Do you have a mission statement, or are you on a mission? Available	at:	https://hbr.
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True,	truly	impactful,	mission	statements	he	suggests,	‘yearn.	They	
cry.	They’re	unequivocal.	And	they’re	the	product	of	the	soul	–	the	
product	for	living	and	building	and	creating.’	
Like	Pallotta,	I	am	far	more	interested	in	the	mission	than	the	
mission	statement.	All	further	education	colleges	have	in	common	
a	profoundly	important	mission:	they	help	young	people	and	
adults	to	change	their	lives	and	those	of	their	families;	they	help	
businesses	to	improve	and	grow;	and	through	that	work,	they	
strengthen	the	communities	in	which	they	work.	You	can	see	and	
feel	it	whenever	you	walk	around	a	college;	it	gets	me	every	time.
That	mission	to	improve	the	lives	of	others	through	education	is	
the	thing	that	unifies	everyone	who	works	in	a	further	education	
college	–	whether	they’re	a	teacher,	work	in	corporate	services	or	
occupy	a	leadership	role.	Particularly,	as	austerity	has	whittled	away	
at	reward	and	the	resources	available	to	colleagues	as	they	look	to	
deliver	in	their	roles,	colleagues’	affinity	with	the	mission	of	their	
college	has	become	a	more	important	and	isolated	reason	for	their	
decision	to	work	in	a	college	despite	the	challenges.
This	unifying	mission	presents	an	incredible	opportunity	for	
the	leaders	of	further	education	colleges	–	particularly,	but	not	
exclusively,	those	who	need	to	drive	transformational	change.	We	
saw	in	Chapter 4	that	Barber,	the	IPA	and	McKinsey	all	talked	about	
the	importance	of	a	clear,	communicable	vision	for	the	future;	
without	one,	transformations	risk	a	lack	of	focus,	direction	and	
efficiency	of	execution.
Robert	Quinn	and	Anjan	Thakor	are	brilliant	and	deeply	relevant	
in	their	thinking	on	organisational	mission	–	or	‘purpose’	as	they	
call	it102.	They	distinguish	between	organisations	which	frame	their	
purpose	in	cold,	economic	and	commercial	terms	(e.g.	growth	or	
shareholder	value)	and	those	which	instead	define	their	mission	
in	terms	of	higher	purpose	which:	‘reflects	something	more	
aspirational.	It	explains	how	people	involved	in	an	organisation	are	
102	Quinn,	R.	E.	and	Thakor,	A.	V.	2018.	Creating a purpose-driven organisation.	Available	at:	https://hbr.
org/2018/07/creating-a-purpose-driven-organization	[Accessed	Sept	2018]
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making	a	difference,	gives	them	a	sense	of	meaning,	and	draws	
their	support.’
They	argue	that	most	organisations	operate	on	the	assumption	
that	work	is	fundamentally	contractual	in	nature	–	with	employees	
acting	as	independent	economic	actors	looking	to	maximise	their	
returns	whilst	minimise	their	effort	and	costs.	They	see	this	as	
a	self-fulfilling	prophecy	which	precludes	the	notion	of	a	fully-
engaged	workforce	–	creating	a	transactional	relationship	between	
an	organisation	and	its	employees.	In	such	organisations,	managers	
incentivise	employees	based	on	that	contractual	view	and	
employees	respond	in	kind;	managers	see	that	as	validation	of	their	
assumptions	about	the	employment	relationship	and	so	double-
down	on	the	contractual	approach.	
From	their	research,	though,	they	saw	that	organisations	which	
frame	an	authentic	higher	purpose	can	unlock	new	levels	of	
staff	engagement,	commitment,	innovation	–	and	bottom-line	
performance:	‘people	will	try	new	things,	move	into	deep	learning,	
take	risks	and	make	surprising	contributions.’	This	happens	precisely	
because	it	goes	beyond	that	contractual	view	of	the	employment	
relationships	and	creates	an	intersection	between	the	individual	
and	collective	good	–	which,	in	turn,	facilitates	a	different	set	of	
motivations	and	behaviour	amongst	leaders,	managers	and	their	
employees.	They	suggest	eight	steps	that	organisations	can	take	to	
unlock	this	new	energy	source:
•	 	Envision	an	inspired	workforce:	expose	senior	leaders	to	great	
examples	of	wholly	engaged	and	committed	employees	who	
obviously	go	above	and	beyond	because	they	see	a	higher	
purpose	in	their	work.	Ask	them	to	envision	an	organisation	in	
which	the	majority	of	employees	were	so	engaged.
•	 	Discover	the	purpose:	be	wary	of	the	platitudinous	mission	
statements	which	can	often	emerge	from	long	and	analytical	
pieces	of	work	on	purpose.	They	argue	that	an	organisation’s	
higher	purpose	does	not	need	to	be	invented;	rather,	it	should	
be	discovered	through	an	empathetic	process	of	engagement	
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with	staff.	Higher	purpose	should	be	discovered	through	a	
collective,	iterative	process	involving	staff	at	all	levels.
•	 	Recognise	the	need	for	authenticity:	again,	be	wary	of	‘work	
on	purpose’	undertaken	because	that’s	what	organisations	
are	supposed	to	do.	‘Work	on	higher	purpose’	must	be	about	
goals	and	values	that	senior	leaders	will	then	inject	into	the	
veins	of	the	business,	starting	with	their	own	decisions	and	
conduct.	On	this	Quinn	and	Thakor	say:	‘if	your	purpose	is	
authentic,	people	know,	because	it	drives	every	decision	and	
you	do	things	other	companies	would	not…’	They	note	that	
an	organisation’s	true	nature	is	revealed	by	what	its	leaders	do	
in	the	toughest	of	times.
•	 	Turn	the	authentic	message	into	a	constant	message:	
they	note	that	the	task	of	communicating	and	clarifying	
an	organisation’s	higher	purpose	is	never	done;	the	task	is	
for	purpose	to	‘sink	into	the	collective	conscience’	of	the	
organisation.	When	this	happens	colleagues	will	begin	to	use	
the	purpose	as	a	filter	for	decision-making.
•	 	Stimulate	individual	learning:	they	argue	that	by	connecting	
the	purpose	to	the	learning	processes	of	the	organisation,	
leaders	strengthen	both.	They	reference	the	military	concept	
of	‘commanders’	intent’	through	which	soldiers	become	
able	to	carry	on	with	their	mission	in	the	absence	of	the	
commander	–	having	internalised	the	commander’s	purpose	
for	the	mission.	
•	 	Turn	mid-level	managers	into	purpose-driven	leaders:	
organisations	need	middle-leaders	who	understand	the	
organisation’s	purpose,	‘deeply	connect	with	it	and	lead	with	
moral	power’	–	which	they	note	goes	way	beyond	what	most	
organisations	expect	and	get	from	their	middle	tiers.	
•	 	Connect	the	people	to	the	purpose:	helping	employees	connect	
their	day-to-day	tasks	with	the	organisation’s	higher	purpose	
precisely	so	that	they	can	begin	to	engage	with	those	tasks	
differently,	rethink	them	and	perform	them	to	a	new	standard.	
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•		Unleash	the	positive	energizers:	through	every	organisation	
there	is	a	group	of	change	agents	–	mature,	purpose-driven,	
optimistic	and	engaged.	Organisations	must	use	these	change	
agents	to	support	the	development	of	new	initiatives,	garner	
feedback	and	new	ideas	from	their	colleagues	which	can	be	
used	to	maintain	momentum.
Their	simple	conclusion	on	purpose:	‘by	tapping	into	that	power	
you	can	transform	a	whole	organisation.’	I	agree	with	every	word	
of	the	above.	I’ve	included	an	extended	summary	of	their	work	
because	I	wish	I’d	read	it	in	the	spring	of	2015.
Adopting	this	approach	does	create	a	hostage	to	fortune	for	
leaders.	It	posits	a	north	star	and	sets	very	clear	expectations	about	
the	way	in	which	leaders	will	conduct	themselves,	take	decisions	
and	empower	others	to	do	the	same.	
Len	Sherman	recognises	the	disconnects	that	can	often	exist	
between	organisations	and	their	mission	statements	–	noting	a	
number	of	examples	of	large	corporates,	such	as	Wells	Fargo,	which	
have	fallen	foul	of	the	law	in	ways	which	awkwardly	contradict	their	
stated	mission.	He	also	recognises	the	disdain	that	folk	working	in	
large	organisations	can	often	have	for	their	organisations’	mission	
statements	–	assuming	they’re	even	aware	of	them.103
He	argues,	though,	that	it	is	precisely	because	of	these	
disconnects,	and	the	fast-changing	business	environment,	that	
organisations	need	some	‘anchoring	ideology’	to	guide	them.	
‘When	management	priorities	become	strictly	driven	by	short-term	
business	performance	considerations,	and	business	transactions	are	
handled	on	an	ad	hoc,	case-by-case	basis,	companies	often	lose	
their	business	–	and	sometimes	even	their	moral	–	compass.’104
Amazon’s	success,	he	suggests,	is	the	result	of	a	clearly	articulated	
corporate	purpose	and	management	philosophy	that	guides	
decision-making	at	all	levels	in	an	organisation	with	over	340,000	
103	Sherman,	L.	2017.	Corporate mission statements don’t really matter, unless you want to be a great leader.	
Available	at:	https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2017/04/03/corporate-mission-statements-
dont-really-matter-unless-you-want-to-be-a-great-leader/#1763b92e2246	[Accessed	September	2018]
104	Ibid.
86
employees.	Amazon’s	14	leadership	principles105	are	compelling	and	
widely	known;	more	important,	they	have	been	hardwired	into	the	
way	the	organisation	works.
In	one	very	important	sense,	an	Ofsted	inspection	is	a	great	way	of	
establishing	whether	a	given	college	is	delivering	against	its	purpose	
–	because	inspections,	and	discussions	with	inspectors,	always	
circle	back	to	impact	on	student	experience	and	outcomes.	It	can	
be	spectacularly	frustrating	to	have	an	inspector	bring	you	back	
to	the	student	impact	of	whatever	initiative	you’ve	been	trying	to	
persuade	them	is	a	great	thing	–	but	they’re	absolutely	right	to	do	
it.	That	is	the	purpose	of	Ofsted	and	their	inspections.
I	am	not	arguing	here	that	college	purpose	and	Ofsted	rating	are	
perfectly	synonymous.	They	are	not;	colleges	are	right	to	define	
their	purpose	in	broader	terms	–	going	beyond	their	aim	for	a	
positive	Ofsted	assessment	of	curriculum	quality.	Inspectors’	
zealous	and	relentless	focus	on	student	impact	does,	though,	
bear	comparison	with	the	way	in	which	I	believe	colleges	should	
position	and	relentlessly	test	everything	they	do	against	their	
stated	purpose.
Guided by a clear sense of organisational purpose, leaders 
should devise a genuine, long-term strategy under the banner 
of which they will deliver their transformation…
Strategy	is	both	incredibly	complex	and	desperately	simple.	It	is	the	
subject	of	a	colossal	body	of	academic	work,	corporate	thought-
leadership,	professional	advice	and	discussion	among	leaders	in	all	
sectors.	My	intention	here	is	not	add	a	new	methodology	to	the	
global	stockpile	of	the	same.	Rather	it	is	to	make	two	points:	first,	
that	transformation	requires	strategy;	and,	second,	that	the	strategy	
must	in	fact	be	a	strategy.
One	might	argue	that	the	transformation	of	a	further	education	
college	can	be	a	narrow,	focused	programme	of	action	designed	
to	address	a	particular	set	of	issues	and	requirements	for	
105	Amazon.	Leadership principles.	Available	at:	https://www.amazon.jobs/principles	[Accessed	
September	2018]
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performance	improvement.	It	is	clear	from	the	review	of	Ofsted	
reports	in	Chapter 3 that	poorly	performing	colleges	very	often	
share	a	bundle	of	the	same	causal	issues,	including:	a	failure	to	
make	enough	progress	since	the	previous	inspection;	a	culture	of	
low	expectations;	poor	financial	management;	inaccurate	self-
assessment	and/or	a	lack	of	focus	on	areas	for	improvement;	and	
poor	use	of	data	to	understand	and	drive	performance.	
The	FE	Commissioner’s	annual	report	confirms	the	same;	in	
different	colleges,	he	very	often	makes	recommendations	
pertaining	to	a	common	set	of	causal	issues	which	in	turn	
undermine	headline	curriculum	and	financial	performance.	
Efforts	to	drive	up	16–18	achievement	rates	and	value-added	
will	likely	be	in	vain	if	the	transformation	effort	doesn’t	tackle	
causal	issues	as	well	as	the	performance	symptoms	which	need	
to	be	addressed	–	whatever	they	may	be	in	a	given	organisation.	
My	conclusion	is	that	the	transformation	of	a	college	should	be	
presumed	to	be	a	whole-organisation,	all-in-scope	endeavour	until	
its	scope	can	be	more	tightly	defined.	
It	follows	from	the	power	of	purpose	advocated	above	that	
such	whole-organisation	transformations	require	leaders	to	
posit	a	clear,	simple,	focused	strategy	to	guide	the	change.	
Together	with	their	connection	of	the	organisation	to	its	higher	
purpose,	the	strategy	that	leaders	devise	should	help	liberate	the	
organisation	to	heal	itself	–	where	the	day-to-day	decisions	taken	
by	colleagues	at	all	levels,	in	all	parts	of	the	organisation,	help	to	
deliver	the	required	improvements.
Having	accepted	the	need	to	devise	a	strategy	under	the	banner	of	
which	the	transformation	will	be	executed,	the	leader’s	challenge	
is	to	devise	a	good	strategy.	On	this	point,	I	am	grateful	to	Martin	
Doel	for	introducing	me	to	the	work	of	Richard	Rumelt.	Rumelt	
distinguishes	between	good	and	bad	strategy	–	and	helpfully	
characterises	both.106	He	notes	that:
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 “ Too many organisational leaders say they have a strategy 
when they do not. Instead they espouse what I call ‘bad 
strategy’. Bad strategy ignores the power of choice and 
focus, trying instead to accommodate a multitude of 
conflicting demands and interests… Bad strategy covers 
up its failure to guide by embracing the language of broad 
goals, ambition, vision and values.”
He	identifies	four	hallmarks	of	bad	strategy:
•	 	Failure to face the problem:	Rumelt	argues	that	a	strategy	is	
a	way	to	face	and	overcome	a	difficulty	–	and	that	a	challenge	
must	be	clearly	defined,	or	else	the	quality	of	the	strategy	
cannot	reasonably	be	assessed.	Without	identifying	and	
analysing	obstacles,	you	don’t	have	a	strategy	at	all,		
he	suggests.
•	 	Mistaking goals for strategy:	he	argues	that	many	
organisations	mistake	the	articulation	and	pursuit	of	a	
strategic	goal	for	a	strategy	–	without	identifying	the	
organisational	strengths	or	market	changes	which	they	will	
leverage	in	pursuit	of	that	goal.	‘The	job	of	the	leader	…	is	also	
to	create	the	conditions	that	will	make	the	push	effective,’		
he	notes.
•	  Bad strategic objectives: he	warns	against	‘fuzzy	strategic	
objectives’	which	can	appear	as	a	long	list	of	things	to	be	
done	which	have	often	emerged	from	senior	leaders’	planning	
sessions	with	the	label	‘long-term’	added	to	an	otherwise	
incoherent	mix.	He	also	warns	against	‘blue-sky’	objectives	
which	simply	restate	the	desired	future	state	of	affairs,	
skipping	over	‘the	annoying	fact	that	no	one	has	a	clue	how		
to	get	there.’	
•	  Fluff:	the	final	hallmark	of	bad	strategy,	he	suggests,	is	‘fluff’	
i.e.	‘superficial	abstraction	designed	to	mask	the	absence	of	
thought	….	A	restatement	of	the	obvious,	combined	with	a	
106	Rumelt,	R.	2011.	The perils of bad strategy.	Available	at:	https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-perils-of-bad-strategy	[Accessed		
September	2018]
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generous	sprinkling	of	buzzwords	that	masquerade		
as	expertise.’
There	are	some	fairly	clear	resonances	between	the	above	checklist	
and	the	set	of	common	causal	issues	identified	through	my	review	
of	Ofsted	reports.	
Rumelt	argues	that	strategy	is	about	focus	and,	therefore,	choice,	
i.e.	‘setting	aside	some	goals	in	favour	of	others’.	He	considers	that,	
‘when	this	hard	work	is	not	done,	weak	strategy	is	the	result’.	Good	
strategy	reflects	a	basic	underlying	structure:	
•	  A diagnosis:	which	explains	the	nature	of	the	challenge	–	
simplifying	the	complexity	of	reality	by	identifying	the	critical	
aspects	of	the	situation.
•	 	A guiding policy:	an	overall	approach	chosen	to	cope	with	or	
overcome	the	obstacles	identified	in	the	diagnosis.
•	 	Coherent actions:	a	coordinated	set	of	steps	which,	taken	
together,	support	the	accomplishment	of	the	guiding	policy.
The	diagnosis	stage	is	critical	in	my	and	others’	experience.	That	
auditing,	listening	and	analysing	phase	should	enable	leaders	to	
distil	a	clear	sense	of	what’s	really	going	on	–	and	what’s	really	
going	wrong	–	in	the	organisation.	The	leader’s	skill	here	is	to	
distinguish	cause	from	symptom	–	focusing	on	the	real,	root	
issues	undermining	organisational	wellbeing	and	performance.	It	is,	
therefore,	as	important	to	test	the	emerging	diagnosis	as	it	was	to	
look	and	listen	in	the	first	instance.
The	‘guiding	policy’	should	directly	address	the	diagnosis,	be	
consistent	with	the	organisation’s	purpose	and	values	(see	below)	
–	and	should	provide	colleagues	with	a	clear	sense	of	how	the	
challenge	will	be	addressed.	The	‘coherent	actions’	are	where	
strategy	and	transformation	intersect.	We	saw	in	Chapter 4 
that	Barber,	the	IPA	and	McKinsey	all	placed	great	emphasis	on	
the	existence	of	a	clear,	detailed	and	communicable	roadmap	
for	the	transformation.	Determining	and	framing	concrete,	
transformational	actions	in	the	context	of	the	organisation’s	
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purpose,	problems	and	a	clear	approach	is	how	leaders	create	
for	themselves	the	opportunity	to	generate	understanding,	
engagement	and	enthusiasm	for	the	change.
Leaders’ first task in any strategy or transformation effort is to 
thoroughly investigate and develop a nuanced understanding 
of the baseline position…
I	am	used	to	arriving	new	to	an	organisation	on	a	pre-determined	
transformation	mission	–	as	was	the	case	when	I	was	charged	with	
transforming	Capita’s	own	apprenticeship	programme	into	a	large,	
customer-facing	business	–	or	arriving	new	to	an	organisation	and	
finding	that	transformation	is	needed	–	as	was	the	case	when	I	
took	up	post	at	North	Hertfordshire	College.	Others	may	already	be	
in	post	when	the	need	for	transformation	is	sparked.
Whatever	the	circumstances	in	which	leader	and	transformation	
come	together,	the	first,	and	in	some	ways	most	important,	task	
of	the	whole	transformation	is	to	establish	the	baseline.	Further	
education	colleges	are	incredibly	complex,	multi-dimensional	
organisations,	working	in	a	challenging	and	often	unstable	
operating	environment	(see	Chapter 1).	Before	they	begin	to	
devise	their	prescription,	leaders	must	first	establish	a	thorough,	
nuanced	diagnosis.
That	diagnosis	will	likely	start	with	the	headlines	which	
prompted	the	transformation	in	the	first	place	–	whether	an	
unfavourable	Ofsted	inspection,	financial	event,	intervention	
from	the	FE	Commissioner	or,	simply,	a	slide	in	performance	
which	leaders	and	governors	wish	to	stem.	That	headline	must	
be	seen	as	the	beginning	of	the	baselining	exercise,	not	the	end.
The	broader	and	deeper	the	baselining	exercise	the	better.	As	a	
minimum,	it	should	include:
•	 	Analysis of curriculum performance data:	a	thorough	
interrogation	of	curriculum	performance	data,	identifying	
issues	and	trends	at	a	granular	level	–	and	reaching	for	insight	
as	to	root	causes	of	performance	issues	that	will	need	to	be	
addressed	through	the	transformation.
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•	  Analysis of financial performance data:	a	similarly	robust	
and	comprehensive	review	of	financial	performance	data	–	
and	a	detailed	review	of	the	balance	sheet,	fixed-asset	register,	
extant	commercial	contracts	and	other	finance	tools	so	that	
issues	can	be	flushed	out	early	–	and	so	that	a	picture	can	be	
established	of	the	resources	that	can	be	made	available	to	
drive	the	transformation.
•	 	Review of regulatory and contractual compliance:	a	
review	of	regulatory	and	contractual	compliance	across	
the	organisation	including	a	detailed	review	of	corporate	
policy	and	practice	relating	to	all	regulated	aspects	of	the	
organisation’s	operation.	This	level	of	detail	may	feel	excessive	
but,	particularly	for	an	incoming	leader,	it	is	far	better	to	gain	
comfort	on	these	fundamentals	early.	
•	 	Staff engagement and feedback:	an	extended	programme	
of	listening	to	colleagues	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation	on	
whichever	matters	they	wish	to	raise	with	the	leader.	Open,	
authentic	and	informal	engagement	from	leaders	(see	Chapter 
7)	will	elicit	more	candid	and	insightful	input	from	colleagues	
than	would	be	the	case	through	formal	mechanisms	alone.	
This	is	also	a	great	moment	to	conduct	a	baselining	staff	
survey	–	in	which	colleagues	are	assured	of	their	anonymity	
and	encouraged	not	to	hold	back	in	their	feedback.
•	 	Stakeholder engagement and feedback:	a	similar	external	
consultation	exercise	through	which	leaders	glean	a	sense	of	
the	stakeholder	relationships,	partnerships	and	support	that	
exists	with	local,	regional	and	national	organisations.	Both	of	
these	listening	exercises	should	help	the	leader	build	a	sense	
of	the	organisation’s	history,	culture,	open	wounds		
and	unique	strengths.
•	  Curriculum quality review:	some	sort	of	curriculum	
quality	review	process.	I	personally	favour	a	series	of	mock	
inspections,	phased	over	a	couple	of	months,	through	which	
a	thorough	understanding	of	the	strengths	and	areas	for	
improvement	in	each	curriculum	area	is	established.	
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That	these	reviews	are	conducted	in	a	sensitive	and	supportive	
manner	is	crucial.	They	must	be	positioned	and	conducted	as	a	
supportive	means	through	which	future	improvement	actions	will	
be	established	–	not	as	an	exercise	in	performance	appraisal	or	
the	judgement	of	colleagues’	competence.
Only	when	they	have	completed	the	above	baselining	exercise,	
reflected	on	and	synthesised	their	findings	into	a	coherent	
diagnosis	are	leaders	in	a	position	to	devise	a	way	forward:	a	
‘guiding	policy’	and	set	of	‘coherent	actions’	in	Rumelt’s	language;		
a	strategy	and	transformation	plan	in	mine.	
This	sort	of	exercise	might	usefully	be	positioned	as	a	classic	‘first	
100	days’	exercise	by	leaders	new	to	their	organisation.	Such	an	
approach	makes	it	clear	to	colleagues	that	leaders	are	in	listening	
mode,	are	interested	in	and	open	to	colleagues’	input	–	and	that	
they	do	not	intend	to	make	major	changes	before	they	properly	
understand	the	organisation.	
I	spoke	to	several	CEOs	who,	like	me,	have	experience	of	taking	
up	post	in	a	college	which	is	in	obvious	need	of	transformation.	
All	talked	about	the	importance	of	this	baselining	exercise;	
understanding	the	breadth,	depth,	substance	and	nuance	of	the	
challenge.	Particularly	those	who	had	taken	up	post	in	seriously	
troubled	organisations	wish	that	they	had	invested	more	time	in	a	
more	structured	and	formal	baselining	exercise	at	the	outset.	They	
talked	about	skeletons	falling	out	of	cupboards	months	into	their	
time	in	post	which,	in	hindsight,	they	could	have	done	to	know	
about	much	sooner.	I	found	it	incredibly	easy	to	empathise.
They	talked	about	two	reasons	for	not	investing	in	the	sort	of	
structured	exercise	suggested	above.	First,	they	talked	about	the	
crisis-management	effort	which	consumed	them	on	taking	up	
post:	understanding	the	substance	of	the	screaming	issues	they	
inherited,	sharing	news	with	their	board,	making	changes	in	the	
senior	team,	talking	to	staff	about	the	situation	in	the	hope	of	
maintaining	some	stability,	dealing	with	the	FE	Commissioner	and	
ESFA,	negotiating	with	lenders,	etc,	etc.	Managing	the	crisis	can	be	
so	consuming	that	devising	and	commencing	the	transformation	
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is	forced	into	the	back	seat.	Indeed,	there	is	a	risk	that	it	is	not	
possible	to	stem	the	blood	flow	and	begin	the	life-saving	surgery	
that	is	required.
Second,	they	talked	about	an	assumption	that	because	they	
could	see	so	many	big	issues	so	clearly	that	they	–	in	hindsight	
mistakenly	-	thought	they’d	established	the	full	baseline.	As	those	
skeletons	continued	to	fall	out	of	cupboards,	they	realised	that	the	
baseline	was	broader,	deeper	–	and	worse	–	than	they	originally	
understood.	All	wish	that	they	had	invested	more	in	the	sort	of	
structured	baselining	exercise	described	above	–	for	their	own	
sanity	as	much	as	to	form	a	platform	for	transformation.	
Constant and substantial changes in the policy context make 
setting strategy in a further education college incredibly 
difficult. Leaders should chart their own course…
Strategy	should,	by	its	nature,	be	about	the	organisational	long-
term.	A	critical	factor	in	the	diagnosis	and	strategy-setting	process	
for	any	organisation	is	an	analysis	of	current	and	likely	future	
government	policy.	This	is	as	true	for	FTSE	100	businesses	as	it	
is	for	further	education	colleges.	If	you	didn’t	already	think	that	
government	policy	was	a	really	important	factor	in	the	strategy-
setting	processes	of	major	private-sector	businesses,	I	am	sure	that	
Brexit	has	clarified	matters	for	you.
It’s	important	to	note	at	this	point	that	further	education	colleges	
are	independent	organisations,	technically	classified	as	sitting	
outside	of	the	government	sector	by	the	ONS.107	They	are	not	an	
extension	of	DfE	in	the	way	that	Job	Centres	are	an	extension	of	
the	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions	(DWP)	or	that	hospitals	are	
of	the	Department	for	Health.	They	are	autonomous,	independent	
organisations	expected	to	set	their	own	strategy	in	a	manner	that	
is	consistent	with	their	charitable	objects	–	which	they	can	change	
if	they	want	to.
107	Office	for	National	Statistics.	2012.	Reclassification of further education corporations and sixth form 
colleges in England.	Available	at:	http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160107051314/http:/
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_266962.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018]
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The	environment	is	so	heavily	regulated,	and	they	are	so	heavily	
dependent	on	government	for	their	funding,	that	it	may	not	seem	
to	be	the	case	–	but	it	is.	The	area	review	process	was	conducted	
in	the	soft-edged	way	that	it	was	precisely	because	DfE	cannot	
just	make	colleges	do	what	it	wants.	DfE	could	not	simply	decide	
which	colleges	should	merge	with	which	others	and	demand	that	
they	do	so.	They	could,	of	course,	have	passed	legislation	permitting	
them	to	do	so	–	as	happened	in	Scotland	ahead	of	a	similar	
rationalisation	programme.108
I	wrote	in	Chapter 1	about	the	24-hour	policy	cycle	that	blights	
further	education	in	this	country.	We	have	seen	11	secretaries	of	
state	and	three	funding	bodies	since	1997.	When	(if?)	T	levels	are	
introduced	from	2020	they	will	be	the	fourth	iteration	of	the	full-
time	programme	offer	for	young	people	aged	16-18	since	1997,	
after	Curriculum	2000,	14-19	diplomas	and	study	programmes.	
Likewise,	the	current	standards-based	apprenticeship	regime	is	
the	fourth	iteration	of	the	work-based	training	offer	since	1997	
–	after	NVQs,	Train	to	Gain	and	the	previous	frameworks-based	
incarnation	of	the	apprenticeship	programme;	and	that’s	if	we	
ignore	programme-led	apprenticeships,	the	employer	ownership	of	
skills	pilots	and	other	unfortunate	side-shows.
Any	one	of	those	initiatives	may	have	been	the	right	answer	for	
the	nation’s	skills	and	productivity	shortcomings	compared	to	
our	international	competitors.	Further	education	policies	are	like	
Premier	League	football	managers:	there	are	lots	of	them,	very	few	
last	very	long,	even	fewer	succeed	in	the	long-term	–	and	some	
have	a	nasty	habit	of	reappearing.	
This	instability	is	a	serious	issue	for	leaders	attempting	to	devise	
sensible,	long-term	strategies	for	a	given	further	education	college.	
How	can	you	devise	a	five-year	strategy	for	your	college	when	
government	policy	cannot	be	relied	upon	to	last	for	the	first	one	of	
those	five	years,	let	alone	all	of	them?	It	would	be	very	easy	to	give	
up.	To	stop	trying	to	think	strategically.	To	think	of	the	college	as	
108	Scottish	Parliament.	2013.	College regionalisation.	Available	at:	www.parliament.scot/
ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_13-73.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018]
95
a	contracts	business	–	entirely	at	the	whim	of	its	next	grant	letter	
from	the	funding	body	of	the	moment.	
I	believe	very	strongly	that	the	unpredictability	of	government	
policy	requires	that	colleges	invest	more,	not	less,	in	the	strategy-
setting	process.	Where	government	policy	is	not	clear	or	certain,	
organisations	must	posit	their	own	north	star	and	chart	their	
own	course.	They	must	be	clear	about	their	higher	purpose	and	
see	government	policy	as	a	factor,	but	not	the	only	factor,	which	
shapes	their	operating	environment.
That	means	using	their	independence	from	government	to	build	
a	position	which	affords	them	some	insulation,	some	insurance,	
against	changes	in	government	direction.	It	means	building	
resilience	so	that	they	can	respond	to	the	changes	they	have	to,	
whilst	deciding	which	others	they’ll	engage	with.	This	for	me	is	
an	important	distinction.	Changes	like	T	levels,	or	the	maths	and	
English	condition	of	funding,	cannot	be	ignored.	They’re	what’s	
required	of	further	education	colleges	for	the	grant	funding	they	
receive	from	government	each	year.
Apprenticeship	reform	is	slightly	different.	At	one	level,	further	
education	colleges	have	to	respond	because	if	they	deliver	any	
apprenticeships	at	all,	they	must	be	compliant	with	the	prevailing	
rules.	At	another	level,	colleges	are	free	to	and	must	shape	their	
own	response	to	apprenticeship	reform:	will	they	look	to	grow	
or	shrink	their	provision,	go	national	or	stay	local,	generalise	or	
specialise,	price	at	cap	or	discount?	Their	response	is	not	a	strategy	
–	it	should	be	guided	by	their	strategy.
Initiatives	like	my	old	favourite,	Institutes	of	Technology,	are	
different	again.	They’re	an	example	of	initiatives	which	further	
education	colleges	can	more	obviously	choose	to	engage	with	or	
let	pass	them	by.	There	was	no	requirement	that	all	colleges	bid	to	
become,	or	at	some	point	work	with,	an	Institute	of	Technology.	
Colleges	were	free	to	determine	whether	and	how	they	engaged	
with	the	policy	–	without	obvious	or	immediate	implications	for	
their	core	programme	offer.	Their	response	is	not	a	strategy	–	it	
should	be	guided	by	their	strategy.	
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I	do	also	believe	that	while	government	policy	is	unpredictable,	
government	strategy	over	the	last	20	years	has	actually	been	
remarkably	consistent.	It	strikes	me	that	at	least	four	clear	trends	
have	sustained	through	the	period:
1.	  A clear focus on skills as a driver of productivity and growth: 
my	first	outing	as	a	civil	servant	was	on	the	2003	skills	white	
paper.	I	will	never	forget	sitting	underneath	a	programme	board	
meeting	table,	taking	the	minutes,	expecting	to	be	fired	for	
booking	a	room	that	was	at	best	a	quarter	of	the	size	it	needed	
to	be;	I	elected	not	to	minute	the	moment	a	quango	CEO	
inadvertently	stuck	her	pen	in	my	director’s	ear,	so	cramped	
were	the	conditions.	That	white	paper	signalled	that	government	
investment	in	adult	skills	would	be	focused	on	addressing	
skills	productivity	gaps	between	the	UK	and	our	international	
competitors.	While	white	papers,	speeches	and	other	
pronouncements	since	then	have	announced	a	raft	of	different	
interventions,	they	have	not	erred	from	that	strategic	intent	with	
respect	to	the	purpose	of	further	education	and	skills.
2.	  A strong desire to give employers real influence over the 
system:	in	that	2003	white	paper,	we	talked	about	creating	a	
‘demand-led	system’	and	committed	to	invest	in	the	employer	
training	pilots	which	became	Train	to	Gain.	By	2006	and	
2007,	the	Leitch	Review	and	the	white	paper,	which	I	had	the	
privilege	of	collating	in	response,	moved	the	narrative	on	to	
talk	about	a	‘genuinely’	or	‘truly	demand-led	system’;	the	Skills	
Pledge	and	other	initiatives	accompanied	that	dialling-up	of	
the	rhetoric.	By	2011,	the	narrative	had	developed	into	one	of	
‘employer	ownership’	of	the	skills	system;	the	largely	pointless	
employer	ownership	of	skills	pilots109	followed,	before	being	
quickly	overtaken	by	apprenticeship	reform	and	the	levy.	Again,	
though,	while	policy	has	bounced	around,	the	strategic	trend	has	
survived	successive	governments.
109	Department	for	Education.	2018.	Employer ownership of skills pilot: round 1 final evaluation.	Available	
at:	www.gov.uk/government/publications/employer-ownership-of-skills-pilot-round-1-final-
evaluation	[Accessed	September	2018]
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3.			A clear focus on student progression and destinations:	the	
obvious	corollary	of	the	above	has	been	a	growing	focus	on	
student	progression,	destinations	and	outcomes.	Long	gone	are	
the	days	in	which	strong	achievement	rates	alone	made	for	a	
Good	or	Outstanding	further	education	college.	Ofsted’s	focus	
on	outcomes,	value-added	and	employability	has	grown	steadily	
over	the	last	15	years.	Likewise,	the	programme	offer	for	16-	to	
18-year-olds	has	become	ever-more	focused	on	employability	
and	destinations.	The	evolution	from	study	programmes	to	
T	levels	is	as	natural	as	the	evolution	of	the	apprenticeship	
landscape	over	a	similar	period.
4.			Growing commercialisation in the operation of the sector:	
while	the	level	of	regulation	and	government	intervention	mean	
that	it	would	too	much	to	describe	a	marketisation	of	further	
education,	there	has	certainly	been	a	steady	increase	in	the	
commerciality	of	the	sector	environment.	As	funding	pressures	
have	increased,	the	need	for	commercial	expertise	in	the	general	
operation	of	a	given	college	has	grown	steadily;	the	need	for	
commercial,	marketing	and	business	development	expertise	
has	also	grown	as	colleges	have	come	to	compete	for	students,	
business	customers	and	capital	grants.
My	conclusions	from	the	above	are	threefold:	first,	that	leaders	
should	take	full	advantage	of	their	independence	from	government	
to	set	strategies	which	insulate	them	from	constant	change	in	the	
policy	environment;	second,	that	leaders	should	see	government	
policy	as	a	prime,	but	not	the	only,	driver	of	their	strategy;	and,	
third,	that	in	doing	so,	leaders	should	discern	the	underlying	and	
long-term	trends	in	government	policy	such	that	their	strategy	is	
consistent	with	or	even	ahead	of	the	flow	of	changes	coming	out	
of	Whitehall.	
Purpose, strategy and leaders’ focus on organisational values 
combine to create the conditions for a successful transformation…
I	am	clear	though,	that	leaders’	investment	in	creating	the	right	
organisational	context	for	the	transformation	is	the	steepest	part	
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of	the	climb.	With	purpose,	strategy	and	ways	of	working	firmly	
established,	direct	transformation	actions	will	be	delivered	more	
quickly,	effectively	and	easily	–	because	colleagues	delivering	them	
will	be	engaged,	enthused	and	understand	what	a	given	action	has	
to	do,	to	play	its	part	in	the	overall	change.	
I	have	often	reflected	that	a	focus	on	organisational	values	
happened	to	me,	more	than	I	happened	to	it,	in	Hertfordshire.	
At	the	end	of	a	fairly	fraught	first	week	in	post,	I	spoke	to	staff	
about	the	issues	I	had	identified	with	the	organisation’s	historic	
administration	of	student	records,	and	the	action	I	was	taking	to	
address	them	in	the	immediate	term.
That	I	took	a	principled	position	on	the	matter,	and	took	the	action	
that	I	considered	necessary	in	spite	of	the	organisational	tumult	it	
created,	positioned	me	as	‘that	guy’	before	I	had	really	started	to	
do	any	of	the	things	which	I	had	planned	–	and	which	you	might	
expect	of	an	incoming	CEO.	What	followed	was	something	of	an	
organisational	bloodletting	through	which	colleagues	spoke	up	
about	their	concerns	on	a	raft	of	different	issues	and	fronts.	Whilst	
keeping	my	counsel	on	what	would	follow,	I	listened	diligently	to	
every	comment	and	complaint,	every	suggestion	and	rejection	of	
organisational	custom	and	practice.	
Two	things	flowed	from	those	early	weeks	of	my	time	in	
Hertfordshire.	One,	I	never	stopped	trying	to	be	authentic,	
accessible	and	open	to	informal	discussion	with	colleagues	at	all	
levels.	I	think	it	would	be	fair	to	say	that	it	took	some	colleagues	
quite	a	long	time	to	understand	just	how	fundamentally	I	wanted	
to	redraw	the	traditional	rules	of	engagement	between	CEO	and	
colleagues	throughout	the	organisation.	
Second,	I	learned	that	our	organisational	values	–	and	purpose	
–	mattered	a	great	deal.	I	was	overwhelmed	by	the	dedication,	
determination	and	integrity	of	the	vast	majority	of	my	new	
colleagues.	Their	commitment	to	their	students,	the	lengths	they	
would	go	to	in	support	of	a	student	in	need,	was	quite	amazing	
to	me.	I	came	to	see	that	as	a	function	of	their	connection	to	the	
organisation’s	higher	purpose	–	and	their	personal	values.	And	I	
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learned	to	talk	more	and	more	in	those	terms,	about	what	we	did,	
why	and	how.
It	worked.	Ofsted	commended	this	aspect	of	work	and	directly	
linked	it	to	the	improvements	we	were	able	to	deliver,	saying:	
‘senior	leaders	have	ensured	good	communications	at	all	levels	
in	the	college	and	have	developed	a	culture	of	trust	and	respect.	
Consequently,	staff	feel	respected	and	valued.	They	contribute	
effectively	by	using	their	expertise	to	improve	the	quality	of	
provision	and	outcomes	for	learners.’110
Steve	Zaffron	and	Gregory	Unruh	argue	that	organisations	
should	be	seen	as	a	‘network	of	conversations’	–	reflecting	the	
fundamental	corporate	reality	that,	‘conversations,	whether	
acknowledged	or	not,	are	going	on	all	the	time;	unacknowledged	
conversations,	however,	are	not	being	managed	or	led.	Managers	
assume	that	passing	along	memos,	directives,	and	policies	
constitutes	“conversation,”	but	often	these	become	mere	“topics”	
of	the	real,	informal	conversations	that	are	already	occurring	in	the	
larger	network.’111	
They	argue	that	recognising	this	reality,	and	working	with	it,	can	
help	organisations	and	their	senior	leaders	to	improve	information	
flows,	build	collaboration	and	performance	improvement.	They	
distinguish	three	different	types	of	conversation:	
•	 		Leadership	conversations	which	are	about	creating	a	
compelling	view	of	the	organisation’s	future	–	noting	that	the	
fulfilment	of	strategic	vision	is	dependent	on	engaging	and	
energising	those	who	must	act	to	realise	that	future.
•	 		Managerial	conversations	which	are	focused	on	the	short	
term	through	discussion	of	particular	corporate	initiatives		
and	projects	which	leaders	are	using	to	connect	the	present	
to	the	future.	
110	Ofsted.	2017.	Further education and skills inspection report – North Hertfordshire College.	Available	
at:	https://reports.ofsted.gov.uk/provider/31/130721	[Accessed	September	2018]
111	Zaffron,	S.	and	Unruh,	G.	2018.	Your organisation is a network of conversations.	Available	at:	
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/your-organization-is-a-network-of-conversations/	[Accessed	
September	2018]
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•	 		Individual	conversations	which	are	about	the	today,	i.e.	what	
individuals	are	doing	today	to	deliver	projects	and	initiatives	
that	will	in	turn	fulfil	the	strategic	vision.
The	leadership	challenge	they	identify	is	to,	‘identify	and	co-create	
an	inspiring	future	that	informs	the	conversations	taking	place	at	
all	levels	of	the	organization.	Creating	a	future	is	different	from	
“getting	buy-in”	on	a	corporate	vision	statement.	In	our	experience,	
buy-in	often	extracts	little	more	than	compliance	from	workers,	
whereas	a	future	that	employees	feel	a	part	of	and	find	compelling	
unleashes	commitment	and	enthusiasm.’	
I	doubt	their	analysis	could	be	truer	anywhere	more	than	a	further	
education	college.	The	network	of	informal	conversations	that	take	
place	in	a	college	is	quite	remarkable.	Colleges	are	communities	as	
much	as	they	are	organisations.
I	returned	from	one	summer	holiday,	having	shed	a	few	pounds,	
to	hear	later	that	week	via	the	rumour	mill	that	I	was	dying.	I	
was	not.	But	I	learned	how	the	communication	lines	really	work	
in	a	college	–	and	began	to	think	how	I	could	turn	that	to	my	
transforming	advantage.
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The hard yards of transformation 
Don’t assume that new levels of performance will always mean 
new staff. Leaders should look to unleash and grow the talent of 
colleagues already in the organisation…
It	is	always	easy	for	leaders	–	particularly	those	who	are	newly	
appointed	–	to	assume	that	to	change	the	performance,	they	will	
need	to	change	the	people.	At	senior	levels,	some	changing	of	the	
guard	is	inevitable.	As	they	go	through	their	particular	version	of	
the	baselining	and	strategy-setting	process,	leaders	will	want	to	
consider	whether	they	have	the	senior	team	they’ll	need	around	
them	to	deliver	the	transformation.	Likewise,	members	of	their	
senior	team	often	use	the	appointment	of	a	new	chief	executive	as	
a	spark	for	reflection.
The	thing	I	am	far	more	interested	in	here	is	the	mindset	and	
approach	that	leaders	take	with	respect	to	colleagues	beyond	
the	senior	team.	As	I	talked	about	in	Chapter 5,	engaging	with	
colleagues	openly,	authentically	and	substantively	about	the	
organisation’s	higher	purpose	can	be	both	cathartic	and	energising	
for	colleagues	at	all	levels.	It	can	start	the	healing	process	by	
bringing	colleagues	together	around	the	thing	they,	very	likely,	have	
in	common:	their	affinity	for	the	work	that	the	organisation	does	
for	students,	businesses	and	the	communities	they	serve.	
Likewise,	the	articulation	of	a	‘good	strategy’	should	provide	
colleagues	with	a	clear	sense	of	the	approach	that	the	organisation	
is	taking	to	its	improvement	effort	–	helping	them	take	good	
CHAPTER SIX
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operational	decisions	on	a	day-to-day	basis	which	support,	not	
thwart,	that	effort.	This	element	is	particularly	important	for	
mid-level	managers.	Their	development	into	a	pool	of	what	Quinn	
and	Thakor	call	‘purpose-driven	leaders’	will	likely	be	the	defining	
development	in	the	transformation	journey	as	a	whole.	Mid-
level	managers	typically	hold	the	organisation’s	disaggregated	
performance	improvement	goals	in	their	job	descriptions.	It	is	
pretty	much	impossible	to	improve	performance	without	them.	
Only	when	this	group	is	engaged,	enthused,	empowered	and	
confident	in	their	ability	to	make	operational	decisions	consistent	
with	the	organisation’s	overall	strategy	and	purpose	will	the	
transformation	really	pick	up	pace.	I	strongly	endorse	Quinn	and	
Thakor’s	prescription	on	this	point.	Leaders’	authentic,	constant	
engagement	with	this	group	is	perhaps	the	most	important	
leadership	investment	they	will	make	–	and	one	of	the	most	
important	roles	they	will	personally	play	in	the	transformation.	
Zaffron	and	Unruh’s	description	of	the	organisation	as	a	network	
of	conversations	is	also	deeply	relevant	here.	Leaders’	willingness	
to	engage,	consult	and	help	guide	colleagues	as	they	connect	their	
day-to-day	work	with	the	organisation’s	purpose	and	strategy	is	
critical	to	the	transformation	effort.	As	Quinn	and	Thakor	note,	
strengthening	that	connection	helps	colleagues	rethink	their	daily	
tasks	and	perform	them	to	a	new	standard.
All	of	the	above	is	about	flipping	the	presumption	and	assuming	
that	you	can	unleash	and	grow	the	talent	of	colleagues	already	
working	in	the	organisation	–	rather	than	assuming	that	new	
performance	always	and	necessarily	means	new	people.	Turnover	
is	always	disruptive,	not	without	costs	and	can	often	be	harmful	
and	destabilising	for	the	organisation	and	colleagues	who	work	
in	it.	Leaders	should,	therefore,	aim	to	transform	with	the	lowest	
possible	level	of	staff	turnover	–	even	if	that	transpires	to	be	
substantial	turnover	in	the	short-term.
This	approach	will	require	a	substantial	investment	in	staff	
development	–	whether	to	address	capability	and	performance	
gaps	and/or	to	help	colleagues	familiarise	themselves	with	the	
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particular	expectations,	approaches	and	tools	the	organisation	has	
settled	on	to	drive	its	transformation.	This	should	be	a	structured,	
sustained	and	multi-faceted	programme	which	addresses	
organisational,	departmental	and	individual	areas	for	improvement.	
Barber’s	public	value	framework	(see	Chapter 4)	highlights	the	
importance	of	a	workforce	strategy	linked	to	service	delivery	goals	
and	identified	performance	issues;	likewise,	‘people’	is	one	of	the	
IPA’s	seven	lenses	of	transformation.
One	of	the	most	pleasing	aspects	of	the	HLG	transformation,	
from	my	perspective,	was	the	number	of	managers	with	whom	I	
shared	the	whole	journey.	Their	engagement,	enthusiasm,	passion	
for	the	organisation	and	its	improvement	journey	inspired	me.	
Their	willingness	to	think	differently,	try	new	things	and	aim	high	in	
everything	we	did	was	the	defining	factor	in	our	improvement.	
Several	in	that	group	were	unrecognisable	in	their	performance	
from	my	first	day	to	my	last.	I	attribute	all	credit	for	that	change	
to	them.	They	took	advantage	of	the	environment	we	created	
together	to	develop	themselves	and	their	teams.	They	take	full	
credit	for	one	of	the	most	complimentary	quotes	in	our		
Ofsted	report:	
As a result of inspirational leadership, there has been a 
substantial and positive impact on the culture of the college 
and a rapid improvement in the quality of teaching, learning 
and assessment.... Senior leaders have ensured good 
communications at all levels in the college and have developed 
a culture of trust and respect. Consequently, staff feel respected 
and valued. They contribute effectively by using their expertise to 
improve the quality of provision and outcomes for learners.112 
Leaders must provide colleagues with a clear, simple 
architecture which helps them translate purpose, strategy  
and transformation into improved performance…
112	Ofsted.	2017.	Further education and skills inspection report – North Hertfordshire College.	Available	
at:	https://reports.ofsted.gov.uk/provider/31/130721,	p.	3.
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I	talked	in	Chapter 1	about	the	incredibly	complicated,	constantly	
changing	and	challenging	operating	environment	in	which	colleges	
work.	In	defining	purpose,	setting,	maintaining	and	delivering	
strategy,	leaders	must	make	sense	of	that	environment	and	judge	
what	to	engage	with,	when	and	how.	That’s	an	incredibly	difficult	
task	–	particularly	in	a	college	that’s	on	a	transformation	journey.	
The	last	thing	you	need	when	you’re	trying	to	transform	
organisational	performance	is	for	the	goalposts	to	move	or,	worse,	
for	the	rules	of	the	game	change	altogether.	The	reality	of	the	
further	education	sector	is	that	leaders	should	presume	movement	
of	goalposts	and	substantive	rule	changes	during	the	life	of	their	
transformation	journey.	Those	starting	the	journey	in	2019	will	very	
likely	(who	can	say	for	sure)	need	to	implement	T	levels	at	some	
point	before	their	transformation	is	complete.	And	who	would	
bet	against	material	adjustment	in	the	apprenticeship	reform	
programme,	too?	
Just	as	they	need	to	make	sense	of	the	external	environment	
in	setting	strategy	for	the	organisation,	so	leaders	also	need	to	
help	colleagues	make	sense	of	both	the	external	and	internal	
environment	throughout	the	transformation	period.	External	
change	can	be	a	source	of	concern	and	confusion	for	colleagues:	
does	a	change	in	the	external	environment	mean	the	
organisation’s	strategy	is	about	to	change?	Is	the	organisation	
under	new	and	existential	threat?	Are	our	transformation	plans	
invalid,	or	about	to	change?	
With	respect	to	the	external	environment,	I	tend	to	think	about	
leaders	creating	umbrellas	under	which	colleagues	can	confidently	
get	on	with	the	task	in	hand	–	without	worrying	too	much	about	
the	latest	change	in	policy,	funding	or	local	politics.	Perhaps	
because	my	particular	background	was	in	policy-making	rather	
than	teaching	and	learning,	I	saw	it	as	my	job	at	HLG	to	take	care	
of	external	and	corporate	business	so	that	my	colleagues	could	stay	
focused	on	our	transformation	task.	I	very	rarely	asked	curriculum	
colleagues	to	engage	with	anything	other	than	pieces	of	work	that	
would	improve	curriculum	performance.
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One	of	the	best	examples	of	the	need	for	such	an	umbrella	was,	
of	course,	the	area	review	process.	The	risk	of	organisational	
distraction	was	great;	my	tolerance	for	it	was	limited	to	say	the	
least.	I	was	critically	clear	with	colleagues	that	I	thought	the	area	
review	was	something	for	the	company	secretary,	finance	director	
and	I	to	take	care	of	–	while	others	assumed	that	the	process	
would	not	have	material	implications	for	us	(which	was	fairly	
certain	to	be	the	case,	given	the	outcome	of	earlier	reviews	in	the	
process,	and	local	partner	perspectives).	
I	could	not	afford	to	have	colleagues	distracted	by	the	process	
when	we	had	a	college	to	transform	–	and	I	wasn’t	prepared	to	
lower	my	expectations	of	the	transformational	progress	they	
delivered	because	of	the	area	review.	There	is	a	hard	edge	here:	
if	senior	leaders	provide	their	operationally	focused	colleagues	
with	umbrellas	which	protect	them	from	the	external	weather,	
they	should	expect	performance	from	those	colleagues	which	is	
reflective	of	the	relative	stability	they	have	created	for	them.	
The	sort	of	open,	authentic	and	constant	engagement	
described	above	is	clearly	an	important	factor	here.	It	is	one	
thing	for	leaders	to	make	sense	and	take	care	of	the	external	
environment	so	that	others	can	get	on	with	the	transformation	
task.	It	is	another	for	colleagues	to	trust	their	leader	to	do	that	
both	well	and	in	good	faith.113	
In	many	ways,	the	more	challenging	task	for	leaders	is	to	
communicate	with	colleagues	about	the	transformation	itself	
in	ways	that	make	sense	to	them,	which	help	them	engage	
with	it	and	play	their	part	in	its	success.	Recall	from	Chapter 
4	the	McKinsey	survey	in	which	90	per	cent	of	respondents	
said	that	the	transformation	they	were	involved	in	would	have	
benefited	from	more	engagement	with	front-line	employees;	
and	the	IPA’s	seven	lenses	which	talked	about	the	need	for:	a	
compelling	picture	of	the	future	(purpose	and	strategy);	a	clear	
113	Han	Ming	Ching,	D.,	Kim,	T-Y.,	Gilbreath,	B.	and	Andersson,	L.	2018.	Why people believe in their 
leaders – or not.	Available	at:	https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-people-believe-in-their-
leaders-or-not/?social_token=a711e1dadb344b248a8f73106c478ba9&utm_source=twitter&utm_
medium=social&utm_campaign=sm-direct	[Accessed	September	2018]
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view	of	how	different	components	of	the	transformation	will	fit	
together	to	deliver	the	whole;	and,	a	roadmap	which	identifies	
the	sequencing	of	and	interdependencies	between	different	
components	of	the	transformation.	
It	follows	from	the	common	issues	described	in	Chapter 3	
and	approach	to	strategy	described	in	Chapter 4	that	the	
transformation	is	likely	to	be	a	large,	multi-faceted	piece	of	work.	If	
colleagues	are	going	to	engage	with	and	contribute	to	a	successful	
transformation,	leaders	need	to	communicate	the	blueprint	in	
ways	which	enable	them	to	understand,	challenge	and	translate	
transformational	imperatives	into	their	daily	work.	
This	requires	that	leaders	develop	a	means	of	communicating	
about	the	transformation	in	ways	that	colleagues	at	all	levels	can	
readily	understand	and	relate	to	–	including	crucially	what	it	means	
for	them,	their	role	and	their	work	in	the	organisation.	In	my	and	
others’	experience,	this	is	about	creating	very	simple,	likely	very	
visual,	summaries	of	the	transformation	programme	which	can	be	
used	as	communication	tools.	
It	is	also	about	the	way	in	which	leaders	lead,	communicate	
and	engage	with	colleagues	at	all	levels.	The	sort	of	purpose-led	
engagement	described	by	Quinn	and	Thakor	and	the	reality	of	the	
organisation	as	a	network	of	conversations	described	by	Zaffron	
and	Unruh	give	leaders	the	opportunity	to	help	their	colleagues	
really	understand	the	transformation	programme	and	what	it	
means	for	them	–	precisely	because	of	the	open,	authentic,	formal	
and	informal	engagement	which	leaders	are	prepared	to	invest	in.
Another	crucial	factor	here	is	the	role	of	middle	managers,	
touched	on	earlier	in	this	chapter.	Given	their	operational	
responsibilities,	this	group	is	absolutely	critical	to	the	success	
of	the	transformation;	their	understanding	of	and	engagement	
with	it	should	therefore	be	amongst	leaders’	highest	priorities	
throughout	the	transformation	process.	
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Large, complex and dynamic organisations and transformation 
programmes require proper programme management and 
operating excellence approaches, led from the corporate centre…
I	see	huge	benefits	from	the	proportionate	application	
of	programme	management	and	operational	excellence	
approaches	in	each	of	these	areas	–	and	real	risks	if	they	are	
not	embraced.	I	am	interested	in	programme	management	
and	operational	process	management	techniques	from	four	
perspectives:	first,	the	way	in	which	the	transformation	roadmap	
is	devised	and	driven;	second,	the	way	in	which	leaders	manage	
the	overall	business	cycle;	third,	the	way	in	which	performance	
and	accountability	arrangements	operate;	and,	fourth,	the	way	
in	which	curriculum	improvement	is	managed.	
Using programme management techniques to devise and drive 
the transformation roadmap
We	saw	in	Chapter 3	that	Ofsted	often	criticises	a	lack	of	
progress	since	the	previous	inspection	and	a	lack	of	focus	on	
areas	for	improvement.	In	Chapter 4,	Barber’s	work	on	public	
value	talked	about	the	importance	of	‘pursuing	goals’	and	
‘managing	inputs’	–	including	the	ways	in	which	resources	
are	allocated	and	progress	monitored.	The	IPA’s	seven	lenses	
framework	is	also	clear	on	the	importance	of	understanding	
how	different	components	of	a	given	transformation	will	be	
configured	to	deliver	the	vision,	and	on	the	need	for	a	detailed	
roadmap	which	sequences	and	identifies	interdependencies	
between	different	aspects	of	the	transformation	programme	as	
a	whole.	And	McKinsey	argued	that	‘cadence	and	coordination	
in	delivery’	is	one	of	five	disciplines	which,	if	applied,	can	
multiply	the	prospects	of	transformation	success	by	more		
than	threefold.
I	needed	none	of	the	above	evidence	to	convince	me	that	
transformations	need	to	be	properly	planned	and	monitored	using	
proportionate	programme	and	project	management	techniques;	
I	can’t	imagine	trying	to	deliver	a	large,	long,	complex,	whole-
organisation	programme	of	work	without	the	comfort	of	a	
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programmatic	environment.	When	I	joined	the	civil	service	as	a	green	
graduate	trainee	in	2003,	programme	and	project	management	
techniques	were	just	being	introduced;	indeed,	I	developed	the	
programme	plan	for	the	2003	skills	white	paper.	
By	the	time	I	left	the	Civil	Service	in	2009,	such	techniques	were	
well-embedded	as	a	means	of	managing	all	manner	of	different	
types	of	work	–	whether	policy	development,	implementation	
or	transformation.	I	learned	much	more	about	the	potential	of	
programme	management	during	my	time	at	PwC,	where	pretty	
much	all	client	assignments	would	be	planned	and	managed	using	
programme	management	techniques;	likewise	in	Capita,	where	the	
scale	of	some	programmes	could	be	quite	staggering.
Others	I	spoke	to	in	preparing	this	piece,	who	have	experience	
of	programme	management	techniques	from	either	within	
or	beyond	the	further	education	sector,	share	the	view	that	
transformations	should	be	devised	and	monitored	through	the	
proportionate	application	of	programme	management	techniques.	
I	say	‘proportionate’	advisedly.	I	have	worked	with	some	incredibly	
skilled,	experienced	and	professionally	qualified	programme	
management	experts	–	including	a	wonderful	band	of	experts	
in	PwC	who	learned	their	trade	in	the	armed	forces	–	none	of	
whom	think	that	the	right	answer	is	to	throw	the	full	programme	
management	toolkit	at	every	piece	of	work.	Great	programme	
managers	use	the	right	tool	to	deliver	in	the	organisational	context	
in	which	they’re	working.
For	me	that	means	that	transformations	should	be	supported,	at	
least,	by:
•	 	A	simple,	high-level	critical	path	which	shows	the	sequencing	
and	interdependencies	between	fundamental	elements	of	the	
transformation	programme	over	time.
•	 	A	more	detailed	plan	setting	out	the	series	of	deliverables	
which,	by	workstream	and	taken	together,	will	deliver	the	
critical	path	and	transformation;
•	 	An	action,	issues	and	risk	log	covering	the	whole	programme.
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It	is	very	likely	that	the	programme	will	consist	of	a	series	of	
smaller,	discrete	projects	focused	on	particular	aspects	of	the	
transformation;	each	should,	in	my	experience,	use	the	same	
tools.	Indeed,	I	tend	to	advocate	the	preparation	of	a	corporate	
programme	management	toolkit	which	colleagues	can	use	both	on	
transformation	pieces	of	work	and	others	–	which	will	happen	as	
colleagues	see	the	benefits	of	working	in	this	way.
Using programme management techniques to manage the 
business cycle 
Colleges	are,	for	the	most	part,	wonderfully	cyclical	organisations.	
The	same	things	happen,	at	broadly	the	same	time,	every	academic	
year:	student	recruitment	campaigns,	enrolment	and	induction;	
progress	reviews,	assessments	and	exams;	data	and	financial	
returns	to	the	ESFA	and	other	funding	partners;	business	planning	
for	the	following	year.	There’s	an	established,	predictable	rhythm	to	
an	academic	year	in	most	parts	of	a	further	education	college.	Even	
in	parts	of	the	organisation	which	don’t	quite	march	to	the	beat	of	
the	academic	year	–	like	apprenticeship	operations	which	should	
recruit	throughout	the	year	–	governance	and	accountability	
arrangements	tend	to	align	with	the	academic	calendar.
The	risk	which	comes	with	any	long-established	annual	cycle	such	
as	this,	is	that	colleagues	fall	into	the	trap	of	doing	what	they	
did	last	year	again	and	again	–	without	reviewing	and	looking	for	
improvements	before	they	move	into	year	n+1.	The	opportunity	is	
to	do	the	opposite,	i.e.	to	programme	manage	each	year	as	a	new	
‘version’	of	the	organisation	–	testing	and	looking	for	improvements	
in	all	areas	before	permitting	a	given	thing	–	whether	a	policy,	
process,	course	or	session	plan	–	to	become	part	of	the	n+1	year’s	
operation.	We’re	all	well	used	to	seeing	our	technology	providers	
do	this	now,	through	the	release	of	different	versions	of	their	
products	and	operating	systems;	why	not	take	the	same	approach	
to	improvement	in	colleges?
Throughout	my	time	at	HLG,	I	became	more	and	more	interested	
in	the	benefits	of	positing	a	gateway	between	one	year	and	the	
next	to	punctuate	an	improvement	cycle	and	to	make	sure	that	
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our	policies,	processes	and	resources	kept	pace	with	the	progress	of	
our	transformation	–	recognising	that	not	all	of	our	improvements	
would	be	made	in	one	giant	leap.	I	began	to	think	in	terms	of	
annual	version	control,	i.e.	the	2017/18	version	of	our	approach	to	
curriculum	assurance	and	improvement.	
Many	colleges	will	do	this	under	the	banner	of	their	self-
assessment	and	quality	improvement	planning	processes.	We	saw	
in	Chapter 3	that	Ofsted	commonly	criticises	self-assessment	in	
poorly	performing	colleges	–	and	the	rate	of	progress	that	colleges	
are	making.	I,	and	others	I	spoke	to	in	preparing	this	piece,	found	
that	the	sort	of	rigour,	relentlessness	and	sharpness	I	am	describing	
here	helped	us	deliver	real	year-on-year	improvements	–	and	in	
areas	beyond	curriculum.	
Including	corporate	service	areas	in	the	annual	improvement	
cycle	is	critical,	given	the	importance	of	the	whole-organisation	
environment	to	the	improvement	effort.	The	cycle	may	look	
slightly	different	in	those	areas	–	perhaps	with	team	plans	and	
improvement	projects	rather	than	self-assessment	reports	and	
quality	improvement	plans	–	but	the	net	position	should	be	the	
same:	defined,	managed	and	measured	annual	improvement.
Using programme management approaches to support 
accountability and performance management 
We	saw	in	Chapter 3 that	both	Ofsted	and	the	FE	Commissioner	
commonly	take	issue	with	leadership,	governance	and	
accountability	arrangements	in	poorly	performing	colleges.	They	
also	often	raise	concerns	about	data	not	being	properly	used	to	
understand	and	drive	performance	improvement.	We	also	saw	that	
McKinsey	placed	great	emphasis	on	‘cadence	and	coordination	
in	delivery’,	‘ensuring	ownership	in	the	line’	and	on	‘executing	
relentlessly’	–	all	of	which	resonate	strongly	for	me	and	others	I	
spoke	to	in	preparing	this	piece.
The	sector	–	and	the	department	–	has	been	very	excited	about	
governance	for	several	years.	The	role	governors	should	play,	
111
the	visibility	they	have	over	the	organisation’s	work,	and	the	
ways	in	which	they	engage	with	colleagues	and	students	are	
all	incredibly	important	–	holding	the	executive	to	account	for	
progress	and	providing	great	advice	at	one	remove	from	the	
daily	grind	of	the	transformation.	
In	this	piece,	though,	I	am	more	interested	in	executive-level	
performance	management	and	accountability	arrangements:	
how	they	can	help	leaders	to	build	a	culture	of	high-performance	
expectations;	establish	and	maintain	clear	accountabilities;	and	
create	a	forum	for	discussion	which	supports	timely,	focused	
action	to	drive	sustained	performance	improvement.	I	see	huge	
potential	for	clear,	simple	and	focused	arrangements	to	help		
drive	transformations.
I	will	talk	later	in	this	chapter	about	the	role	that	data	and	insight	
should	play	in	performance	management	–	including	particularly	
the	importance	of	there	being	a	‘single	version	of	the	truth’.	Suffice	
to	say	for	now,	that	timely	and	accurate	data	is	essential	to	any	
performance	discussion;	indeed,	it	is	often	barely	worth	having	the	
discussion	without	the	data.	I	have	on	many	occasions	preferred	to	
postpone	by	24	or	48	hours	whilst	colleagues	bring	together	a	data	
set	which	can	carry	the	weight	of	the	discussion	which	needs	to	
take	place.
There	is	a	risk	that	in	large,	complex	and	changing	organisations,	
meetings	and	reports	spread	like	wildfire	–	each	emerging	for	
justifiable	reasons	in	response	to	a	particular	need	for	focus	on	
a	given	issue	or	seam	of	work.	The	likely	result	of	this	common	
phenomenon	is	treacle;	colleagues	stuck	in	a	cycle	of	preparing,	
reading	and	discussing	reports	in	meetings	–	leaving	precious	little	
time	for	action.	
Some	2017	research	found	that	executives	spend	an	average	of	
almost	23	hours	a	week	in	meetings.	Of	those	surveyed:	65	per	
cent	said	meetings	keep	them	from	completing	their	own	work;	
71	per	cent	said	meetings	are	unproductive	and	inefficient;	64	per	
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cent	said	meetings	come	at	the	expense	of	deep	thinking;	and,	
62	per	cent	said	meetings	miss	opportunities	to	bring	the	team	
closer	together.114	
I,	therefore,	favour	the	creation	of	a	single,	all-encompassing	
executive-level	reporting	cycle,	facilitated	by	programme	
management	tools	and	techniques.	Such	an	approach	should:	
•	 	Connect	the	organisation	to	itself	through	a	pyramid	structure	
which	enables	colleagues	to	escalate	and	cascade	information	
through	all	levels	of	the	organisation	–	making	sure	that	all	
parts	of	the	organisation	and	all	aspects	of	the	transformation	
are	covered.	
•	 	Replace	the	vast,	vast	majority	of	other	performance	and	
accountability	forums	in	the	organisation	by	covering	all	
aspects	of	performance	in	a	given	area	–	freeing	colleagues	
time	to	focus	on	action,	not	discussion.
•	 	Bring	together	the	right	set	of	colleagues	to	have	a	full,	
effective	discussion	of	performance	in	a	given	area	including,	
for	example,	curriculum	quality	and	finance	colleagues	as	well	
as	the	leaders	of	a	given	area	of	work	and	the	people	they	
report	to.
•	 	Provide	a	forum	for	advisory,	reflective	discussion	which	
helps	colleagues	translate	the	organisation’s	purpose	into	
daily	action	in	their	area	–	as	well	as	necessary	hard-edged	
discussion	of	current	priorities,	performance,	issues	and	risks.
Supporting	this	sort	of	approach	with	a	single,	simple,	concise	and	
comprehensive	reporting	template	–	which	can	be	used	at	most,	
if	not	all,	levels	in	the	reporting	pyramid	–	is	crucial;	it	serves	as	a	
helpful	prompt	to	ensure	that	all	relevant	areas	are	covered	every	
month.	Likewise,	the	maintenance	of	action,	issues	and	risk	logs	
for	each	area	helps	ensure	that	the	outcome	of	each	discussion	
happens	–	and	creates	an	audit	trail	which	is	not	unhelpful	when	
114	Perlow,	L.	A.,	Noonan	Hadley,	C.	and	Eun,	E.	2017.	Stop the meeting madness.	Available	at:	https://hbr.
org/2017/07/stop-the-meeting-madness	[Accessed	September	2018]
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Ofsted	and	others	are	looking	for	evidence	of	systematic,	focused	
improvement	action.
I	was	surprised	at	how	readily	senior	and	middle	managers	in	
HLG	embraced	this	sort	of	approach;	rather	than	seeing	it	as	
a	cumbersome,	bureaucratic	reporting	regime	they	welcomed	
–	at	least	they	told	me	they	did!	–the	clarity	it	brought	to	our	
accountability	arrangements,	the	forum	for	discussion	it	created	
and	the	number	of	other	meetings	it	replaced	or	made	unnecessary	
given	its	introduction.	As	the	process	matured,	I	came	to	see	it	as	
the	real	engine	of	our	transformation.	
Using programme management techniques to support 
curriculum improvement 
As	I	begin	to	discuss	the	fourth	way	in	which	I	think	programme	
management	techniques	can	be	applied	to	the	transformation	of	
a	further	education	college,	I	should	be	clear	that	I	am	no	kind	of	
programme	management	junkie.	My	tendency	toward	the	strategic,	
creative	and	next	thing	can	make	me	something	of	a	nightmare	
for	whoever	holds	the	programmatic	reins	in	the	organisations	I	
lead	–	which	is	precisely	why	I	am	always	so	keen	to	invest	in	such	
approaches;	they	create	a	structured,	semi-constant	playing	field	
for	me	and	others	to	work	within.
Comfortably	the	most	interesting	and	enjoyable	piece	of	work	we	
did	at	HLG	was	to	apply	programme	management	and	process	
excellence	techniques	to	the	regime	we	put	in	place	to	drive	
curriculum	performance	improvement.	As	our	improvement	
gathered	momentum,	we	began	to	encounter	the	abovementioned	
risk	of	proliferation	and	fragmentation,	i.e.	that	our	approach	
to	improvement	consisted	of	too	many	distinct	elements,	the	
relationships	between	which	were	not	sufficiently	clear	–	either	
to	those	of	us	who	had	architected	the	approach	or,	more	
importantly,	those	who	we	were	asking	to	engage	with	and	deliver	
elements	of	it.
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I	talked	in	Chapter 4	and	earlier	in	this	chapter	about	the	
importance	of	a	clear,	simple	and	communicable	framework	for	the	
transformation;	nowhere	is	this	more	important	than	in	relation	to	
the	core	of	the	core	business	of	the	organisation	–	curriculum.	
We	created	what	programme	management	and	operations	
colleagues	in	other	sectors	would	recognise	as	a	standard	operating	
procedures	manual,	i.e.	a	set	of	detailed,	step-by-step	guidelines	
which	help	colleagues	carry	out	often-complex	tasks	and	processes	
in	an	efficient,	effective	and	consistent	way.	It	described	each	of	
our	curriculum	management	and	improvement	processes	including:	
their	purpose,	described	in	the	context	of	our	overall	purpose	and	
improvement	goals;	a	summary	of	how	each	worked,	step	by	step;	
their	interdependence	with	other	improvement	processes	and	
activities;	and,	the	accountabilities	which	related	to	each.
Though	difficult	and	at	times	painful,	the	process	through	which	
we	put	the	manual	together	helped	us	to	refine	many	of	our	
processes	and	policies;	build	understanding	and	engagement	
amongst	middle	managers;	and,	crucially,	frame	each	in	the	context	
of	our	overall	purpose	and	transformation	goals	–	building	the	sort	
of	engagement	and	momentum	which	Quinn	and	Thakor	described	
in	Chapter 4.	
Blending	colleagues’	curriculum	expertise	with	that	of	others	
who	had	spent	most	of	their	careers	in	very	different	sectors	and	
operating	environments	was,	for	me,	the	fulfilment	of	the	vision	
which	inspired	me	to	become	a	college	principal	in	the	first	place	
–	the	combination	of	expertise	from	different	areas	to	do	the	
business	of	a	college	better.
In an environment where funding is desperately scarce, it is vital 
that leaders have processes in place to align resources with 
organisational purpose, strategy and transformation priorities…
Under	this	heading,	I	am	particularly	interested	in	two	slightly	
different	things:	first,	ensuring	that	resources	are	aligned	with	the	
organisation’s	purpose	and	strategy;	and	second,	recognising	the	
costs	of	change	associated	with	the	transformation	effort.
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During	my	time	as	a	civil	servant	in	what	is	now	the	Department	
for	Education,	I	worked	on	successive	spending	reviews	and	other	
‘fiscal	events’	–	budgets,	pre-budget	reports	and	other	ad	hoc	
spending	announcements	with	respect	to	further	education	and	
skills.	I	learned	then	that	spending	processes	can	often	be	the	most	
strategic	exercises	an	organisation	engages	in	if,	as	is	the	case	
with	spending	reviews,	the	long-term	allocation	of	resources	to	a	
given	area	of	activity	is	at	stake.	You	can	always	tell	how	serious	
government	is	about	a	given	policy	announcement	by	looking	at	
the	resource	allocation	that	accompanies	it	–	or	not.
The	same	is	true,	I	believe,	of	financial	processes	within	a	delivery	
organisation	–	whether	a	further	education	college,	other	public	
service	or	private	sector	business.	Just	as	leaders	need	to	help	
colleagues	at	all	levels	to	translate	purpose	and	strategy	into	daily	
action,	so	they	also	need	to	reflect	purpose	and	strategy	in	their	
allocation	and	use	of	resources.	Particularly	in	an	environment	
with	so	very	little	resource,	it	is	crucially	important	for	leaders	to	
ensure	that	the	resources	which	are	available	are	perfectly	aligned	
with	their	priorities.	This	imperative	bears	on	two	very	different	
processes:	business	planning	and	operational	cost	control.
However	challenging	the	context,	I	always	loved	the	annual	
business	planning	process	during	my	time	at	HLG.	It	was	my	annual	
opportunity	to	check	and	review	whether	I	was	content	that	we	
were	investing	and	balancing	available	resources	in	a	manner	that	
reflected	our	purpose,	strategy	and	values.
One	of	the	many	balances	that	must	be	struck	in	any	annual	
business	planning	process	is	between	what	I	would	call	a	‘last	year	
plus	or	minus’	approach,	which	presumes	last	year’s	allocation	of	
resources	as	its	starting	point,	and	a	‘zero-based’	exercise	which	
builds	up	resourcing	for	each	area	from	a	blank	sheet	each	year.	The	
former	risks	oddities	and	inefficiencies	creeping	in	over	time.	The	
latter	is	a	massive	and	complex	task.
For	the	first	full	financial	year	of	a	transformation	journey,	leaders	
may	very	likely	judge	that	a	zero-based	exercise,	or	something	
close	to	it,	is	necessary.	I,	and	several	others	I	spoke	to	in	preparing	
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this	piece,	certainly	did.	Thereafter,	it	remains	crucial	for	leaders	to	
use	business	planning	processes	as	their	opportunity	to	test	that	
resources	are	aligned	with	priorities	–	without	necessarily	taking	a	
zero-based	approach	every	year.
I	learned	almost	everything	I	know	about	operational	cost	control	
during	my	time	at	Capita	–	widely	appreciated	as	the	apogee	of	the	
practice.	While	Capita’s	imperatives	were	rather	different,	many	of	
the	principles	and	approaches	are	transferrable.
Different	leaders	and	finance	functions	will	have	their	own	
favourite	measures	to	control	cost.	The	challenge	is	to	build	a	
culture	of	healthy	austerity	and	challenge,	rather	than	simply	to	
turn	off	the	spending	taps	by,	for	example,	reducing	delegated	
authorities	to	barely	practicable	levels	or	requiring	CEO	approval	
of	new	suppliers	or	certain	categories	of	spend.	Again,	this	relies	
on	mid-level	managers’	engagement	with	and	ability	to	translate	
purpose	into	daily	reality	–	managing	conversations	within	their	
teams	about	the	ways	in	which	they	are	stretching	the	canvas	over	
the	frame	in	the	best	way	possible	in	the	circumstances.
The	other	factor	I	want	to	talk	about	here	is	the	costs	of	change.	
I	note	in	Chapter 1	that	government	has	a	nasty	habit	of	issuing	
unfunded	mandates	to	further	education	colleges,	i.e.	new	
requirements	which	do	not	come	with	a	fair	allocation	of	new	
resources.	That	paucity	of	resource	often	relates	both	to	the	costs	
of	change	and	the	costs	of	delivery.	Referring	again	to	the	maths	
and	English	example	used	in	Chapter 1,	all	colleges	will	have	
incurred	substantial	costs	of	change	–	including,	for	example,	staff	
recruitment	and	training	as	well	as	the	great	deal	of	work	required	
to	ready	themselves	to	operationalise	the	change	–	as	well	as	
the	direct	operational	cost	pressures	associated	with	the	new	
requirement	imposed	on	them	from	autumn	2015.	
The	same	principle	applied	to	the	transformation	of	the	
organisation.	Any	credible	transformation	plan	will	include	short-	
and	medium-term	pieces	of	work,	system	and	other	changes	
as	well	as	the	increased	workload	borne	by	colleagues	across	
the	organisation	as	they	operationalise	the	product	of	those	
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transformation	projects.	The	IPA	seven	lenses	framework	highlights	
the	risks	associated	with	having	colleagues	work	on	transformation	
projects	on	top	of	their	business-as-usual	responsibilities,	and	with	
using	the	same	pool	of	‘usual	suspects’	to	work	on	transformation	
projects	–	as	well	as	the	need	to	recognise	that	transformation	is	a	
different	skillset	to	business	as	usual.
The	financial	context	means	that	these	risks	will	manifest	as	issues	
in	most	college	transformation	efforts;	there	simply	isn’t	enough	
money	available	to	do	transformation	properly	–	particularly	where	
financial	issues	form	part	of	the	baseline	position	from	which	a	
given	college	is	trying	to	transform	itself.	Of	the	88	colleges	that	
were	rated	either	Inadequate	or	Satisfactory	for	their	financial	
health	in	2016/17,	over	half	(46)	were	also	either	Inadequate	or	
Requires	Improvement	in	their	previous	Ofsted	inspection.	
It	is	also	worth	noting	here	that	where	organisations	fail	to	align	
resources	with	priorities,	those	priorities	are	doubly	undermined	–	
first,	for	want	of	the	possible	resources,	and	second,	as	colleagues	
across	the	organisation	see	that	resources	are	being	distributed	to	
other	areas	which	they	should	assume	from	the	strategic	narrative	
are	less	of	a	priority.	The	effect	is	to	undermine	the	organisational	
conversation	about	priorities	and	focus	on	purpose.
Colleges are large, complex and commercial organisations. 
Leaders should try to concentrate their commerciality in 
commercial parts of the organisation… 
I	talked	in Chapter 5	about	some	of	the	long-term	trends	in	
government	policy	relevant	to	the	further	education	sector.	Among	
them	were	two	intimately	related	trends	which	I	want	to	pick	
up	on	now.	First,	government’s	sustained	effort	to	put	employers	
in	charge	of	the	skills	system	in	which	they	engage	to	access	
publicly	(and	now	levy-)	funded	training.	Second,	the	growing	
commercialisation	of	the	further	education	sector.
As	government	has	sought	to	put	purchasing	power	in	the	hands	
of	the	employer-customer,	so	it	has	required	that	colleges	and	
other	publicly	funded	training	providers	work	harder	–	and	more	
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commercially	–	to	secure	the	right	to	deliver	training	for	those	
employers.	I	talked	in	Chapter 1	about	the	very	real	commercial	
opportunities	and	challenges	presented	for	colleges	by	the	
advent	of	the	apprenticeship	levy	–	which,	more	than	any	of		
its	many	predecessor	arrangements,	gives	real	purchasing	power	
to	employers.
It	is	right,	rational	and	necessary	for	colleges	to	grow	their	
commercial,	marketing	and	business	development	capability	in	
response	to	these	and	other	changes	which	seek	to	make	them	
compete	for	their	lunch	–	as	Minister	Boles	characterised	it.
Beyond	the	competitive,	commercial	tensions	which	have	been	
designed	into	the	further	education	sector,	as	purchasing	power	has	
been	pushed	into	the	hands	of	employers,	we	have	also	seen	a	raft	
of	other	factors	raise	the	commercial	stakes	in	further	education.	
Paucity	of	funding	itself	demands	greater	commerciality	as	colleges	
look	for	new,	smarter	ways	to	stretch	the	canvas	over	the	frame.	
Managing	relationships	with	lenders	whose	appetite	for	the	sector	
has	been	spooked	by	the	area	review	process	and	insolvency	
regime	to	come.	Capital	projects	and	grant	applications.	For	some,	
international	operations	too.	The	requirement	for	commercial	
expertise	is	now	substantial	and	constant.
It	strikes	me	that	colleges	have	responded	to	the	growing	need	
for	commerciality	in	a	combination	of	three	ways:	by	bringing	
commercial	experts	into	their	senior	management	teams	and	
governing	bodies;	by	creating	discrete	commercial	teams	to	focus	
on	commercial	aspects	of	their	operation;	and/or	by	seeking	to	
grow	the	commerciality	of	the	organisation	as	a	whole	–	including	
their	mid-level	managers,	and	operational	and	teaching	staff.	I	am	
a	very	strong	advocate	of	the	first	two	–	but	have	real	reservations	
about	the	third.	
Whether	it’s	the	growth	of	a	thriving	apprenticeship	and	
commercial	training	operation,	international	business	or	the	
negotiation	of	high-value	capital	projects	and	asset	disposals,	
colleges	need	access	to	genuine	commercial	expertise	to	make	the	
most	of	the	opportunities	open	to	them	–	and	to	mitigate	the	risks.	
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It	is	not	reasonable	to	expect	that	career	curriculum	leaders	
will	simply	turn	their	hand	to	these	tasks	because	the	sector	
has	evolved	that	way	–	just	as	it	is	not	reasonable	to	assume	
that	folk	from	a	commercial	background	will	somehow	become	
curriculum	gurus	the	moment	they	set	foot	in	a	college.	Better,	
surely,	to	introduce	commercial	experts	to	lead	commercial	
work	so	that	curriculum	colleagues	can	focus	on	curriculum.	
There	is	something	here	for	me	about	creating	reasonable	job	
roles	in	an	unreasonable	sector.
By	concentrating	commercial	work	in	commercial	job	roles	and	
business	units,	you	de	facto	preserve	the	integrity	of	curriculum	
roles.	From	a	performance	perspective,	this	means	that	leaders	
are	in	a	strong	position	to	expect	strong	performance	from	both	
their	commercial	and	curriculum	colleagues.	Where	curriculum	
colleagues	are	also	burdened	with	commercial	targets	and	
responsibilities,	that	feels	much	harder	to	me	–	partly	because	their	
attentions	are	divided,	and	partly	because,	in	many	cases,	leaders	
will	be	asking	colleagues	to	deliver	things	which	sit	beyond	their	
expertise.	That	means	both	that	targets	will	likely	be	missed,	and	
that	colleagues’	morale	will	–	understandably	–	slip.
My	particular	preference	is	to	create	a	completely	distinct	business	
unit	responsible	for	apprenticeships,	commercial	learning	and	
development	services	to	employers,	traineeships	and	other	pre-
employment	programmes.	My	reasoning	is	an	extension	of	the	
above	–	because	I	see	the	growth,	management	and	delivery	of	
these	provisions	as	being	materially	different	in	nature	to	more	
traditional	college	courses	for	young	people	and	adults.	
We	did	this	at	HLG,	creating	Hart	Learning	&	Development	(Hart	
L&D)	as	a	discrete	business	unit	focused	on	helping	businesses	to	
invest	in	emerging	talent	through	apprenticeships,	traineeships	and	
other	programmes.	We	gave	the	business	its	own	brand,	leadership	
team	and	identity	within	the	Group	so	that	it	could	develop	
business	regionally	and	nationally,	while	also	addressing	local	need.	
We	won	a	TES FE	award	for	our	marketing	of	Hart	L&D	and,	over	
time,	began	to	secure	national	client	contracts	with	organisations	
like	the	Co-Op	and	Lloyds.	
120
I	don’t	believe	we	could	have	won	those	contracts	under	the	
North	Hertfordshire	College	brand;	we	needed	clients	to	see	the	
business	as	a	national	one.	I	don’t	believe	we	could	have	won	them	
without	the	commercial,	marketing	and	business	development	
expertise	we	injected	into	the	business.	I	am	absolutely	certain	we	
could	not	have	delivered	those	contracts	from	a	traditional	college	
organisational	structure	without	undermining	the	quality	of	our	
provision	for	all	of	the	students	supported	by	the	relevant	college	
curriculum	department.
I	was	fascinated	to	talk	to	Gary	Headland	about	the	growth	of	
Lincoln	College	Group’s	international	business	–	which	is	now	
broadly	the	same	size	as	their	Group’s	colleges	in	the	UK.	Though	
Gary’s	focus	was	international	business,	rather	than	the	domestic	
apprenticeship	and	wider	learning	market,	his	approach	is	very	
similar	to	mine.	He	has	created	a	discrete	international	and	
commercial	division	to	lead	their	international	and	UK		
commercial	work	–	permitting	college	colleagues	in	the	UK		
to	focus	curriculum	performance.
Others	will	have	different	views	and	follow	different	paths	
depending	on	their	perspective	on	some	of	these	issues	and,	
crucially,	on	their	commercial	ambition.	Structure	should	directly	
follow	strategy.	In	both	of	the	examples	described	above,	the	
commercial	ambition	was	substantial.	It	made	sense	and	was	
necessary	to	invest	in	discrete	operating	structures.	Where	the	
ambition	is	different,	different	structures	may	be	preferable.
It can be difficult for colleges to maintain a single version of the 
performance truth. Beyond that, there is a huge opportunity for 
colleges to access genuine insight about their performance…
Maintaining	an	up-to-date,	accurate	and	compliant	data	set	in	a	
further	education	college	is	a	mammoth	task	in	its	own	right.	The	
stakes	are	high,	given	that	the	data	sets	which	colleges	submit	to	
the	ESFA	determine	the	payments	they	receive	from	the	Agency	
during	that	year,	inform	the	funding	allocation	they’ll	receive	for	
subsequent	years	and	are	used	to	report	publicly	their	student	
numbers,	retention,	achievement	and	other	performance	measures.	
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It	would	be	all	too	easy	for	leaders	to	feel	like	they	have	achieved	
something	just	by	submitting	a	clean	data	set	to	the	ESFA	each	
month	–	without	having	used	that	data	within	the	organisation.
You	will	recall	from	Chapter 3	that	Ofsted	often	criticises	poorly	
performing	colleges	for	their	failure	to	use	data	to	help	them	
identify,	understand	and	address	areas	for	improvement	in	the	
curriculum	performance.	Those	criticisms	often	relate	to	the	
ready	availability	of	basic,	headline	performance	information	
which	enables	leaders	and	managers	to	understand	how	they	are	
performing	–	let	alone	why	they	are	performing	at	a	given	level.	
Established	good	practice	is	for	colleges	to	maintain	some	sort	
of	performance	dashboard(s)	which	shows	leaders	and	managers	
things	like	student	attendance,	progress,	retention,	forecast	
achievement	at	the	whole-organisation,	department	and	course	
level.	Different	institutions	use	different	tech	applications	to	help	
them	do	this	in	different	ways,	depending	on	their	particular	
preferences	and	operating	models.	Maintaining	a	single	version	of	
the	truth	throughout	the	organisation	is	the	aim	for	most.
The	above	position	is	difficult	to	establish	given	the	amount	and	
complexity	of	student	data	in	most	colleges	–	and	given	the	
fact	that	the	majority	of	that	data	pertains	to	a	fairly	dynamic	
customer	group,	i.e.	16-	to	18-year-olds.	Reaching	that	position	is	
worth	the	investment	it	requires,	given	the	ability	it	affords	leaders	
and	managers	to	see	and	take	action	to	address	performance	
issues	in	a	timely	manner.	All	I	am	talking	about	here	though	is	
information.	Not	insight.	
Few	colleges	push	beyond	information	to	access	genuine	insights	
which	help	them	understand	and	take	hyper-targeted	action	to	
improve	in-year	performance	and/or	address	sustained	areas	for	
improvement.	It	is	one	thing	to	have	the	information	to	hand	
which	tells	you	that	student	attendance	on	a	given	course	is	too	
low.	It	is	quite	another	to	interrogate	the	huge	amount	of	data	
which	colleges	hold	on	their	students	to	access	genuine	insights	
about	why	attendance	might	be	low	on	a	given	course.
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Access	to	information	may	very	well	lead	to	timely	action	to	
address	the	issue,	including	discussions	with	students,	texting	
students	to	remind	them	about	forthcoming	sessions,	engagement	
with	their	parents,	i.e.	the	standard	set	of	things	that	curriculum	
managers	know	you	should	do	in	response	to	poor	attendance.
Access	to	insight	will	more	likely	prompt	timely	and	focused	action	
to	address	the	particular	causal	issue	–	rather	than	the	symptom,	
i.e.	poor	attendance.	If	non-attending	students	all	live	in	the	same	
area	and	the	bus	doesn’t	get	them	to	college	in	time	for	the	
particular	sessions	they	tend	not	to	attend,	leaders	need	to	talk	to	
the	bus	company	as	well	as	their	students.
This	sort	of	approach	is	worth	the	modest	investment	that	it	
would	require	–	helping	colleges	to	understand	causal	issues	as	
well	as	headline	areas	for	improvement,	helping	them	to	invest	
their	time	and	resources	in	more	targeted	and	effective	ways	
to	drive	improvements	more	quickly	as	part	of	their	overall	
transformation	programme.
This	sort	of	approach	is	also	very	likely	to	be	more	difficult	in	
a	poorly-performing	college,	where	the	first	priority	may	well	
be	to	establish	robust	information	processes,	dashboards	and	
a	single	version	of	the	truth	which	can	be	used	as	part	of	basic	
performance	management.
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Leading the transformation
It’s the role, and the opportunity, of the leader to model the 
change they envision for the organisation. That means the chief 
executive is principally a principal…
Throughout	this	piece,	I	have	deliberately	referred	to	the	most	
senior	member	of	the	executive	team	in	a	further	education	
college	as	the	chief	executive	–	because	the	CEO	label	is	almost	
always	and	only	given	to	the	most	senior	member	of	the	executive	
in	a	given	organisation.	Many	in	further	education	prefer	CEO/
principal,	or	principal.	
Particularly	as	more,	larger,	organisations	have	emerged	following	
the	area	review	process,	we	have	started	to	see	more	organisations	
separate	these	two,	once	synonymous,	labels	between	two	(or	
more)	individuals	–	with	a	chief	executive	responsible	for	corporate	
matters,	and	a	principal	(or	principals)	focused	on	curriculum	
quality	and	improvement.
The	logic	is	easy	to	follow.	The	corporate	leadership	requirement	in	
colleges	has	grown	exponentially	over	the	last	15	years	or	more.	
Until	the	2000s,	colleges	received	block	grants	from	government,	
independent	of	student	numbers.	Managing	a	profit	and	loss	
account	in	such	circumstances	must,	in	hindsight,	feel	like	a	stroll	in	
the	park	for	those	who	have	been	on	the	journey	from	there	to	the	
apprenticeship	levy	era,	in	which	funding	both	follows	the	learner	
and	is	paid	in	arrears	on	actuals.	It’s	now	a	completely	different	gig.
CHAPTER SEVEN
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By	the	pivotal	summer	of	2015,	leaders	had	become	painfully	
used	to	salami-slicing	resources	to	deliver	more	for	less	(again);	
managing	complex,	dynamic	profit	and	loss	accounts,	intimately	
related	to	the	ESFA’s	Kafkaesque	funding	rules;	building	commercial	
operations	which	could	seize	the	opportunities	presented	by	
apprenticeship	reform;	managing	relationships	with	lenders	whose	
appetite	to	continue	lending	had	been	spooked	through	the	
area	review	process;	negotiating	substantial	asset	disposal	and	
capital	projects;	and,	still,	running	redundancy	programmes	to	find	
additional	savings	to	stay	afloat.
Add	to	that	workload	and	person	specification	the	need	for	deep	
expertise	in	curriculum	and	you	have	two	issues.	First,	a	question	
over	whether	it	is	possible	for	the	most	senior	member	of	the	
executive	to	devote	sufficient	time	and	energy	to	curriculum	
matters,	given	the	many	other	demands	on	their	time	in	a	
challenging	sector	context.	Second,	whether	it	is	realistic	to	expect	
that	you	will	find	in	a	single	person	the	combination	of	corporate	
and	curriculum	expertise	required	to	succeed	in	role.	
There	is	currently	one	player	in	the	whole	of	major	league	baseball	
who	both	pitches	and	bats	for	a	reason;	they’re	both	really	hard	
things	to	do	to	the	required	standard,	so	pretty	much	everyone	
does	one	or	the	other	at	the	elite	level.
Notwithstanding	these	issues,	having	thought	and	talked	to	many	
colleagues	about	it,	I	have	concluded	that	there	are	real	risks	for	
those	institutions	which	elect	to	separate	corporate	and	curriculum	
responsibilities	between	a	CEO	and	principal(s).	My	reasoning	is	
simple:	you	can’t	let	the	chief	executive	off	the	hook	for	purpose.	
I	have	heard	too	many	discussions	about	the	separation	of	CEO	
and	principal	labels	becoming	an	exercise	in	the	separation	of	
accountabilities	and	I	don’t	buy	it.	It	follows	from	the	argument	
in	Chapter 4	about	the	importance	of	purpose	and	the	role	of	
the	leader	in	connecting	the	daily	work	of	individuals	across	the	
organisation	to	that	purpose,	that	the	leader	must	themselves	be	
connected	to	that	purpose.	
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More	than	that,	they	must	be	the	living,	breathing,	constantly	
talking	embodiment	of	that	purpose.	They	should	inspire,	guide,	
coach	and	cajole	colleagues	at	all	levels	to	align	their	work	with	the	
organisation’s	higher	purpose,	strategy	and	transformation	plan.
That	is	not	to	say	that	the	CEO	must	be	the	freakishly	talented	
individual	who	can	do	both	curriculum	and	corporate	–	who	
can	pitch	and	bat.	It	is	to	say	that	the	most	senior	person	in	the	
organisation	must	be	obsessed	with	curriculum	performance	
–	because	that’s	the	whole	and	pretty	much	only	point	of	the	
organisation.	Great	corporate	performance	is	useless	in	social	policy	
terms	if	it	is	not	facilitating	great	curriculum	performance.
The	role	of	the	most	senior	executive	in	the	organisation	is	to	
build	a	leadership	team,	and	an	organisation,	which	delivers	
against	the	organisation’s	purpose.	That	means	building	a	senior	
and	extended	team	with	the	blend	of	skills	and	experiences	
required	to	deliver	against	the	whole	of	that	purpose,	i.e.	
corporate	and	curriculum	performance.	
In	turn,	that	means	recruiting	colleagues	with	the	expertise	
that	the	organisation	needs	but	which	they	do	not	themselves	
possess.	It	is	no	accident	that	my	top	recruitment	priority	on	
arrival	at	HLG,	as	someone	without	a	professional	background	
in	teaching	or	curriculum	management,	was	a	seasoned,	
progressive	curriculum	leader.	
In	making	that	appointment,	and	in	later	affording	that	
individual	the	title	‘principal’,	I	did	not	delegate	purpose	or	
performance	against	it.	I	continued	to	live	and	breathe	our	
core	business.	I	continued	to	do	learning	walks,	join	lesson	
observations,	talk	to	teaching	colleagues	every	day	–	and	to	
roll	up	my	sleeves	in	the	preparation	of	our	curriculum	quality	
improvement	manual.	My	desk	was	full	of	corporate	matters,	
but	my	mind	was	always	full	of	purpose.
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Leading transformation is different to leading business as usual. 
They require different skills, experience and behaviours… 
While	I	am	not	at	all	persuaded	that	you	can	completely	separate	
corporate	and	curriculum	leadership,	I	am	completely	convinced	
that	leading	in	business-as-usual	is	a	very	different	skillset	to	
leading	in	start-up,	crisis	or	transformation.	
I	have	spent	most	of	my	career	starting,	changing	or	–	in	a	couple	
of	instances	–	closing	things	down.	When	I	accepted	the	HLG	
job,	I	was	looking	forward	to	the	challenge	of	business	as	usual;	I	
envisioned	a	long,	Sir	Alex	Ferguson	style,	tenure	over	the	course	
of	which	I’d	get	everything	exactly	how	it	needed	to	be;	evolve	and	
pioneer	new	ways	of	doing	things.	
That	my	task	was	in	fact	an	exercise	in	crisis	management	and	
then	major	transformation	suited	my	experience.	My	passion,	my	
experience	and,	therefore,	my	expertise	is	in	changing	things	–	
quickly	and	substantially.	I	do	revolution	not	evolution.
To	be	absolutely	clear,	I	do	not	see	one	skill	set	as	more	important	
or	valuable	than	the	other.	Quite	the	contrary.	I	see	them	as	
different	careers;	many	of	the	leaders	I	spoke	to	who	were	in	the	
midst	of	a	major	transformation	agreed.	They	intend	to	lead	their	
organisation	to	safe,	solid,	ground	and	then	move	on	to	their	next	
transformation	mission.
Jessica	Leitch,	Mark	Dawson	and,	my	old	and	inspirational	boss	at	
PwC,	David	Lancefield,	argue	that	most	organisations	lack	senior	
leaders	with	the	particular	expertise	required	to	tackle	‘wicked	
problems,’115	i.e.	those	which	have	incomprehensible	causes,	
uncertain	solutions	and	which	require	major	transformation	
programmes.	A	2015	PwC	survey	they	cite	found	that	only	8	per	
cent	of	6,000	senior	executives	possessed	the	expertise	required	to	
lead	major	transformations.	
115	Leitch,	J.,	Lancefield,	D.,	and	Dawson,	M.	2016.	10 principles of strategic leadership.	Available	at:		
https://www.strategy-business.com/article/10-Principles-of-Strategic-Leadership?gko=25cec	
[Accessed	September	2018]
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Leitch,	Dawson	and	Lancefield	concluded	that	those	
transformational	leaders	tend	to	share	several	common	traits:		
‘…they	can	challenge	the	prevailing	view	without	provoking	
outrage	or	cynicism;	they	can	act	on	the	big	and	small	pictures	at	
the	same	time,	and	change	course	if	their	chosen	path	turns	out	to	
be	incorrect;	and,	they	lead	with	inquiry	as	well	as	advocacy,	and	
with	engagement	as	well	as	command,	operating	all	the	while	from	
a	deeply	held	humility	and	respect	for	others.’116
They	argue	that	this	leadership	gap	is	typically	hidden	from	view	–	
only	coming	to	light	when	an	organisation	faces	major	challenges:	
‘it’s	in	the	do-or-die	moments,	when	companies	need	a	strategic	
leader	most,	that	they	discover	the	current	leadership	isn’t	up	to	
the	task.’	They	go	on	to	argue	that	it	is	possible	for	organisations	
to	build	strategic	leadership	capability	by	focusing	on	emerging	
leaders	whose	capability	is	currently	being	overlooked	or	stifled.	
They	identify	10	principles	of	strategic	leadership	–	a	combination	
of	organisational	systems	and	individual	capabilities	–	which	
organisations	can	use	to	develop	the	strategic	leadership	capability	
they	will	need	when	‘wicked	problems’	present	themselves.	Among	
those	principles	are	several	which	resonate	with	this	discussion:
•	  Distribute responsibility: ‘strategic	leaders	gain	their	skill	
through	practice,	and	practice	requires	a	fair	amount	of	
autonomy.	Top	leaders	should	push	power	downward,	across	
the	organization,	empowering	people	at	all	levels	to	make	
decisions.’117
•	  Be honest and open about information:	whilst	certain	
things	may	need	to	remain	secret,	they	argue	that	individuals	
need	access	to	a	broad	base	of	information	to	become	
strategic	leaders.	They	argue	that,	‘transparency	fosters	
conversation	about	the	meaning	of	information	and	the	
improvement	of	everyday	practices.’118
116	Ibid.
117	Ibid.
118	Ibid.
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•	  Hire for transformation: ‘hiring	decisions	should	be	based	
on	careful	considerations	of	capabilities	and	experience	and	
should	aim	for	diversity	to	overcome	the	natural	tendency	of	
managers	to	select	people	much	like	themselves.’119	
•	  Bring your whole self to work: ‘strategic	leaders	understand	
that	to	tackle	the	most	demanding	situations	and	problems,	
they	need	to	draw	on	everything	they	have	learned	in	their	
lives.	They	want	to	tap	into	their	full	set	of	capabilities,	
interests,	experiences,	and	passions	to	come	up	with	
innovative	solutions.…	Significantly,	they	encourage	the	
people	who	report	to	them	to	do	the	same.’120	
•	  Find time to reflect:	‘your	goal	in	reflection	is	to	raise	your	
game	in	double-loop	learning.	Question	the	way	in	which	you	
question	things.	Solve	the	problems	inherent	in	the	way	you	
problem-solve.’121	
Their	work	is	important	and	relevant	for	two	reasons:	first,	it	
affirms	a	view	that	the	leadership	of	transformation	is	a	distinct	
skill	set.	Colleges	should	not	assume	that	their	best	business-
as-usual	leaders	will	do	an	equally	good	job	of	leading	major	
transformations	–	and	vice	versa.	Second,	because	it	offers	a	
perspective	on	how	organisations	might	generate	the	capability	to	
lead	transformation	amongst	their	talented,	existing	leaders	and	
managers.	Given	the	challenging	operating	context	and	outlook	
for	further	education	colleges,	the	generation	of	such	a	cadre	of	
transformation	leaders	seems	to	me	strategically	apposite.	
Differences in leadership type matter. School sector research 
suggests that only those leaders who redesign the whole 
organisation deliver sustained improvements… 
Hill,	Mellon,	Laker	and	Goddard	have	done	some	very	interesting	
work	on	the	leadership	types	which	have	most	impact	on	school	
119	Ibid.
120	Ibid.
121	Ibid.
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performance.	They	studied	over	400	leaders	of	academy	schools122	
–	looking	at	their	education,	background	and	experience	and,	
recording	their	actions	and	impact	using	a	wide	range	of	different	
variables	and	measures	over	a	seven-year	period.	They	identified	
five	different	types	of	leaders,	but	only	one	that	was	really	effective.	
The	five	leadership	types	are:
•	 	  ‘Surgeons’: who	are	decisive	and	incisive,	quickly	identifying	
what’s	not	working	and	redirecting	resources	to	the	most	
pressing	problem,	i.e.	the	current	year’s	exam	results.	Exam	
results	do	tend	to	improve	in	the	one	or	two	years	that	a	
surgeon	is	at	the	school	but	fall	back	to	where	they	started	
once	the	surgeon	has	left.
•	  ‘Soldiers’:	focus	on	efficiency	and	order;	they	hate	waste	
and	believe	schools	get	into	trouble	because	they’re	lazy	
and	wasting	public	money.	They	believe	that	if	they	focus	on	
cost	and	deadlines,	the	rest	will	take	care	of	itself.	Financial	
performance	quickly	improves	under	soldiers,	but	exam	results	
remain	the	same	and	morale	dips	as	staff	fear	for	their	jobs.
•	 	‘Accountants’: try	to	grow	their	school	out	of	trouble.	They’re	
resourceful,	systematic,	and	believe	that	schools	get	into	
trouble	because	they’re	small	and	weak.	Revenue	increases	
under	accountants,	but	exam	results	remain	the	same	because	
they’re	not	the	accountants’	focus.
•	 	‘Philosophers’:	are	passionate	about	teaching	and	love	
debating	the	merits	of	alternative	approaches;	they	believe	
schools	fail	because	they’re	not	teaching	properly.	They	spend	
as	much	of	their	time	as	possible	with	teachers,	are	somewhat	
elitist	and	believe	that	teachers	are	far	more	important	than	
the	people	who	support	them.	Nothing	changes	under	a	
philosopher’	–	students	carry	on	misbehaving,	parents	remain	
disengaged	and	performance,	both	curriculum	and	financial,	
remains	the	same.
122	Hill,	A.,	Mellon,	L.,	Laker,	B.	and	Goddard,	J.	2016.	The one type of leader who can turn around a failing 
school.	Available	at:	https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-one-type-of-leader-who-can-turn-around-a-
failing-school	[Accessed	September	2018]
130
•	 	‘Architects’:	are	the	only	leaders	who	generate	real,	long-term,	
impact.	They	quietly	redesign	the	school;	they	didn’t	set	out	to	
be	teachers,	and	typically	work	in	industry	for	10	or	15	years	
before	deciding	they	want	to	have	a	greater	impact	on	society.	
They’re	insightful,	humble	and	visionary	leaders	who	believe	
schools	fail	because	they’re	poorly	designed	or	do	not	serve	
their	local	community.	They	believe	it	takes	time	to	improve	
a	school,	so	take	a	long-term	view	of	what	they	need	to	do.	
They	redesign	the	school	to	create	the	right	environment	for	
teachers	and	the	right	school	for	the	community.
Their	research	suggests	that	architects,	on	average,	have	a	15-
23	per	cent	higher	long-term	impact	on	the	school	than	other	
leadership	types.	They	calculate	that	if	architects	accounted	for	50	
per	cent	of	school	leaders,	UK	schools’	performance	would	increase	
by	9.68	per	cent	and,	therefore,	GDP	by	between	$3.8	billion	and	
$7.6	billion.	
The authenticity and openness of the leader matters, too. Their 
willingness to be open about their own anxieties can help put 
others at ease about theirs, and help everyone focus on the task 
in hand…
One	of	the	most	important	points	I	hope	to	make	in	this	piece	
is	about	the	merits	of	authentic,	accessible	and	inspirational	
leadership.	As	I	argued	in	Chapter 4,	the	leaders’	prime	role	is	to	
visualise,	communicate	and	galvanise	colleagues	at	all	levels	in	
pursuit	of	an	improved	future	organisational	state.	Everything	else	
follows,	and	builds	on,	their	creating	that	platform.
That	approach	places	a	heavy	leadership	burden	on	the	CEO.	
Technical	expertise	in	curriculum	and/or	corporate	matters	is	not	
enough.	Their	technical,	operation	and	tactical	decisions	will	not	
deliver	the	progress	that	they	could	if	the	organisational	wheels	
have	not	been	oiled	with	a	sense	of	purpose,	clarity	and	energy.	
This	requirement	for	authentic,	accessible	and	inspirational	
leadership	is	evident	in	Quinn	and	Thakor’s	work.	They	talk	about	
the	fundamental	importance	of	discovering	the	organisation’s	
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higher	purpose	through	an	empathetic,	discursive	process	of	
staff	engagement;	modelling	that	purpose	in	leaders’	own	
conduct	and	decisions	such	that	colleagues	begin	to	really	
believe	it;	communicating	constantly	with	colleagues	about	the	
organisation’s	purpose,	helping	them	make	operational	decisions	in	
the	context	of	and	connecting	their	daily	work	with	that	purpose.	
All	these	activities	require	people-oriented,	communicative	and	
open	leaders.
Derek	Dean123	talks	insightfully	about	the	challenge	that	CEOs	can	
face	in	helping	their	top	teams	respond	to	rapid	organisational	
change	–	whether	prompted	from	within	or	externally.	He	argues	
that	CEOs	must	help	their	senior	people	work	through	fear	and	
denial,	and	quickly	learn	new	ways	of	working	so	that	they	can	
help	drive	positive	change	in	the	organisation.	He	talks	about	the	
real,	simple,	fear	that	senior	leaders	often	face	when	times	of	rapid	
change	undermine	the	assumptions	on	which	they	are	used	to	
operating,	and	notes	that	‘spiking	levels	of	fear	can	convert	frank,	
flexible,	open	and	self-reflective	leaders	into	defensive,	close-
minded,	rigid	and	literal	ones.’124	This	can	become	a	downward	
spiral	when	others	notice	the	change	in	a	given	senior	leader	and	
let	them	know	in	subtle	ways	which	reinforce	their	fear.
To	help	senior	leaders	break	the	cycle,	Dean	argues	that	CEOs	
must	engage	with	their	team	on	an	emotional	level,	to	help	their	
colleagues	verbalise	and	acknowledge	the	validity	of	the	feelings	
they’re	experiencing	so	they	can	move	past	them	and	become	
productive.	Doing	this	may	very	likely	include	the	CEO	admitting	
that	they	share	their	colleagues’	fears	and	acknowledging	that	the	
reaction	is	perfectly	normal;	‘when	CEOs	acknowledge	their	own	
fears,	they	strip	away	the	stigma	attached	to	the	emotion	and	
make	it	easier	for	other	executives	to	move	beyond	it’,125	he	says.	
123	Dean,	D.	2009.	A CEO’s guide to reenergizing the senior team, McKinsey.	Available	at:	www.mckinsey.
com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/a-ceos-guide-to-reenergizing-thesenior-team	
[Accessed	September	2018]
124Ibid.
125Ibid.
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He	also	suggests	that	CEOs	must	model	the	right	behaviours	
including	an	openness	to	dialogue	and	collaboration,	respecting	
others’	opinions	and	showing	self-confidence.	He	notes	that,	‘some	
of	these	may	be	difficult	to	summon	in	tough	times,	but	they	are	
powerful	counters	to	the	prevailing	defensiveness	and	fear	that	
often	are	rife	in	those	times’.
That	human	touch	can	be	difficult	for	many.	It	can	feel	like	a	risk	
for	leaders	to	share	so	much	of	themselves	with	their	colleagues	
–	whether	in	their	senior	team	or	beyond.	Most	prefer	to	maintain	
some	distance	between	their	authentic	self	and	their	colleagues	–	
preferring	to	maintain	a	professional	persona	which	they	consider	
more	appropriate.	
Leaders need to check that there is real alignment between them 
and their senior teams, let alone middle managers and others…
Research	by	Donald	Sull,	Charles	Sull	and	James	Yoder126	found	that	
most	organisations	fall	short	in	terms	of	the	strategic	alignment	
between	top	team	members,	senior	executives,	middle-managers	
and	frontline	supervisors.	Their	analysis	of	responses	from	over	
4,000	people	in	124	organisations	found	that,	‘only	28	per	cent	of	
executives	and	middle	managers	responsible	for	executing	strategy	
could	list	three	of	their	company’s	strategic	priorities’.
They	found	that	senior	leaders	tend	to	overestimate	the	level	of	
strategic	alignment	that	exists	–	wrongly	assuming	that	the	whole	
organisation	is	on	the	same	page	with	respect	to	strategy	–	and	
that	misalignment	often	begins	in	the	top	team	–	with	only	51	
per	cent	of	the	top	team	members	they	surveyed	being	able	to	
articulate	their	organisation’s	top	priorities.	
As	a	result,	the	sharpest	drop	in	alignment	comes	between	those	
top	team	members	and	their	direct	reports	–	22	per	cent	of	whom	
were	able	to	correctly	articulate	their	organisation’s	top	priorities.	
Alignment	continues	to	drop,	but	at	a	much	slower	rate,	further	
126	Sull,	D.,	Sull,	C.	and	Yoder,	J.	2018.	No-one knows your strategy – not even your top leaders.		
Available	at:	https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/no-one-knows-your-strategy-not-even-your-top-
leaders/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=sm-direct	[Accessed		
September	2018]
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down	the	organisation	–	with	18	per	cent	of	middle	managers,	and	
13	per	cent	of	frontline	supervisors	able	to	correctly	articulate	their	
organisation’s	top	priorities.
To	address	the	issue,	they	recommend	that	senior	leaders	should	
‘focus	first	on	their	direct	reports,	making	sure	they	understand	
the	company’s	overall	strategy	and	how	their	function,	geography,	
or	business	unit	fits	into	the	bigger	picture’.	They	found	that	only	
half	of	the	senior	executives	who	reported	directly	to	a	top	team	
member	said	that	their	boss	consistently	explained	how	their	goals	
supported	the	organisation’s	overall	agenda.
They	argue	that	leaders	at	all	levels	must	be	able	to	articulate	
why	their	priorities	matter,	both	in	terms	of	the	team	and	wider	
organisation.	In	their	survey,	this	was	the	single	best	predictor	of	
strategic	alignment.	
The experience of leading a gritty, arduous transformation will 
change you. Painful leadership experiences shape the leader 
you’ll become…
As	we	navigated	our	way	through	the	transformation	journey	in	
Hertfordshire,	I	often	reflected	that	I	wouldn’t	have	been	able	to	
meet	the	many	requirements	of	the	role	without	having	done	
every	single	one	of	the	very	different	jobs	I’d	done	before.	My	
time	as	a	retail	manager	before	I	went	to	university,	my	time	in	
Whitehall,	at	the	Football	Association,	PwC	and	Capita.	I	learned	
and	experienced	important,	different	things	in	each	of	those	
roles	–	and	drew	on	all	of	those	experiences	at	different	points	
in	our	journey.	
Among	that	eclectic	career	back-catalogue	were	some	particularly	
formative	experiences.	The	Civil	Service	is	a	quite	remarkable	place	
in	terms	of	the	opportunities	and	responsibilities	it	permits	you	
to	embrace	early	on	in	your	career.	I	worked	on	my	first	spending	
review	when	I	was	26	years	old.	It	was	very	clear	to	me	when	I	
joined	PwC	that	they	wouldn’t	have	been	quite	so	content	to	let	a	
26-year-old	work	on	what	was	a	£5	billion	deal	with	HM	Treasury.	
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Likewise,	starting	a	new	business	in	Capita	was	an	incredible	
experience	which	I	will	always	be	incredibly	grateful	that	my	old	
boss	–	and	hero	–	Maggi	Bell	afforded	to	me.	Capita	preferred	its	
managing	directors	to	have	a	little	more	operational	dirt	under	
their	fingernails	than	a	former	senior	civil	servant	and	big	four	
strategy	consultant	could	possibly	have	accrued.	But	Maggi	and	
other	members	of	the	Capita	Board	backed	me,	and	my	fingernails	
quickly	attracted	the	level	of	dirt	required	for	transformation.
Bennis	and	Thomas	argue	that	what	makes	a	leader	has	
something	to	do	with	the	ways	in	which	different	people	deal	
with	adversity.127	Having	interviewed	40	top	leaders	in	business	
and	the	public	sector,	they	found	that	all	‘were	able	to	point	
to	intense,	often	traumatic,	always	unplanned	experiences	
that	had	transformed	them	and	had	become	sources	of	
their	distinctive	leadership	abilities’.	They	call	these	defining	
experiences,	‘crucibles	of	leadership’	after	the	containers	that	
medieval	alchemists	used	to	turn	base	metals	into	gold.
They	define	these	crucibles	as,	‘a	transformative	experience	through	
which	an	individual	comes	to	a	new	or	altered	sense	of	identity’	
and	note	that,	‘it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	then	that	one	of	the	
most	common	types	of	crucibles	we	documented	involves	the	
experience	of	prejudice….	For	all	its	trauma	…	the	experience	of	
prejudice	is	for	some	a	clarifying	event.	Through	it	they	gain	a	
clearer	vision	of	who	they	are,	the	role	they	play,	and	their	place	in	
the	world.’	Other	crucibles,	they	suggest,	‘illuminate	a	hidden	and	
suppressed	area	of	the	soul…	involving	for	instance,	episodes	of	
illness	or	violence.’	Not	all	crucibles	are	traumatic,	though;	‘they	
can	involve	a	positive,	if	deeply	challenging,	experience	such	as	
having	a	demanding	boss	or	mentor’.	
From	their	research,	Bennis	and	Thomas	conclude	that	great	leaders	
possess	four	essential	skills	–	which	happen	to	be	the	same	skills	
required	for	a	person	to	find	meaning	in	what	could	be	debilitating	
experience:	the	ability	to	engage	others	in	shared	meaning;	a	
127	Bennis,	W.	and	Thomas,	R.	J.	2002.	Crucibles of leadership.	Available	at:	https://hbr.org/2002/09/
crucibles-of-leadership	[Accessed	September	2018]
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distinctive	and	compelling	voice;	a	sense	of	integrity,	including	a	
strong	set	of	values;	and,	most	‘importantly,	they	suggest,	adaptive	
capacity,	i.e.	‘an	almost	magical	ability	to	transcend	adversity,	with	
all	its	attendant	stresses,	and	to	emerge	stronger	than	before’.
This	capacity,	they	argue,	is	itself	composed	of	two	qualities:	first,	
the	ability	to	grasp	context,	weigh	different	factors	and	put	a	
situation	into	context;	and	second,	what	they	call	hardiness	–	the	
perseverance	and	toughness	that,	‘enables	people	to	emerge	from	
devastating	circumstances	without	losing	hope’.
It’s	remarkable	how	consistent	their	assessment	is:	with	the	skills	
which	Leitch,	Dawson	and	Lancefield	identify	in	transformational	
leaders;	with	the	role	which	Quinn	and	Thakor	describe	for	the	
leader	in	connecting	an	organisation	to	its	purpose;	which	Hill,	
Mellon,	Laker	and	Goddard	describe	for	the	architect	that	will	most	
likely	succeed	in	their	transformation	of	a	school;	and,	which	Dean	
describes	with	respect	to	leaders’	support	for	their	senior	team.	
It’s	certain	that	my	time	in	Hertfordshire	was	the	most	important	
crucible	of	my	leadership	career	to	date.	The	preparation	of	this	
piece	has	been	incredibly	powerful	for	me	in	reflecting	on	my	
experience,	understanding	how	I	led	HLG	and	how	I	will	lead	my	
next	mission.	
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Conclusions 
Government does know what serious and impactful 
intervention in poorly performing education institutions looks 
like. Its failure to do so in further education is a choice…
Before	offering	some	conclusions	from	this	piece,	I	want	to	share	
one	last	case	study	from	beyond	the	further	education	sector.	In	
2002,	the	DfES	launched	the	London	Challenge	to	improve	the	
performance	of	schools	in	Tower	Hamlets,	Newham,	Lewisham,	
Hackney	and	Westminster	–	some	of	the	worst-performing	
areas	in	the	country.	The	objectives	of	the	programme	were	to:	
raise	standards	in	the	poorest-performing	schools;	narrow	the	
attainment	gap	between	pupils	in	London;	and	to	create	more	
Good	and	Outstanding	schools.
The	programme	had	three	core	elements:	a	focus	on	a	group	of	
around	30	priority	schools	with	the	worst	performance;	work	
with	‘key	boroughs’	where	there	were	systemic	failings	in	local	
school	performance;	and	a	commitment	to	investing	in	improving	
leadership.	Interventions	and	support	included	highly	experienced	
former	school	leaders	acting	as	advisers	to	support	the	schools;	
generous	allocations	of	funding	which	advisers	could	quickly	deploy	
for	discrete	and	tailored	interventions;	and	the	forensic	use	of	data	
to	drive	improvement.	
As	a	result	of	the	London	Challenge:	London	schools’	Key	Stage	
4	results	went	from	being	among	the	worst	to	the	best	in	the	
country;	London	had	the	smallest	attainment	gap	in	the	country	
for	pupils	in	receipt	of	free	school	meals;	and,	by	2010,	Ofsted	rated	
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30	per	cent	of	London	schools	as	Outstanding.128	The	legacy	of	
the	programme	is	still	visible.	At	the	end	of	2016/17,	91	per	cent	
of	London	secondary	schools	were	rated	Good	or	Outstanding	by	
Ofsted;	the	highest	proportion	of	any	region	in	the	country.129
I	share	this	example	for	one	reason.	Government	knows	what	
serious,	effective,	improvement	intervention	in	the	education	sector	
looks	like.	That	we	have	not	seen	a	similar	programme	in	relation	
to	poorly	performing	further	education	colleges	is	a	matter	of	
prioritisation	through	successive	policy	and	spending	processes.	
If	government	was	super-serious	about	improving	colleges,	they	
would	both	boost	funding	and	intervene	more	fundamentally	when	
organisations	are	not	performing	to	the	required	standard.	
Particularly since the pivotal summer of 2015, transforming a 
poorly performing further education college has become an 
exercise in beating the odds, and the system… 
In	Chapter 1,	I	tried	to	give	a	sense	of	how	incredibly	difficult	it	is	to	
run	a	further	education	college.	Beyond	the	challenges	associated	
with	delivery	of	any	public	service,	colleges	have,	and	continue	to	
face,	a	particular	combination	of	challenges	with	respect	to	their	
policy	and	funding	context.	I	believe	that	these	pressures	passed	a	
tipping	point	in	the	summer	of	2015.	My	point	of	view	in	preparing	
this	piece	has	therefore	been	that	the	successful	transformation	of	
a	further	education	college	has	become	an	exercise	in	beating	the	
odds	and,	to	a	very	real	degree,	the	system.	To	quickly,	substantially	
and	sustainably	improve	curriculum	and/or	financial	performance,	
leaders	need	to	get	pretty	much	everything	right.
In	baseball	there	is	the	concept	of	a	‘perfect	game’	–	one	in	which,	
over	the	course	of	all	nine	innings,	a	given	pitcher	does	not	allow	
the	opposing	team	to	hit	the	ball,	let	alone	get	to	first	base,	score	
any	runs	or	home-runs.	In	over	200,000	games	of	professional	
128	Institute	for	Government.	2018.	Implementing the London Challenge.	Available	at:	www.
instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Implementing%20the%20
London%20Challenge%20-%20final_0.pdf	[Accessed	September	2018]
129	Ofsted.	2018.	Data view.	Available	at:	https://public.tableau.com/profile/ofsted#!/vizhome/
Dataview/Viewregionalperformanceovertime	[Accessed	September	2018]
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baseball	played	through	to	the	summer	of	2015,	there	had	been	23	
perfect	games	pitched.	While	the	odds	of	successfully	transforming	
a	struggling	further	education	college	are	better	than	that,	I,	and	
many	others,	can	confirm	that	it	doesn’t	feel	like	it	when	you’re	
leading	such	an	effort.
My conclusion is that to transform poorly performing colleges 
leaders should adopt a purpose-led, people-oriented, 
programmatic and insight-driven approach…
Leverage the power of purpose to inspire the transformation 
Colleges	have	in	common	a	profoundly	important	–	and	energising	
–	purpose.	Leaders	should	look	beyond	a	transactional	view	of	the	
employment	relationship	and	leverage	that	purpose	to	engage,	
galvanise	and	help	guide	colleagues	through	the	transformation.	A	
focus	on	purpose	and	engagement	can	be	particularly	powerful	in	
helping	leaders	build	a	cadre	of	aligned,	empowered	and	effective	
middle-managers	who	can	drive	improvement	in	their	areas.
Devise a genuine, long-term strategy to guide the 
transformation
Colleges	are	complex,	dynamic	organisations	operating	in	a	frenetic	
sector	context.	Their	successful	transformation	requires	that	leaders	
posit	a	clear,	simple,	genuinely-strategic	and	long-term	strategy	to	
guide	the	transformation	into	the	medium-term.	Such	a	strategy	
must:	properly	diagnose	the	issues	and	challenges	which	need	to	be	
addressed;	set	out	a	clear,	workable	guiding	policy	to	address	those	
issues;	and	define	clear	actions.	
Establish a thorough, insightful, understanding of the  
baseline position
Whatever	the	moment	which	sparks	the	transformation	–	whether	
an	Ofsted	inspection,	Commissioner	intervention	or	change	of	
chief	executive	–	it	is	vital	that,	in	setting	strategy,	leaders	establish	
a	thorough,	insightful	understanding	of	the	baseline	position.	
That	baselining	exercise	should	include,	at	least:	detailed	analysis	
of	curriculum	and	financial	performance	information;	a	review	
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of	regulatory	and	contractual	compliance;	extended	staff	and	
stakeholder	engagement;	and	some	form	of	curriculum	quality	
review	exercise.
Chart your own course through constant changes in 
government policy 
Government	policies	relevant	to	further	education	change	pretty	
much	constantly.	It	is	barely	possible	to	run	a	strong	and	stable	
college	–	let	alone	transform	one	–	while	also	responding	to	every	
new	announcement	coming	out	of	Whitehall.	In	setting	strategy,	
leaders	should	chart	their	own	course	in	the	context	of	obvious	
medium-term	trends	in	government	policy,	like:	the	importance	of	
skills	to	productivity;	the	desire	to	give	employers	greater	influence	
over	the	system;	the	focus	on	student	progression;	and	the	
commercialisation	of	the	sector.	
Make a lived reality of organisational values to build a  
culture of high performance
Along	with	a	focus	on	purpose	and	a	clear	strategy,	organisational	
values	create	a	platform	for	organisational	change	–	and	a	
way	of	working	to	realise	it.	Much	like	purpose,	values	are	
often	underutilised	as	a	lever	for	change;	also,	like	purpose,	an	
organisational	focus	on	values	starts	with	the	conduct	and	
decisions	of	the	organisations’	most	senior	leaders.	Where	leaders	
model	the	right	ways	of	working	and	decision-making,	others	will	
more	likely	follow	suit,	helping	to	build	the	culture	of	purpose	and	
performance	required	for	transformation.
Unleash and grow the talent of colleagues already in  
the organisation
Leaders	often	assume	that	to	change	the	performance	they	need	
to	change	the	people.	I	would	encourage	leaders	to	flip	their	
presumption	and	assume	that	by	engaging	authentically	with	
colleagues	about	purpose,	setting	a	clear	strategy,	making	a	lived	
reality	of	organisational	values	–	and	by	investing	seriously	in	
staff	training	and	development	–	they	will	be	able	to	unleash	and	
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grow	the	talent	of	colleagues	already	in	the	organisation.	These	
leadership	investments	have	the	potential	to	deliver	transformed	
engagement	and	performance.
Provide colleagues with a clear, simple, architecture for  
the transformation 
Leaders	should	–	not	least	by	focusing	on	purpose	and	setting	
good	strategy	–	create	umbrellas	which	shelter	colleagues	from	
the	complexity	of	the	external	environment,	so	they	can	focus	on	
the	transformational	task	in	hand.	They	need	also	to	find	simple,	
accessible	ways	to	communicate	the	shape	and	emphasis	of	the	
transformation	to	colleagues,	so	they	can	easily	see	how	it	affects	
them	–	and	what	it	requires	of	them.	By	giving	shelter,	constancy	
and	clarity,	leaders	create	reasonable	roles	in	an	unreasonable	
context	–	such	that	they	can	reasonably	expect	that	colleagues	will	
deliver	the	required	contribution	to	the	transformation.
Proportionately apply programme management and process 
excellence techniques
One	of	the	most	important	things	that	leaders	can	do	to	bring	
structure	and	clarity	is	to	proportionately	apply	the	principles	
of	programme	management	and	process	excellence	to	their	
transformation.	That	means:	using	programme	management	
techniques	to	devise	and	drive	the	transformation	as	a	programme	
of	work;	using	programme	management	and	‘version	control’	
to	punctuate	the	annual	business	–	and	improvement	–	cycle;	
introducing	streamlined,	robust,	accountability	and	performance	
management	structures;	and	using	programme	and	process	
management	techniques	to	support	curriculum	improvement	–	for	
example	by	creating	a	set	of	standard	operating	procedures	for	
curriculum	management.
Establish the processes and culture required to align resources 
with priorities 
Colleges	are	now	badly	under-funded	by	government;	it	is	doubtful	
that	they	now	receive	the	resources	necessary	to	operate	in	
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business	as	usual	–	let	alone	transform.	In	that	context,	it	is	crucial	
that	leaders	operate	business-planning	and	operational-cost	
control	processes	which	ensure	that	the	resources	that	are	available	
are	aligned	with	their	transformation	priorities.	Those	processes	
must	be	supported	the	establishment	of	an	organisational	culture	
which	supports	the	same	prioritisation	–	again	this	is	a	function	of	
leaders’	focus	on	purpose.
Contain necessary commerciality to commercial job roles and 
business units
Colleges	have	responded	differently	to	the	growing	commerciality	
of	the	overall	sector	environment.	Asking	colleagues	across	the	
organisation	to	be	more	commercial	in	their	work	poses	real	risks	
to	transformations	–	confusing	colleagues’	job	roles	and	creating	
unreasonable	expectations.	Rather,	leaders	should	create	structures	
which	concentrate	commerciality	in	discrete	job	roles	and	business	
units	charged,	for	example,	with	growing	apprenticeship	levy	
revenue	–	and	freeing	curriculum	colleagues	to	focus	on		
curriculum	improvement.	
Push for a single version of the performance truth – and insight, 
not just information 
Maintaining	an	accurate,	compliant	data	set	in	a	further	education	
college	is	a	mammoth	task	in	its	own	right.	Leaders	should	
establish	a	single	version	of	the	performance	truth	for	use	at	all	
levels	in	the	organisation.	Beyond	that,	leaders	should	also	push	for	
insight,	not	just	timely	information;	such	is	the	data	that	colleges	
maintain	on	their	students,	it	should	be	possible	to	understand	–	
and	predict	–	performance	by	forensically	analysing	student	data.	
This	sort	of	analytical	approach	will	enable	leaders	and	managers	
to	sharply	focus	improvement	actions.	
Lead authentically and live the organisation’s purpose and 
values in your own conduct
The	leader	of	the	transformation	must	fundamentally	associate	
themselves	with	the	organisation’s	purpose	and	transformation.	
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Though	the	CEO	and	pincipal	labels	may	be	allocated	to	two	
or	more	leaders,	it	is	vital	that	the	most	senior	member	of	the	
executive	team	is	acutely	focused	on	–	and	on	the	hook	for	–	
curriculum	improvement.	
To	deliver	the	sort	of	purpose-led	transformation	advocated	
here,	leaders	will	need	to	engage	openly	and	authentically	with	
colleagues	at	all	levels	in	the	organisation.	They	must	be	happy	
and	able	to	guide	and	support	colleagues	in	making	operational	
decisions	in	the	context	of	the	organisation’s	purpose,	strategy	and	
values.	They	must,	therefore,	exemplify	the	organisation’s	purpose,	
strategy	and	values	in	their	own	conduct	and	decision-making.
Recognise that leading in transformation and business as usual 
are different skillsets
It	is	important	to	recognise	that	leading	transformations	is	a	
distinct	skillset,	different	in	nature	to	the	leadership	of	business	
as	usual;	neither	is	‘better’	nor	more	valuable	than	the	other	–	but	
they	are	different.	Leaders	must	ensure	that	they	–	and	their	team	
–	possess	the	requisite	expertise	in,	for	example,	operating	on	
strategic	and	operational	levels	at	the	same	time,	changing	their	
approach	and	plans	in	response	to	events.	
Even if you get everything right, the odds are still stacked  
against you…
All	of	the	above	and	more	may	not	be	enough.	Most	
transformations	fail.	Only	with	more	stability	and	support	from	
government	can	colleges	really	be	expected	to	transform	and	
sustain	their	performance	for	the	long-term.	Where	leaders	succeed	
in	delivering	transformations,	they	do	so	by	beating	the	odds,	and	
the	system.
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YOLO 
‘I’m going to die, son.’
My	life	changed	forever	when	my	dad	called	me	from	the	hospital	
car	park	to	tell	me	that	he’d	just	been	diagnosed	with	bowel	and	
liver	cancer	and	had	weeks,	maybe	months,	but	definitely	not	
years,	to	live.	It	was	early	May	2015.	I’d	been	in	post	at	HLG	for	less	
than	three	months	and	had	spent	pretty	much	all	of	that	time	in	
raw	crisis	management	mode.	It	was	a	Friday	afternoon.	I	was	sat	in	
my	new	office	in	Letchworth,	wearing	the	college	tracksuit.
I	sat	in	my	office,	alone,	for	the	couple	of	hours	it	took	my	wife	
to	get	from	central	London	to	the	college	so	that	we	could	drive	
to	my	parents’	house	in	south	Manchester.	I	farmed	a	few	emails,	
accepted	a	cup	of	tea	from	my	discombobulated	PA,	spoke	to	my	
dad	again,	and	then	farmed	a	few	more	emails.	My	wife	arrived,	
and	we	headed	for	my	parents	in	the	jalopy	I’d	just	bought	to	drive	
between	college	sites.	
I	will	never	forget	the	conversation	we	had	that	night.	My	instinct	
was	clear.	Quit	work.	Move	home.	Spend	every	day	that	dad	
had	left	with	him,	and	then	be	around	to	help	my	mum	and	
grandparents	put	their	lives	back	together	without	him.	None	of	us	
would	know	how	to	live	without	my	dad.	We’d	only	find	a	way	to	
do	it	if	we	found	it	together.	
EPILOGUE
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He	was	having	none	of	it,	insisting	that	I	carry	on	building	the	life	
and	career	that	he	had	devoted	so	much	of	his	life	to	support	me	
through.	Four	weeks	later,	I	sat	with	my	dad	when	his	consultant	
relayed	the	results	of	his	liver	biopsy.	
‘You’re	fine,	Dave.’
For	four	weeks,	we	had	lived	with	the	end	in	sight.	My	dad	was	
going	to	die.	He	started	work	at	16	and	had	retired	only	a	couple	of	
weeks	before	his	terminal	diagnosis.	Throughout	those	awful	weeks	
I	kept	thinking	about	how	cruel	it	was	that	my	dad,	the	hardest-
working	person	you	could	ever	meet,	would	be	denied	a	retirement.	
He’d	worked	so,	so	hard,	for	so	many	years;	surely,	he	deserved	a	
long	and	happy	retirement?	
I	kept	thinking	about	fishing	trips.	When	my	wife	and	I	were	on	
honeymoon	in	the	USA	(see	prologue)	we’d	been	to	Florida	Keys.	I	
knew	that	my	dad	would	love	Florida	Keys.	I	knew	that	he’d	dearly	
love	to	go	fishing	there.	We’d	talked	about	it	but	never	made	the	
time	to	do	it.	Now	we’d	run	out	of	time,	I	thought.	
When	dad	was	given	his	reprieve,	we	all	immediately	knew	that	
those	four	weeks	would	be	the	most	important	of	our	lives.	We	
knew	how	incredibly,	incredibly,	lucky	we	were.	We	all	immediately	
knew	that	the	lesson	was	clear	and	simple:	you	only	live	once.	
We	agreed	immediately	that	we’d	go	fishing	in	Florida	Keys	as	soon	
as	possible.	
Around	six	months	later,	my	grandad	passed	away.	My	dad	is	my	
hero.	My	grandad	was	my	best	friend.	He	took	me	to	Old	Trafford	
for	the	first	time	in	1985	and	to	pretty	much	every	home	game	
thereafter,	until	his	health	began	to	fade	in	the	mid-2000s.	He	was	
the	quietest,	kindest	man.	He	grew	up	in	a	tiny	village	in	Ireland	in	
the	1930s	before	cycling	to	Dublin	and	joining	the	RAF	in	1945.	He	
was	posted	to	Cheadle,	near	Stockport,	where	he	met	my	grandma.	
They	were	married	for	over	60	years	before	he	died.	
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For	years,	I’d	talked	about	visiting	the	village	with	him.	He	never	
really	liked	to	talk	about	himself,	his	life	or	where	he	grew	up.	
My	grandma	would	make	him,	sometimes,	because	she	knew	
how	much	I	wanted	to	know	more	about	where	he	was	from	
and	his	early	life.	I’ll	never	forget	the	last	conversation	we	had,	
just	a	few	days	before	he	died;	that	defining	moment	of	my	life,	
I	will	not	share	here.	I’ll	always	wish	I’d	made	the	time	to	visit	
his	home	town	with	him.	I	miss	him	every	day	and	dedicate	this	
piece	to	his	memory.	
I’m	sharing	these	parts	of	my	life	here	because	I	don’t	think	it’s	
possible	to	completely	understand	the	perspective	I’ve	offered	in	
this	piece,	why	I	decided	to	step	away	from	HLG	having	completed	
the	hardest	leg	of	the	organisation’s	journey	–	or	what	I’ve	been	
doing	since	–	without	understanding	the	seismic	impact	of	the	
above	on	my	outlook.	I	doubt	very	much	that	I	would	have	been	
brave	enough	to	leave	HLG	if	it	weren’t	for	my	dad’s	non-death	
experience	and	the	lessons	it	taught	everyone	in	my	immediate	
family	about	YOLO.	
It’s	now	well	over	a	year	since	I	left	HLG.	When	I	decided	to	leave,	I	
worried	that	I	might	come	to	regret	the	decision;	I	loved	the	place,	
the	people	–	and	our	purpose.	I	have	actually	found	it	much	easier	
than	I	feared	I	might	to	move	on	and	let	the	organisation	do	the	
same.	I	was	very	clear	that	I	didn’t	want	to	be	the	sort	of	former	
CEO	whose	lingering	presence	cast	a	shadow	over	the	desk	of	his	
successor.	Leaving	meant	leaving.	My	successor	deserved	the	time,	
space	and	latitude	to	define	his	own	agenda	–	just	as	I	had	three	
years	previous;	I	had	no	qualms	about	him	charting	a	different	
course	to	the	one	we	agreed	while	I	was	in	post.
I’ve	spent	the	last	year	living	like	YOLO.	In	January,	I	visited	
the	village	where	my	grandad	grew	up	–	and	met	his	brother	
for	the	first	time,	still	working	on	the	family	farm	in	his	80s.	
In	March,	I	set	up	MH&A	as	a	business	through	which	I	could	
work	with	interesting	clients	on	new	and	difficult	assignments	
–	crisis,	strategy,	transformation	and	growth.	I	spent	all	of	June	
and	July	travelling	around	Hawaii,	Japan,	China	and	Hong	Kong	
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with	my	wife.	Since	I	returned,	I’ve	been	as	busy	as	I’d	like	to	be	
professionally	–	growing	the	business	and	enjoying	a	wonderful	
breadth	and	variety	of	different	client	projects.	I’ve	also	continued	
to	YOLO.	I	joined	a	choir,	made	more	time	for	my	family	and	
friends,	and	as	soon	as	this	piece	has	been	published…
…I’m	going	fishing	in	Florida	with	my	dad.
	
149
Published January 2019 
The Further Education Trust for Leadership
Website: www.fetl.org.uk 
Email: enquiries@fetl.org.uk 
 @FETforL
